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Abstract
In this thesis dissertation, I study which factors drive human capital investments
at diﬀerent stages of the life-cycle by using structural dynamic behavioral models,
and what we can learn from these models in order to design better labor and ed-
ucation policies in the long-term. Over the three chapters of this work I assess
policy relevant questions that are either related to both developing and developed
countries, and I show how these methodologies can be used in conjunction with
other more traditional approaches to perform two types of policy evaluation: the
assessment of existing policies, or ex-post policy evaluation, and the prediction of
economic behavior under policies that have not been yet implemented, or ex-ante
policy evaluation. My work has two main goals. The first goal is methodological.
I show the gains of structural modeling in understanding the mechanisms behind
human capital investments, for example the disentanglement of preferences, returns
and expectations, and the importance of dynamics. I also show how these models
can be complemented and even better identified when they are combined with ex-
perimental data. The second goal is to answer some relevant economic questions
for which there are still no answers. On one hand, I study the determinants of la-
bor informality and self-employment in developing countries disentangling the role
of comparative advantage and labor market segmentation on labor informality. On
another hand, I study the determinants of parental investments in children and their
eﬀects in child development, first emphasizing the role of parental income and finan-
cial constraints, and then focusing on less investigated factors like parental beliefs
and attitudes towards child-rearing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last 20 years, the estimation of structural dynamic programming models
have widened the frontiers for empirical research in areas like labor economics and
development economics. Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) have argued that structural
models have several advantages of addressing more complex questions about indi-
vidual and household behavior that were prohibitive for reduced-form approaches.
First, provided the model is correctly identified, one can estimate policy invariant
parameters and perform counterfactual policy evaluation, either by extrapolating
reduced-form estimates out of sample, or by evaluating the impacts of policies not
yet implemented. Second, we can assess the eﬀect of dynamics by incorporating
explicitly modeling the role of expectations in optimal decisions. Third, we can
disentangle the diﬀerent mechanisms driving decisions such as preferences, finan-
cial constraints and underlying technologies in a straightforward way, as the model
provides a direct link between the economic theory and the data. And finally, in
the context of policy evaluation, we can control for unobserved heterogeneity in re-
sponses to treatment among observationally identical people, if we account for the
fact that using diﬀerent IV deliver might deliver diﬀerent treatment parameters.
In this thesis dissertation, I study which factors drive human capital investments
at diﬀerent stages of the life-cycle and which types of labor and education policies
enhance human capital accumulation in the long-term, by using structural dynamic
behavioral models. Over the three chapters of this work I assess policy relevant ques-
tions that are either related to both developing and developed countries, and I show
how these methodologies can be used in conjunction with other more traditional
approaches to perform two types of policy evaluation: the assessment of existing
policies, or ex-post policy evaluation, and the prediction of economic behavior un-
der policies that have not been yet implemented, or ex-ante policy evaluation.
1
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My work has two main goals. The first goal is methodological. By using struc-
tural estimation alone, or complemented with more traditional methods, I show the
gains of this methodology in understanding the importance of human capital invest-
ments over the life-cycle, with a particular focus in developing countries (Todd and
Wolpin (2010)). First, by modeling individual and household behavior over the life-
cycle, I can exploit the dynamic components of decisions in a transparent way. That
is to say, agents have expectations about the future and they are an important part
of the current decisions. Second, by fully imposing the Human Capital Investment
theory in modeling, I can disentangle the incentives for human capital accumula-
tion driven by preferences, economic returns, and expectations. Third, I show how
these tools can be easily complemented with other advanced econometric techniques
like non-parametric estimation, gaining a deep understanding of the mechanisms
behind the data patterns. And finally, by conducting the experimental evaluation
of a large-scale policy, I show how a high degree of complementarity between struc-
tural estimation an traditional reduced-form methods for policy evaluation can be
exploited, breaking the unnecessary and artificial division in the literature between
these two-approaches. In particular, I discuss how experimental data is useful to
assess the short-term evaluation of policies, but it’s also a powerful source of identi-
fication within more sophisticated models simulating the long term eﬀects of those
policies.
The second goal is to answer some relevant economic questions about the fac-
tors driving human capital investments at diﬀerent stages of the life-cycle. The first
research question is placed on the determinants of human capital investments later
in the life-cycle and attempts to address to which extent human capital accumula-
tion and preferences are a determinant of labor informality in Latin America, and
the long-term assessments of particular educational and labor policies on the size of
the informal sector. The other two research questions are placed in understanding
the determinants of parental investments in children. The second research ques-
tion attempts to understand whether the timing of parental income and financial
constraints matter for the human capital accumulation of their children when they
become adults in Norway, while the third research question looks more at the ef-
fects of non-monetary resources on parental investments in children. By exploiting
experimental data from a large scale parenting program in Chile, I assess the role of
parental beliefs and attitudes towards child-rearing in parental behavior and early
child development.
I divide this thesis dissertation in four chapters, each related to one of the three
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research questions. In Chapter 2, I develop a dynamic discrete choice model esti-
mated with rich Chilean longitudinal data, in which individuals jointly decide on
their schooling and labor participation, to investigate the extent to which human
capital accumulation drives participation in informal labor markets. Labor markets
in Chile have been documented as being fairly competitive, and provide a unique
setting to test for the comparative advantage approach to informality. This way, I
explore three potential mechanisms: First, the importance that individuals assign to
wages relative to their valuation of non-wage sector attributes; Second, whether in-
dividuals accumulate sector-specific human capital with heterogeneous returns; and
Third, the importance of the labor market expectations driving labor and schooling
choices. Heterogeneous returns are included by modeling unobserved heterogeneity
that determine both schooling and sector-specific productivity.
Some findings are worth being discussed. Model estimates suggest that compar-
ative advantage is a more important source of selection into informal jobs than labor
market segmentation. I find that human capital accumulation and preferences for
job amenities explain up to 75% of transitions between the informal and the for-
mal sector, and the importance of comparative advantage is increasing in education.
Second, I test for the importance of labor market expectations and persistency by
simulating the eﬀect of a recently implemented 20% wage subsidy in formal jobs tar-
geted at workers between 19 and 26 years old. I find that the subsidy would not only
be eﬀective in decreasing informality among the targeted groups, but the incentives
to informality also decrease for younger workers (those between 15 to 18 years old).
The reduction in informality rates as a consequence of the subsidy would remain
persistent until after the age of 40. Furthermore, I find evidence that human capital
diﬀers across sectors. High School returns are larger in the formal sector; there is a
wage premium to College in the informal sector; and skills acquired in the formal
sector in the form of labor experience are more transferable to the informal sector
than the other way around. Preferences are also heterogeneous. More educated in-
dividuals assign more importance to non-wage sector attributes, particularly in the
formal sector, while less educated individuals value higher wage returns, particularly
in the informal sector.
Chapter 3 is based on a co-authored paper with Pedro Carneiro (UCL), Kjell Sal-
vanes (Norwegian School of Economics) and Emma Tominey (York University). In
this investigation, we analyze whether the timing of parental income shocks matters
for the process of skill accumulation of children beyond the importance of perma-
nent income. Using rich longitudinal administrative data for 500,000 individuals in
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Norway, we develop parametric and semi-parametric estimation of how the timing
of parental income matters for diﬀerent outcomes measured when their children are
in their early 20s. The main finding of the paper is that, for a given level of perma-
nent parental income, balanced income profiles lead to higher levels of education of
the child than income profiles subject to several fluctuations. This is because it is
better to smooth investments in children than to suﬀer large fluctuations (which are
a consequence of income shocks). This result also holds for related outcomes like
high school dropout and college enrolment. For other outcomes, such as earnings,
IQ, or teenage pregnancy, the picture can be slightly diﬀerent, indicating diﬀerences
in the production function for diﬀerent outcomes. In terms of magnitudes, although
permanent income is more relevant in the production function of human capital
outcomes, the timing of income also matters. Increases in permanent income of
£100,000 would increase child earnings by age 30 in 10% and would increase school-
ing attendance in 0.5 years, while if parents were able to shift the same amount from
when the child is in middle childhood (6-11 years old) to early childhood (0-5 years
old), earnings by age 30 would increase 5% and schooling attendance would increase
by 0.25 years. To interpret our findings we complement the non-parametric approach
estimating models of parental investment in children with more than one period of
childhood, where we emphasize borrowing constraints, uncertainty about income
shocks, and parental preferences about own consumption and the human capital of
their children. Model estimations do explain the data findings. In particular, they
show that income shocks are transmitted into investment decisions because of the
eﬀect of borrowing constraints and income uncertainty, and because the technology
of skill formation is highly complementarity in investments across diﬀerent periods
of childhood.
Chapter 4 is based on a work-in-progress co-authored paper with Pedro Carneiro
(UCL), Miguel Cordero (U Bristol), Emanuela Galasso (World Bank) and Paula
Bedregal (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile). It discusses the use Random-
ized Control Trial methods combined with dynamic behavioral models of parental
investments in children to assess the importance of parental beliefs and attitudes to-
wards child-rearing in parental cognitive and non-cognitive stimulation and several
measures of child development. The experimental data is extracted from a large-
scale parenting program in Chile aiming at modifying parental beliefs about how to
raise their children and their perceived self-competence as parents. The evaluation
was designed and implemented by the authors, and we collect pre and post-treatment
data from a sample of more than 3,000 households. The investigation has several
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innovations: First, it looks at multiple dimensions of parental beliefs, mixing scales
borrowed from the literature of psychology of child development and instruments
created to elicit parental perceptions, diﬀerent dimensions of parental investments,
and several dimensions of child cognitive and non-cognitive development. Second,
we exploit the exogenous variations of beliefs provided by the intervention to esti-
mate treatment eﬀects accounting for measurement error by using a dynamic factor
model. Third, we decompose treatment eﬀects by using the theory of mediation
analysis to investigate indirect eﬀects of beliefs on child outcomes through changes
in parental behavior, and direct changes through changes in the productivity of
investments. Finally, we use the experimental data and the elicitation of parental
beliefs to separately identify key preference and expectations parameters of a model
of parental investments in children in which parents face uncertainty in the returns
of the technology of skill formation. Our target is to use the estimated structural
parameters to assess the long-term eﬀects in child development of counterfactual
policies, with an accent in cost-eﬀectiveness. Preliminary baseline data indicates
that parental beliefs are indeed at the root of the socioeconomic gradients we also
find in child outcomes and parental investments, and we find some evidence that
beliefs potentially impact child outcomes through the two proposed channels. We
are currently collecting the follow-up data, and we will be able to estimate treatment
eﬀects by October 2014.
The last chapter is a companion chapter which presenting my research agenda in
the study of the phenomenon of Labor Informality and Self-employment in develop-
ing countries. In this work, I propose a new behavioral model to understand these
phenomena of labor markets in developing countries but from a family perspective,
in the context where the labor supply, consumption and family formation are all
decisions that happen simultaneously. This framework will allow me in the near fu-
ture to understand gender-specific patterns of labor informality and self-employment
both for single and married households, and investigate diﬀerent potential mecha-
nisms determining the structure of labor markets like comparative advantage, the
pension and the welfare system, and intra-household specialization. The final pur-
pose of estimating such a model relies on using the model to perform ex-ante policy
simulations of alternative ongoing reforms to labor markets and to the educational
system in Latin America, for which there is no evidence of their long-term potential
impacts.
Chapter 2
Human capital and labor informality
2.1 Introduction
The phenomenon of informal labor markets in developing economies has been one
of the main concerns for economists and policy-makers during the past decade. Ac-
cording to Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007), nearly 40% of the labor force in Latin
America is informal, ranging from lower bounds of 25% in the cases of Chile and
Uruguay, to upper bounds of 60% in the cases of Peru and Colombia. The infor-
mal sector often comprises small-scale, self-financed and unskilled labor intensive
activities, and workers in this sector tend to be younger and less educated (Mal-
oney (1999)). Given that informal activities are fairly widespread across diﬀerent
industries and economic activities, Amaral and Quintin (2006) and Moscoso Boedo
and D Erasmo (2013) argue that we can characterize the formal and the informal
sectors as having two diﬀerent production functions. Formal firms not only tend
to be larger, but also have larger capital/ labor ratios, higher levels of technology,
and demand labor that is more skilled. As a consequence, the formal sector tends
to operate at larger ranges of productivity, while wages are also larger (Meghir,
Narita, and Robin (2012)). Furthermore, Levy (2010) argues that, in order to avoid
costly labor regulations and contributions, informal firms distort their size and tend
to operate with suboptimal combinations of capital and labor given the technology
available. Since labor and capital are misallocated, observationally similar workers
can be considered as less productive in the informal sector. They are also paid lower
wages and are not covered by social security. Considering this, there has been a
wide consensus that informal labor is composed of workers who, voluntarily or not,
do not contribute to the social security system.
Most of the debate on the phenomenon of labor informality has focused on under-
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standing whether individuals choose to work informally based on their comparative
advantage, or on the contrary, whether this is the result of exclusion driven by seg-
mented labor markets that impose barriers to mobility, in particular towards the
formal sector. If markets are competitive, then workers optimally decide on their
sector of employment based on their skills and preferences for job attributes like au-
tonomy, independence, or the possibility of avoiding costly taxes and contributions.
In light of this, policies changing labor market incentives in favor of one par-
ticular sector would influence the expected rewards of forward-looking individuals
and encourage them to accumulate human capital in the sector with the largest ex-
pected benefits. Moreover, educational policies facilitating schooling participation
could potentially change the incentives for informal labor participation depending
on how schooling is rewarded across sectors. In contrast, if barriers to mobility cre-
ated by poorly designed labor policies prevent workers from choosing jobs according
to their skills and preferences there will be little role for policies tackling informality
from a human capital accumulation perspective. The evidence from Latin American
countries seems rather mixed. While authors like Pagés and Stampini (2007) pro-
vide some evidence of labor market segmentation, authors like Perry (2007), Levy
(2010), Magnac (1991) and Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007) claim that workers
self-select into informal jobs based on their comparative advantage.
In this paper, I contribute to this debate by studying, from a dynamic perspec-
tive, the extent to which comparative advantage drives participation in informal
labor markets. I develop a life-cycle model in which individuals that are heteroge-
neous in their skills and preferences make decisions about both their schooling and
labor market participation into either formal and informal jobs, or non-employment.
For this purpose, I explore several mechanisms. First, some authors have noted that
in addition to their wages, people might also value some non-wage attributes of a
job, which sometimes even compensate them for potentially lower pay (Maloney
(2004)). For example, workers who decide to be informal may attach more value to
flexibility, autonomy, or the possibility of avoiding paying taxes and contributions,
from which they derive little value; while workers in the formal sector may attach
more value to the fringe benefits associated with a formal contract. Considering
this, I attempt to disentangle the relative importance of wage returns from prefer-
ences for sector amenities driving selection into formal and informal jobs, and study
whether these valuations vary across education. Second, if the formal and informal
sectors can be defined as having diﬀerent production functions, then individuals
will accumulate sector-specific human capital and the returns to diﬀerent types of
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skills should diﬀer across sectors. Moreover, people might have certain unobserved
skills that are more productive in one particular sector, making these returns het-
erogeneous. Consequently, I study whether individuals accumulate diﬀerent human
capital across sectors by breaking down wage diﬀerences into sector-specific returns
to abilities, schooling, and accumulated experience in several sectors. Third, there
is little knowledge of the importance of labor market expectations and dynamics
driving both school attendance and labor market participation in the context of an
economy with both a formal and an informal sector. That is, if individuals can
foresee the existence of two large sectors with potentially diﬀerent wage returns and
job amenities, the assessment of the importance of labor market expectations be-
comes relevant for the design of policies in the long-term. Finally, I use the model
to further study the existence of barriers to mobility across sectors that cannot be
explained by skills and preferences, relying on the estimation of transition costs.
Based on these mechanisms, my work contributes to the literature in four dif-
ferent ways. First, I develop a life-cycle structural model building on a Roy model
extended to endogenous schooling (Willis and Rosen (1979)), and also extended
to compensating wage diﬀerentials (Killingsworth (1987)), which I estimate with
rich Chilean longitudinal data from a nationally representative sample of house-
holds over the period 1980-2009. This approach has important advantages. First of
all, it emphasizes dynamics in the decision-making process. Workers may acquire
more or less schooling and might change their choice of sector, weighting up current
and expected returns from labor markets in dual economies. Additionally, a struc-
tural model can shed light on which components of comparative advantage matter
more for choices (e.g. abilities, schooling, sector experience, personal preferences).
Finally, a structural estimation can also shed light on the presence of barriers to mo-
bility that cannot be explained by skills and preferences by estimating the transition
costs of moving across sectors. Addressing these issues using the more traditional
approaches previously employed in the literature has several limitations. Some au-
thors have attempted to test for the comparative advantage approach by using wage
diﬀerentials (Maloney (1999), Yamada (1996)). However, as Magnac (1991) notes,
wage diﬀerentials might fail to test for selection based on comparative advantage, if
workers choose informal jobs based on utility diﬀerences associated with non-wage
sector attributes. In contrast, a structural approach allows the disentanglement of
preferences for non-wage attributes from the observed patterns of choices and wages.
Other authors have proposed the study of mobility across sectors as a more reliable
test (Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007), Bosch and Maloney (2007)). However, as
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Pagés and Stampini (2007) argue, in an environment where workers are continu-
ously facing idiosyncratic and industry-specific shocks that require job reallocation,
it is still possible to observe mobility in non-competitive labor markets. On the
contrary, a structural model enables the simulation of choices within an economy
in which workers who have heterogeneous skills and preferences continuously face
preference and productivity shocks.
Second, to my knowledge there is little evidence in the literature linking par-
ticipation in informal labor markets with schooling decisions. Arbex, Galvao, and
Gomes (2010) study selection into education and informal jobs in Brazil and find
evidence that education is endogenous. However, their approach does not account
for dynamics and sector-specific skill accumulation, while these elements are an
important source of selection in my findings. In this regard, Pagés and Stampini
(2007) study the extent to which education is a passport to accessing better jobs,
by analyzing labor market segmentation in three Latin American countries, em-
ploying wage diﬀerentials and mobility across sectors using longitudinal data. They
find evidence of a formal wage premium when these jobs are compared to informal
salaried jobs, but no evidence of a formal wage premium when they are compared to
self-employment. Nevertheless, in their approach schooling is considered exogenous.
Third, diﬀerent authors have stressed the importance of heterogeneity when test-
ing for comparative advantage and labor informality. Even when considering the
average wage oﬀer to be larger in the formal sector, sector-specific comparative
advantage may be driven by heterogeneous skills and tastes; hence for some work-
ers, it is more profitable to be informal. For instance, unobserved skills such as
entrepreneurial ability may drive selection into informal jobs associated with self-
employment activities. Therefore, I explicitly incorporate permanent unobserved
heterogeneity in the form of initial endowments that can be rewarded diﬀerently in
each sector, with the immediate consequence that wage returns across sectors are
heterogeneous. These initial endowments, modeled with discrete and finite unob-
served types (Heckman and Singer (1984)), jointly determine school attendance and
sector-specific productivity.
I use the structural estimates for returns, preferences and mobility costs to an-
swer two main questions. First, I assess the degree to which comparative advantage
drives labor informality relative to market segmentation. I find that human capital
accumulation and preferences for job amenities explain up to 72% of transitions be-
tween the informal and the formal sector for individuals with less than High School,
while labor market segmentation only accounts for 28%. The contributions of com-
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parative advantage are decreasing in education (76% for High School degrees, and
83% College). Second, I test for the importance of labor market expectations and
persistency in individual decisions. In doing so, I simulate the eﬀect of a recently
implemented 20% wage subsidy in formal jobs targeted at workers between 19 and
26 years old, and I find that the subsidy would not only be eﬀective in decreasing
informality among the targeted groups, but the incentives to informality also de-
crease for younger workers (those between 15 to 18 years old). The reduction in
informality rates as a consequence of the subsidy would remain persistent until after
the age of 40.
Other estimation results are important to be highlighted. First, both wage re-
turns and non-wage job attributes drive choices, but their relative importance varies
across education levels. Individuals not completing secondary education value wages
more than individuals at higher education levels, who tend to assign a larger relative
valuation to non-wage attributes of jobs. Individuals with higher education assign
a similar valuation to wages, but tend to value relatively more the associated fringe
benefits oﬀered by formal jobs. On the contrary, individuals with low education
assign a larger valuation to wage returns in the informal sector. Second, individuals
accumulate diﬀerent types of human capital across formal and informal jobs, and the
returns to these skills are heterogeneous. Returns to finish High School are larger in
the formal sector, while there is a wage premium for College in the informal sector.
Finally, the returns to formal experience are positive in both the formal and informal
sectors, while informal experience has positive returns only in informal activities.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short literature review on
the theoretical background of informality and its link to the Chilean context; Section
3 describes the surveys and provides the main data descriptives; Section 4 describes
the modeling framework; Section 5 discusses the estimation and the identification
strategy; Section 6 discusses the estimation results and policy simulations; and
Section 7 is the conclusion.
2.2 Background and Related Literature
The traditional perspective on why informal labor markets dates from Harris and
Todaro (1970) and the ILO (1972)1. In this approach, informality is the result
of barriers to entry to the formal sector caused by stringent labor regulations like
binding minimum wages and segmented labor markets. Magnac (1991) defines labor
1International Labor Oﬃce. 1972. Incomes, Employment and Equality in Kenya. Geneva.
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market segmentation as a characteristic of dual labor markets in which the rewards
in diﬀerent economic sectors may diﬀer for workers with equal potential productivity
and the entry of workers to the formal sector is rationed. One implication of this view
is that identical workers will achieve larger benefits in the formal sector, and that
they are paid larger-than-equilibrium wages. A second implication is that workers
never switch voluntarily from a formal to an informal job.
Recent work has questioned the traditional view of informal work as the dis-
advantaged sector (Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007), Bosch and Maloney (2007),
Maloney (1999)). In this literature, workers choose their sector of employment
based on vocational choices and their comparative advantage to work in a more en-
trepreneurial sector. Thus, informality status may be driven by choice rather than
exclusion (Perry (2007)). Under this view, labor markets are competitive, there are
no barriers to mobility across sectors, and the formal and the informal sectors are
symmetrical, equally desirable, and competitive with diﬀerent production functions.
Levy (2010) proposes a more nuanced view of the comparative advantage approach,
recognizing that labor markets are not necessarily competitive and that costly labor
regulations cause some distortions. He argues that the informal sector is less pro-
ductive than the formal sector because there is a misallocation of capital and labor
across the sectors produced by badly designed social policies, such as social protec-
tion programs for the poor, which induce a higher than optimal rate of firms and
workers operating informally. On the one hand, firms optimize given the constraints
imposed by labor regulations, so in order to operate formally they pay higher labor
costs, are more productive and have better technology. Complementarity of skills
and technology means that in equilibrium formal firms demand more skilled workers.
On the other hand, workers choose employment optimally but this is constrained
by their skills and their tastes for non-wage sector attributes like autonomy, flexi-
bility, or the possibility of evading taxes and social security contributions (Maloney
(2004)).2
Most of the evidence in Latin American countries supports the comparative
advantage approach to informality. Analyzing wage diﬀerentials, Maloney (1999) for
Mexico and Yamada (1996) for Perú find little evidence that formal workers have
2Moscoso Boedo and D Erasmo (2013) develop a macroeconomic model of TFP with capital
imperfections calibrated with data from developing countries, and find that countries with a low
degree of debt enforcement and high costs of formalization are characterized by low allocative
eﬃciency and a larger informal sector, lower productivity, and lower stocks of skilled workers.
Paula and Scheinkman (2007) develop and test an equilibrium in which they show that managers
in formal firms have higher levels of ability and choose a higher capital-labor ratio than informal
entrepreneurs.
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higher earnings than the self-employed. Moreover, they find evidence of positive
selection into micro-entrepreneurial activities. But as Magnac (1991) notes, testing
for competitive labor markets by comparing observed or potential wages is incorrect
because of selection bias; workers might have specific skills in each sector. Instead,
he tests for segmentation using data for females in Colombia by incorporating entry
costs into a standard Roy Model, and finds that the assumption of competitive
labor markets cannot be rejected. One limitation of his approach is that if utility
depends on the non-wage-related attributes of jobs in each sector, segmentation is
no longer testable using a Roy model but should be tested using a compensating
wage diﬀerentials model. Pagés and Madrigal (2008) use job satisfaction data from
three low-income countries to assess the extent to which diﬀerent types of informal
jobs provide compensating amenities. They find a large degree of heterogeneity
of job valuation within informal jobs and across formal and informal jobs. For
example, within typically classified informal jobs, self-employment activities are the
most preferred, while being an informal salaried worker in a small firm is the least
preferred.
The limitations of the analysis of wage diﬀerentials have led some authors to test
for the comparative advantage approach by studying mobility across sectors.Bosch,
Goni, and Maloney (2007), Bosch and Maloney (2007) and Maloney (1999) find
substantive evidence of mobility across the formal and the informal sectors, with
higher rates among the less-skilled. Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007) argue that a
substantial amount of the informal work corresponds to voluntary entry, which is
particularly true for the self-employed. Nonetheless, they also recognize that infor-
mal salaried work may correspond closely to the standard queuing view, especially
for younger workers.Pagés and Stampini (2007) obtain similar results by developing
a benchmark mobility indicator measuring the degree of mobility that would occur
in a world in which all states are equally preferred and compare the actual rates
of mobility to that indicator to test for segmentation. They find evidence of labor
market segmentation when comparing the formal salaried to the informal salaried
jobs, whereas self-employment participation is driven by comparative advantage.
Finally, some authors have provided evidence that supports the comparative
advantage approach to informality by investigating the returns to schooling across
sectors. Amaral and Quintin (2006) and Paula and Scheinkman (2007) find het-
erogeneous returns to college education in the informal sector in Argentina and
Brazil. Arbex, Galvao, and Gomes (2010) note that in order to work informally,
skilled workers have to give up some fringe benefits associated with a formal con-
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tract. Therefore, returns to college education should be positive or at least high
enough to oﬀset the lack of benefits. Developing a two-period theoretical framework
with endogenous schooling and heterogeneous returns, tested empirically by using
IV quantile regressions with Brazilian data, they find an education premium in the
informal sector, which varies along the conditional distribution of earnings. Meghir,
Narita, and Robin (2012) develop an equilibrium search model with a formal sec-
tor and an informal sector in Brazilian labor markets, and find that on average
wages in the formal sector are higher than in the informal sector. However, informal
workers are paid more than formal workers in firms operating at the same level of
productivity.
Some important implications can be extracted from the available evidence for
modeling considerations. First, to overcome the limitations of the analysis of wage
diﬀerentials, I propose a structural estimation that considers self-selection into infor-
mal jobs and self-employment based on both wage diﬀerentials and non-wage sector
amenities, which might be valued diﬀerently for workers at diﬀerent education levels.
Second, I explicitly model transition costs in order to capture persistency in choices
found in the data, and to test for the existence of additional sources of barriers to
mobility which cannot be explained by skills and tastes. And finally, the incorpora-
tion of heterogeneous returns is a key factor to capture all the diﬀerent dimensions
of comparative advantage that have been previously discussed in the literature.
2.3 Data and institutional framework
Institutional framework
I consider the informal sector as being composed of firms that are not registered with
the authority, not paying taxes, and not either paying social security contributions
or coming under the labor laws; and by all full-time (more than 40 hours a week)
salaried and self-employed workers reporting that they are not covered by social
security contributions.
The evidence of labor market segmentation in Chile is rather scarce. Contr-
eras, Mello, and Puentes (2008)argue that Chile￿s tax system is not particularly
burdensome, and with regard to labor regulations, the Chilean dictatorship during
the 1980s strongly deregulated the labor markets, decreasing severance pay, dis-
missal costs and minimum wages, and prohibiting union activity. A reform in 1980
intended to link contributions with benefits transformed the pay-as-you-go social
security system into a full capitalization system, including pensions and health in-
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surance, making Chile the least regulated labor-market in Latin America. Heckman
and Pagés (2003) argue that the incentives for informality from social protection
programs for the poor are very small in Chile, compared to bigger economies like
Mexico, Brazil or Argentina.
Further characteristics make the Chilean labor market attractive for the study
of labor informality using a comparative advantage approach. First, social security
contributions are voluntary for the self-employed. As a consequence, the large ma-
jority of self-employed workers are informal, particularly those with lower levels of
education. Second, social security contributions and taxes are compulsory for em-
ployees, and employers are responsible for deducting them automatically from their
salaries. However, the labor protection rules can be easily avoided by small firms,
and as a result roughly half of the informal workers are salaried employees (the other
half are self-employed). Finally, Contreras, Mello, and Puentes (2008) provide some
evidence that the more educated tend to hold more formal jobs, and that participa-
tion is the result of self-selection based on skills rather than the eﬀects of barriers
to mobility, which is tested in the context of a wage diﬀerentials approach.
With regard to educational institutions, two aspects are important to highlight.
First, due to massive liberalization of the education market in 1981, private provi-
sion of schooling at both high school and college levels is very high. At tertiary level,
average tuition fees are very high and show high variability (US$2,700 a year com-
pared to an annual minimum wage of US$ 3,800). As monetary costs for schooling
are large and might greatly influence schooling decisions, I incorporate the variabil-
ity in the data on tuition fees in order to identify college choices in the modeling
framework. Tuition fees at secondary level are rather low. In the Chilean school sys-
tem three schooling systems co-exist: free public schools (50%), private subsidized
schools (43%) and private non-subsidized schools (7%). The amount of subsidies
received by the second group are as large as the cost per student that the state
spends on public schools, so the variability in the tuition fees paid by the families
in the sample is rather low to be used as a source of identification of high school
choices. For this reason, I do not include monetary costs in the preferences for high
school participation.
The surveys
The “Encuesta de Protección Social” (Social Protection Survey) is a longitudinal
survey containing four waves: 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2009. It covers a nationally
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representative sample of 14,045 individuals who are followed across the four waves
with very low attrition rates. In the first wave, individuals are asked to report their
family background, all of their educational history, and all of their labor activi-
ties from 1980 onwards, which include the type of job performed, hours of work,
whether they were paying social security contributions in that job, and their labor
status (whether they worked in a firm or were self-employed). Since female labor
participation is rather low (44%), the model is estimated for males to avoid fertility
decisions.
Direct costs to schooling like tuition fees, are not observed in the sample. In
order to simulate college choices I use a second data source, the CASEN survey,
to construct a tuition fee index by municipality and year, which is incorporated
as monetary costs into the model. This survey is nationally representative, and
among many other socio-demographic variables, households report the fees they
were entitled to pay, and any amount of subsidy provided by the state, so the total
monetary costs can be retrieved. The data is available for the years 2000, 2003, 2006
and 2009, coinciding with the panel of wages and choices used for estimation. In
order to control for potential sources of endogeneity of concurrent trends of tuition
fees and labor outcomes, the data is time and municipality detrended before being
used for the simulations.
Finally, an important drawback of the panel survey is that information on wages
is only available from 2001 onwards. As high school and college participation sharply
increased during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s in Chile, returns to school-
ing are not expected to be the same across cohorts. To overcome this data limitation,
I reconstruct the wage profiles by schooling for the oldest cohorts at younger ages
(for which I do not observe wages), by assuming that cohort eﬀects by schooling
are constant across ages. Furthermore, the model is estimated using the data for
individuals who started making choices after 1980, as it’s not possible to track sec-
tor experience in each sector for those who began their labor market participation
earlier.
In total, the panel of males consists of 4,493 individuals, with 117,003 individual-
year observations.
Data descriptives
Some data descriptives are worth showing to shed light on the main correlations and
sources of dynamics.
Figure 2.1 describes informality rates for the males by age group over the period
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of the study. Informal work is more common among the youth and the elderly, trends
which remain after controlling for cohort fixed eﬀects 3. The u-shape of informality
rates is explained by a larger amount of informal salaried work among the youth, and
increasing participation in self-employment when workers become older. Figure 2.2
also shows that informal labor participation decreases for more educated workers,
a trend which remains relatively stable over the life-cycle. These trends are similar
for women4. Remarkably, the strongest diﬀerences in informality arise between
high school degrees and lower than high school levels. Schooling diﬀerentials remain
when the informality rates are analyzed separately for the self-employed and salaried
employees. 5.
Figure 2.1: Mean Informality Rates Males
3(Figure A.1 Appendix A)
4(Figure A.2 Appendix A)
5(Figure A.3 Appendix A)
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Figure 2.2: Informality Rates by Education
Figure 2.3 compares net wages (after tax and social contributions) in a two-
sector economy. Consistent with evidence from other Latin American countries,
formal wages are always larger than their informal counterparts for all schooling
levels. However, the formal wage premium is neither constant over the life-cycle
nor across schooling levels. For high school dropouts, the average wage premium is
relatively stable for all age groups, whereas for individuals with high school degrees
and college level education the wage premium widens. This feature, and the fact
that wage profiles have diﬀerent slopes across education groups, suggest diﬀerent
underlying dynamics of sector-specific human capital accumulation, justifying the
choice of a comparative advantage approach as the modeling framework6.
6Note that wage profiles with diﬀerent slopes across education groups require the inclusion of
interactions between education and sector experience in the estimation of standard Mincerian wage
equations.
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Figure 2.3: Mean wages by education in two sectors: formal and informal employ-
ment
As discussed above,Maloney (1999) and Pagés and Madrigal (2008) indicate that
there is evidence of heterogeneity within informal jobs. The self-employed tend to
report higher levels of job satisfaction compared to the informal salaried, and they
are likely to self-select into these jobs while the informal salaried seem to face some
barriers to mobility. Figure 2.4 describes participation patterns in Chilean labor
markets. While informality among the salaried decreases over the life-cycle, self-
employment increases. As roughly 85% of the self-employed do not contribute to
the pension system, and therefore are informal, the patterns of informality described
in Figure 1.a are the result of composition eﬀects, which would be important to the
interpretation of my results. Youth informal workers are mainly salaried workers
employed in small firms, whereas the high number of informal workers among the
elderly reflects a larger proportion of self-employed. Indeed,Perry (2007) argue that
some workers with entrepreneurial abilities start their working lives as salaried em-
ployees where they accumulate capital and experience to run their own businesses
later in life. These patterns are consistent with previous evidence that informal
salaried work is less desirable than self-employment.
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Figure 2.4: Labor market participation by sector
Table 2.1 indicates that the probability of having some level of experience as
informal or as a self-employed in the sample is rather large, so there is mobility
across sectors. The fraction of workers with experience as both formal and informal,
and as self-employed workers, decreases with schooling, which is consistent with the
data for other Latin American countries reported by Perry (2007). One the one
hand, 69% of high school dropouts have labor experience both in the formal and
in the informal sectors, while these rates are lower for individuals with high school
degree and college level (52% and 40%). On the other hand, 70% of high school
dropouts have experience as salaried employees and of being self-employed, while
these rates also decrease for individuals with high school degree and college level
(32% and 13%).
Schooling Level Experience as
formal and
informal
Experience as
self-employed
and salaried
employee
LHS 69% 70%
HS 52% 32%
Col 40% 13%
Table 2.1: Fraction of workers with experience as formal/informal, and self-
employed/salaried employees
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However, once workers enter a sector, the probability of switching to another
sector is rather low, or persistency in choices is large. For example, among the
formal salaried workers, the probability of remaining in the same sector is more
than 90%. In contrast, transition rates to the formal salaried state conditional on
being informal salaried are larger, and they tend to increase for more educated
workers (9.5% for LHS, 16.6% for HS and 15.7% for College). This seems to be in
line with the idea that informal salaried work responds to the traditional view of
barriers to entry to formal jobs. Conditional on being self-employed, the probability
of moving to the formal salaried sector is 5% in average (4.2% for LHS, 5.9% for HS
and 5.4% for College), roughly twice the probability of moving to self-employment
from the formal salaried state. Finally, note that the degree of persistency in the
self-employment state is almost as large as in the formal salaried state, and much
larger than persistency in informal salaried jobs. This is consistent with the notion
that self-employment is a choice (Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007).
Less than High School High School Degree College
F I S U F I S U F I S U
F 90.1% 1.8% 2.5% 3.7% 90.7% 1.1% 2.1% 2.3% 90.8% 0.6% 1.7% 2.4%
I 9.5% 80.2% 3.7% 5.6% 16.6% 67.6% 4.9% 5.0% 15.7% 61.0% 3.9% 10.1%
S 4.2% 1.5% 89.6% 3.2% 5.9% 1.2% 84.9% 2.1% 5.4% 1.2% 83.5% 2.1%
U 12.1% 4.1% 4.3% 77.4% 20.5% 4.3% 3.8% 65.1% 18.6% 3.7% 3.9% 67.2%
Table 2.2: Transition probabilities across jobs from period t to t+ 1
2.4 The Model
The theoretical framework is an extended Roy Model allowing for endogenous school-
ing choices (Willis and Rosen (1979)) and for compensating wage diﬀerentials (Killingsworth
(1987)). I build on the literature on career paths and dynamic discrete choice mod-
els with unobserved heterogeneity proposed by Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Adda,
Dustmann, Meghir, and Robin (2013). Two important assumptions are considered
for modeling purposes. The first assumption is a partial equilibrium environment,
so I analyze workers’ decisions given the incentives provided by the current structure
of labor markets; therefore the skill rental prices are fixed and known to the indi-
vidual. Under the presence of GE eﬀects, the skill rental prices can change with the
relative supply of workers with diﬀerent types of skills, and individuals internalize
the change in returns in their decisions. Therefore, the analysis of how people react
to education and labor market incentives should be taken as middle-term responses.
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The second assumption in this particular setup is risk neutrality. The inclusion
of risk aversion has a potential eﬀect on labor supply in two cases. First, individuals
might choose to be more formal or informal and save for precautionary reasons in
response to potentially larger unemployment or income shocks inherent to one par-
ticular sector, or in the case of informal work, in response to the uncertainty of not
having a pension on retirement. However, it has been reported that in Chile savings
are zero or negative for the first four income quantiles7. And second, risk averse
workers might react to the incentives provided by the contributory pension account,
which are compulsory savings for formal workers. But as Attanasio, Meghir, and
Otero (2011b) note, these incentives are likely to aﬀect labor supply decisions only
for workers who are more than 45 years old, and they report that for males in these
age groups the eﬀects are very low (less than 1.7% decrease in formal labor partic-
ipation). Nonetheless, an interesting extension of the model is the incorporation of
risk averse individuals alongside both private and pension savings to analyze how
schooling and labor supply would change in response to credit market imperfections.
In this modeling framework, workers then choose schooling and sector partici-
pation according to their comparative advantage, but transitions across sectors are
costly, which might reflect the presence of labor market rigidities. A worker’s com-
parative advantage is a complex vector, which includes observed and unobserved
skills, and tastes for non-wage job amenities. Unobserved skills are modeled as ini-
tial skill endowments by including discrete and finite unobserved types in the fashion
of Heckman and Singer (1984). Wage oﬀers are sector-specific and are the realization
of a technology of skill production function that embodies the accumulated human
capital of an individual valued in a particular sector according to an equilibrium
rental price. The model attempts to reproduce the dynamics found in the data by
explicitly incorporating labor market expectations as part of the valuation of current
choices. In the context of a human capital investment model, this means two things.
First, past schooling and labor choices determine the accumulated level of skills,
which could be rewarded diﬀerently in each sector depending on market prices. And
second, individuals don’t know for sure the future benefits of a particular choice
in the present, but they know the distribution of shocks, so they can evaluate the
future expected rewards for every possible current choice.
It is worth stressing some model mechanisms. First, wage returns are hetero-
geneous. Therefore, the fact that formal wages are larger on average doesn’t mean
that this is true for everyone. Furthermore, conditional on schooling and sector-
7Butelmann and Gallego (2000). “Household Saving in Chile: Microeconomic Evidence”. Cen-
tral Bank of Chile.
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experience some individuals might earn more in informal salaried jobs or in self-
employment if their initial skill endowments are better rewarded in these sectors,
which reflects the fact that skill endowments are not necessarily equally produc-
tive across sectors. Second, initial skill endowments explicitly relate to schooling
choices and productivity across sectors, as skill endowments act as a proxy for the
underlying ability of the individual, which might determine self-selection into higher
levels of schooling. Third, even if the accumulated human capital of an individual
is better rewarded in a particular sector, she might end up choosing another sector
for several reasons. For example, she might value the non-wage attributes of the
job more, like the level of flexibility or autonomy, or she might face large search
or psychological costs to transition to the sector with a larger wage. Finally, these
features have important implications for understanding how people would react to
incentives. For example, the eﬀects of individual behavior of a decrease in income
taxes in the formal sector are reduced if non-monetary incentives are too important
or if schooling attainment or the choice of a sector are highly dependent on ability.
The timing of the model is as follows. Individuals make their first choice at age
14. They can achieve three education levels: “Less than High School”, “High School
Degree” or “College”. Everyone starts with primary schooling which is completed
at t = 0 (age 14). In the sample 96% of students complete this level. At every
subsequent period people decide whether to continue to the next schooling level, start
working in formal or informal jobs, or stay out of the labor market in unemployment
or home production activities. Denote m = {F, I} one of the three working sector
choices, where F =formal salaried and I =informal salaried. The choice of home
production, non-participation or unemployment is denoted by U .
2.4.1 The State Space
Denote the state space ⌦ as the set of variables that define the state-dependency of
individual utilities over time. I estimate a life-cycle model so the time dimension t
is the age of the individual. I detrend the data on wages and tuition fees to control
for macroeconomic trends, and I take out cohort eﬀects to compute data moments.
Edit is the schooling level of individual i at age t. Then Edit = {LHS,HS,Col}
or Less than High School, High School Degree level, and College level. Accordingly,
labor experience accumulates by sector.
Finally, I denote the unobserved ability by µi. Higher ability individuals self-
select more into schooling, and at the same time, people have diﬀerent sets of skills
that make them more productive in one sector than in another, driving their choices.
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For example, entrepreneurial ability might drive self-selection into informal jobs or
self-employment, while the ability to work in structured work environments might
drive self-selection into formal jobs. Both of these are known by the individual
and fixed from age 14, or t = 0. On the other hand, they are unobserved by the
econometrician and need to be estimated along with the rest of the parameters. I
incorporate permanent unobserved heterogeneity by modeling a discrete number k
of unobserved types (Heckman and Singer (1984)), so that µk is an indicator variable
for type k. The use of a discrete and finite number of types is important to make
the dynamic programming problem tractable.
2.4.2 Flow Utilities
At every period, individuals derive an instantaneous utility from attending school,
staying at home or working in an economic sector. The costs of that decision are, in
the case of schooling, foregone expected earnings or rewards from leisure/home pro-
duction. When choosing the working sector, I also allow for non-monetary rewards
coming from sector-specific job attributes.
Denote the vector of available choices at t by {Ed,m,U}. Since everyone at
t = 0 starts with Edit = LHS, people can make further schooling choices only for
High school degree or College, thenEd = {HS,Col}. Denote UEdit the instantaneous
utility of attending schooling at level Ed. Then,
UEdk,R =  
Ed
1,kµk   TCEdR   ⌘Ed
where TCEdiR is the tuition fee index constructed from household data, which
varies by schooling level Ed and municipality R. The index is constructed with
detrended costs varying over time and across municipalities in order to control for
potential concurrent trends with wages and choices. The factor load  Ed1,k represents
psychic costs or the consumption value of the schooling decision, which may capture
both heterogeneous abilities and family background which translates into financial
constraints to attending high school or college. The term ⌘Edt is a preference shock
to schooling including the non-monetary costs of school attendance not observed in
the data.
The utility of working in sector m is
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Umt,k =  
m
2,EdW
m
t,k    m3,Ed +  m4 t+  m5 t2
whereWmtk is the gross wage oﬀer the individual type k observes at age t in sector
m and dit is the choice the individual makes at age t.8Several additional terms aﬀect
sector preferences:  m2,Ed is the wage valuation, which emphasizes both the marginal
utility of income and the valuation of some sector amenities that are non-separable
in the utility function. Additional sources of heterogeneity are included in this
parameter by allowing it to vary across diﬀerent sectors and education levels.  m3,Ed
captures the worker’s valuation of non-wage sector amenities which are separable
in the utility function. One can interpret this parameter as fixed costs of working,
which are also allowed to vary by education levels. This parameter is relevant to
understand by how much individuals compensate wage diﬀerentials with non-wage
sector attributes. A quadratic function in age is also incorporated to capture the fact
that individuals at diﬀerent ages might have diﬀerent tastes for insurance and/or
labor market participation in one particular sector. The parameter capturing age
eﬀects is  m4 and  m5 .
The utility of unemployment/leisure/home production is
UUt,k =  
U
1,kµk   ⌘Ut
The reward that individual type k obtains from staying at home depends on un-
observed skills captured by  U1k, and preference shocks ⌘Ut , which is a random com-
ponent reflecting uncertainty in the valuation of leisure or home production. For
example, pregnancy can increase the valuation of unemployment for women.
Finally, the model also explicitly includes transition costs, which are explained
below in the section on value functions. These costs are required to be included in
order to match the high levels of persistence found in the data.
8In a model with risk neutral individuals and returns from the stock markets similar to the
interest rate, the timing does not matter when social security contributions such as pension re-
tirement are taken into account. To the extent that there is full capitalization, as in the Chilean
case, I consider gross wages, which in the formal sector already account for the total compensation
including social security contributions.
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2.4.3 The Wage Oﬀer
Every time individuals choose to study they forego earnings from work. Since we
have diﬀerent working sectors, every time individuals choose a sector they also forego
earnings in another sector. Wages are a function of the skill production function
Hmt,k and skill rental prices rmt . As it was specified above, skill functions vary by
sector reflect the existence of diﬀerent production functions across the formal and
the informal sector, which might translate into diﬀerent marginal productivities of
each skill component. The human capital accumulated by workers is a function of
their schooling level, their accumulated sector experience in the same sector and
across sectors, sector-specific unobserved abilities, and productivity shocks.
Wmt,k = r
m
t H
m
t,k = r
m
t f(Ed,X
F , XI , µk, ✏
m
t )
Given a functional form for the skill function (exponential in this case), the
sector-specific log wage oﬀer can be defined as follows,
lnWmt,k = ↵
m
0,kµk + ↵
m
1 HS + ↵
m
2 Col + ↵
m
3,Edln(1 +X
F
t ) + ↵
m
4,Edln(1 +X
I
t ) + ✏
m
t
where ↵m0k represents the rental price for the initial endowment in sector m for
individual type k, and captures selection across choices. ↵m1 and ↵m2 capture the
average returns to schooling levels. Since the data wage profiles by sector and
education show very diﬀerent slopes, which also vary along the life-cycle, I estimate
returns to experience varying by education level, captured by the parameters ↵m3,Ed
and ↵m4,Ed.
Finally, in order to persistency in wages from unobserved factors, I include per-
sistent productivity shocks whose sector-specific innovations are allowed to be cor-
related across sectors
✏mt = ⇢
m✏mt 1 + ⇠
m
t
⇠mt ⇠ N(0,⌃)
2.4.4 Uncertainty
The source of uncertainty in the model comes from preference and productivity
shocks. Preference shocks are modeled following an extreme value type 1 distribu-
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tion, while innovations in persistent wage shocks are normally distributed. Shocks
are important to produce mobility across all choices in t because they shape expected
utilities in each of the alternative choices from t+1 to T , aﬀecting rewards from cur-
rent choices. It is likely that innovations of productivity shocks are correlated across
choices; that is why I draw wage shocks from a multivariate normal distribution.
Sector-specific autocorrelations and the distribution of innovations are identified by
the time series properties of wage data, so these parameters are estimated along the
rest of structural parameters.
2.4.5 Recursive problem
Self-selection into schooling and jobs is based on expected earnings, which depend
on current choices. This entails non-separability over time. The model dynamics are
as follows: all individuals start at age 14 having finished primary school. This is a
fairly safe assumption as 96% of the sample actually did finish primary schooling (in
Chile primary school has eﬀectively been compulsory since 1962). Every year they
must choose whether to continue studying for an extra year of secondary schooling,
dropout and start working or, stay out of the labor force. At age 18 they must
decide whether to continue to College level or drop out of education. If they drop
out of school before the 4th level of high school then their education level stays
at Edt = LHS (Less than High School). If they dropout straight after the 4th
level of secondary school then Edt = HS (High School degree), and if they continue
studying to College level then Edt = Col (College). The maximum level of schooling
is standardized to 5 years of College. If an individual drops out at any schooling
level, she cannot go back to school, a fact that is supported by the data.
If an individual decides to switch sector, she pays a fixed cost ci,j to move from
sector i in t 1 to j in t. The purpose of these costs is to capture high levels of choice
persistence in the data, which can be driven by several factors like search costs, skill
depreciation or psychological costs of transitions. They might also capture certain
labor rigidities that could partially explain mobility rates.
Denote by ⌦t = {Edt, XFt , XIt , µk, R, ✏mt } the state space of type k at age t. R is
an additional state variable saving the municipality where the individual lived while
studying and is used to assign direct costs to schooling. This implies that in the first
two periods the model the Value Function is solved for each of the 300 municipalities
in the sample.Then the value of education at level Ed = {HS,Col} is
V Edt,k (⌦t) = U
Ed
t,k +  Emax
n
V Edt+1,k(⌦t+1), V
m
t+1,k(⌦t+1)  cEd,m, V Ut+1,k(⌦t+1)
o
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By choosing schooling individuals obtain the instantaneous utility UEdit plus the
discounted expected maximum value over the available alternatives at t+1: contin-
uing to the following schooling level, working in one of the two sectors m = {F, I},
or staying out of the labor market. Expectations are taken over the distribution
of preference and productivity shocks implied by choices. Notice that Xit+1 = Xit
when individuals choose schooling and that they pay a transition cost only when
moving to work, but not when moving to unemployment/leisure/home production.
Similarly, the value of working as a formal-employee at t is,
V mt,k(⌦t) = U
m
t,k +  Emax
n
V mt+1,k(⌦t+1), V
m0
t+1,k(⌦t+1)  cm,m
0
, V Ut+1,k(⌦t+1)
o
where it is clear that the worker cannot go back to school, and if she wants
to switch sector, she has to pay a transition cost cm,m0 . By choosing sector m,
individuals accumulate another year of experience in that sector, which translates
into an increase in the valuation of all choices rewarding labor experience in sector
m at age t+ 1.Finally, the value of unemployment/leisure/home production is
V Ut,k(⌦t) = U
U
t,k +  Emax
n
V mt+1,k(⌦t+1)  cU,m, V m
0
t+1,k(⌦t+1)  cU,m
0
, V Ut+1,k(⌦t+1)
o
where the choice of unemployment does not alter the state space for the next
period.
2.4.6 Mobility
In the model, mobility across sectors is generated by three sources. First, an indi-
vidual may switch to another sector if there is a large positive shock in the sector
she intends to move to, and the gains in productivity due to this shock and to the
returns to skills in the new sector are larger than the mobility costs and the potential
losses in the returns to skills if she stays. Second, even if the shocks and transition
costs across sectors are exactly the same, the worker might still want to switch if an
additional year of experience in the new sector is better rewarded than an additional
year of experience in the current sector. Note that experience accumulated in each
sector is potentially rewarded in all sectors with diﬀerent rental prices. Finally, mo-
bility costs across sectors might prevent individuals from switching. For example, if
at some point in the life-cycle a low-skilled informal worker faces a negative shock,
2 Human capital and labor informality 28
she might consider switching to a similar formal job as her experience would also be
rewarded in the new job. However, this decision might be prevented by unaﬀordable
entry costs, search costs, rationing, or the lack of networks, preventing movement.
2.5 Model Solution and Estimation
2.5.1 Solution Method
Dynamic discrete choice models do not have an analytical solution. Within a finite
horizon context, the model must be solved numerically using backward recursion
methods. At period T , each individual draws random shocks from the multidimen-
sional error vector (⌘T , ✏T ) and chooses the alternative that yields the maximum
instantaneous utility evaluated at every possible state space combination of school-
ing and labor histories. I assume that the terminal value function over the life-cycle
is VT+1 = 0. I denote d⇤t = {Ed,m,U} the optimal choice at every period. Then, at
period T individuals solve
d⇤T = argmax(U
Ed
T , U
m
T , U
U
T )
At period every period t, two steps are required to compute the value functions.
First, they need to evaluate expectations over t+ 1 computing the Emax functions,
where expectations are taken over (⌘t+1, ✏t+1), evaluated at every possible choice and
state space combination at t.
To solve for the fact that wage shocks in t+1 depend on the realizations of wage
shocks in t, I follow Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010) to approximate persistent
shocks in more than one dimension with innovations which are potentially corre-
lated across dimensions. They adapt Tauchen’s method (Tauchen (1986)) by using
Markov Chain processes, which they prove is an eﬃcient method provided that the
autocorrelation parameters are not close to unit root9. The evaluation of the Emax
function then involves a multidimensional numerical integration as follows,
Emax[V Edt , V
m
t , V
U
Tt] =
Z
✏t
8<:
Z
⌘t
max[V Edt , V
m
t , V
U
t /d
⇤
t 1,⌦t 1, ✏t 1]f(⌘)d⌘
9=; f(✏t | ✏t 1)d✏
9The analysis of the time series of the wage residuals show that the autocorrelation parameters
in both sectors are close to 0.9
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Where f(✏t | ✏t 1) is the transition matrix for the Markov process of wage shocks.
This matrix is a function of the autocorrelation parameters ⇢m and the variance of
wage innovations ⌃. The advantage of modeling preference shocks ⌘it with an ex-
treme value Type I distribution is that the expected value (Emax) has a closed form
expression so we can decrease the dimensions of numerical integration. Therefore,
the evaluation of the Emax function only involves the numerical integration across
the dimensions of wage shocks, which are normally distributed.
Second, I evaluate the instantaneous utilities at t   1, again for every possible
combination of the steady state at that period, drawing the error vectors (⌘t 1, ⇠t 1)
and compute the value functions at t  1: (V Edt 1, V mt 1, V Ut 1). The optimal choice at
t  1 is then obtained from
d⇤t 1 = argmax(V
Ed
t 1, V
m
t 1, V
U
t 1)
The process is then repeated in the same fashion until t = 0, where the outcome
is the evaluation of the optimal choice d⇤t for every combination of the state space
⌦t in every period.
2.5.2 Model Identification
Three aspects of model specification are worth discussing in my modeling framework.
First, the model does not suﬀer from an initial condition problem. As Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2010) note, in a model with unobserved heterogeneity, if the initial state
space varies across individuals in the sample, one needs to fully specify how the
distribution of unobserved heterogeneity changes with initial states. Initial endow-
ments in the first period of the model are likely to be correlated with observable
states. Therefore, if there is variation in the distribution of initial states in the
sample, one would need to use some parametric or non-parametric specification of
how individuals made choices in the past conditional on unobservables, and solve
it backwards until the state space becomes independent of permanent unobserved
heterogeneity. In this particular case, almost everyone in the sample finished pri-
mary school (primary schooling has been compulsory in Chile since 1962), and thus
everybody started with the same education and experience.
To identify wage returns in diﬀerent sectors, I exploit a large sample variation of
wages by sector, schooling, and sector experience, to estimate counterfactual wage
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returns. I observe data for individuals from diﬀerent cohorts, so I also exploit time
variation to reconstruct wage and participation moments by age. I control for cohort
eﬀects in sector wages to incorporate the potential variation in returns over time as
a result of merging data from diﬀerent cohorts. With regard to the identification
of unobserved heterogeneity parameters varying by type, I attempt to identify the
whole distribution of wage profiles by matching diﬀerent percentiles of sector wage
distributions by schooling.
In order to identify the preference parameters in non-working activities, Todd
and Wolpin (2010) note that one only needs to specify an exclusion restriction in
the working alternatives. In this case, observable education, sector experience, and
accepted wages are suﬃcient statistics to identify those parameters. The identifica-
tion of preference parameters in the working alternatives require further exclusion
restrictions in the non-working alternatives. I exploit the variability on tuition costs
of schooling across municipalities and years for this purpose. The CASEN survey is
a nationally representative household survey which reports the tuition costs actu-
ally paid by families at high school and college levels and any amount of subsidies
received, for each of the years 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009. I use this data
to retrieve the total tuition fees the family would have to pay at each education
level, and I construct a tuition cost index by municipality and year at each level
of education, which is incorporated as a proxy for the monetary costs in the model
simulations. I take out time and municipality dummies from the construct in order
to control for concurrent trends with wages and labor supply.
TCEdt,R =  
Ed
0 +  
Ed
1 ⇤REd +  Ed2 ⇤ t+ ⌫Edt,R
so the average residual by time is then used to simulate schooling choices
UEdk,R =  
Ed
1,kµk   ⌫EdR   ⌘Ed
Finally, in order to identify transition costs across sectors, I exploit the variation
of mobility rates by schooling that I observe in the data.
2.5.3 Estimation
I estimate the model by Indirect Inference (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault
(1993)). Meghir and Rivkin (2010) emphasize the use of simulation methods for
structural estimation, as they do not use all of the information and restrictions im-
plied by the model, given the available data, as MLE methods do, thus speeding
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up the estimation process. The accuracy of the estimated parameters depends only
on good specification of the data identifying moments, which is relatively simple in
linear models.
The idea of indirect inference is to simulate data with the model at each iteration
of the vector of structural parameters (✓)10The process starts by simulating data
from an initial vector of structural parameters (✓0), and passing both the actual
and simulated data by an auxiliary model, usually a system of linear regressions, to
generate a set of data auxiliary parameters  , and the analogous set of simulated
auxiliary parameters  (✓). At each iteration of the structural parameters✓j, Indirect
Inference optimally finds the estimates of ✓j+1that minimize the distance between the
data and simulated auxiliary parameters, until convergence is achieved. For example,
in the first iteration the set of initial simulated auxiliary estimates is  1(✓0) and the
following set of converging parameters ✓1is found by minimizing a weighted distance
between the simulated and data auxiliary parameters. The objective function at
given iteration j is given by the metric
Min✓(     j(✓))0W (     j(✓))
where W is the optimal weighting matrix. Given the large number of moments
required to identify the model, I use the diagonal of the optimal weighting function
defined by Wˆ = diag(V CV ( ) 1), which is obtained from the auxiliary estimates ,
and is suﬃcient to obtain consistent estimates. The use of a non-eﬃcient weighting
matrix has implications for the estimation of standard errors that are explained
below.
A standard selection problem involves the estimation of a set of auxiliary linear
regressions including log wage regressions and LPM models for participation both
with the actual data and the simulations. Building on this approach, I use the
following auxiliary model
10Simulating moments involves a forward recursive data generation process which uses as inputs
the initial guess of the parameter vector (✓0) , a random draw of the vector of shocks for every
individual at every age (⌘i,t, ✏i,t) , and the optimal policy function d⇤t . The forward recursion process
works as follows: in period t= 1 the optimal choice is retrieved by evaluating the policy function in
⌦1 , whereas the simulated counterfactual wages are obtained by evaluating Wm(✓0, ✏1,⌦1) . The
optimal choice d⇤1 involves individuals choosing either education, work in sector m or unemployment
in the first period, so the state space is updated accordingly for the next period accumulating
either education or sector experience, and ⌦2 is evaluated for each simulated individual. This
process is repeated until the whole sequence of choices d⇤t = [d⇤1, .....d⇤T ] and counterfactual wages
Wmt = [W
m
1 , .....W
m
T ] are obtained and used to simulate moments. I simulate data on choices and
counterfactual wages for N = 10, 000 individuals in T = 52 periods.
2 Human capital and labor informality 32
266664
lnWit
P (dit = J)
P (dit = J |dit 1 = J 0)
 lnW JJ
0
it
377775 = Z 0it  + ⌫it ⇠ N(0,⇤)
which involves estimating a log wage regression, the probability of participation
in sector J , the transition probability from sector J 0 to sector J , and the growth
of log wages across sectors, on a vector of observable variables Zit which includes
the schooling level, sector experience, age, and tuition costs. Additionally, we must
include in the set of moments the time series properties of the log wage regressions
by sector, namely the autocorrelation and the VCV matrix of the shocks innova-
tions. The vector of auxiliary parameters   to be matched are the coeﬃcients of the
auxiliary regressors ( ), and the VCV of the residuals ⇤.
Asymptotic Properties
Standard errors of the estimates are obtained by applying the asymptotic properties
of GMM estimators described in Hayashi (2000). Let Wˆ be a symmetric and positive
definite weighting matrix such that Wˆ ! W⇤as N ! 1, and let ✓(Wˆ ) the set of
estimated parameters. Under standard regularity conditions it can be shown that
the asymptotic properties of the estimators are described by
p
NT (✓(Wˆ )  ✓o)  ! N(0, avar(✓(Wˆ ))
A consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance is
[avar(✓(Wˆ )) = (d0Wˆd) 1d0Wˆ SˆWˆd(d0Wˆd) 1
where Sˆ is a consistent estimate of the VCV matrix of the data auxiliary param-
eters and where d = @ 
@b✓ is the gradient of the objective function evaluated at the
vector of estimated parameters.
The matrix Sˆ is obtained by bootstrapping methods and the gradients d are
obtained by simulation. Each of the estimated structural parameters is shocked a
suﬃciently small value ("), and partial derivatives are obtained by
d =
 (✓(Wˆ ) + ")   (✓(Wˆ ))
"
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Smoothing the Objective Function
Using Indirect Inference in discrete choice models imposes important challenges. As
Magnac, Robin, and Visser (1999) note, in discrete choice environments, objective
functions are step functions of the structural parameters, which makes the use of
derivative-based methods diﬃcult. Derivative-based methods are generally preferred
to local or global search methods because of speed and accuracy considerations. I
use the approach presented by Keane and Smith (2003) who propose the use of a
smoothing function allowing estimation by gradients.
To correct for the choppiness of the objective function, they propose an alterna-
tive system of auxiliary regressions to be used in the simulated data, which consists
in proxying dJit by a smooth function of the structural parameters obtained from
simulated value functions
gJ(✓) =
exp
 
V J(✓)/ 
 P
j exp (V
J(✓)/ )
where gJ(✓) can be interpreted as the asymptotic probability of choosing alterna-
tive J , and is a calibrated smoothing parameter. The mirroring system of auxiliary
regressions then becomes26666664
X
J
gJt ⇤ lnW Jit
gJt
gJJ
0
t
gJJ
0
t ⇤ lnW JJ 0it
37777775 = Z
0
it (✓) + ⌫it ⇠ N(0,⇤)
Note that in the simulated auxiliary system we can observe each of the counter-
factual wages.Therefore, the simulated log wages are the expected log-wages across
sectors.
Identifying Moments
In order to gain identifying power of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters, I add
to the set of auxiliary parameters the proportions of people below wage percentiles
{1.0,25,50,75 and 90} by education level and sector, and regressions of log wages by
sector on education, experience and age (Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir, and Shaw
(2013)). The set of moments involves 155 auxiliary parameters used to estimate 45
structural parameters.
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Structural Parameters Identifying Moments
A. Wage returns Log wage regressions by sector on {Ed,Xm, age, TC}
B. Shocks
Autocorrelation and variance of innovation of log wage
residuals
C. Sector preferences Participation regressions on {Ed,Xm, age, TC}
D. Transition Costs Wage growth across sectors on {Ed,Xm, age}
Transition probabilities regressions on {Ed,Xm, age}
E. Type-specific
parameters
Quantiles Log wages by sector and schooling
Table 2.3: Set of identifying moments
Table 2.3 describes the set of matching moments linked to the set of structural
parameters I attempt to identify.
Finally, besides the discussion on the model identification, I check empirically
whether the set of moments proposed actually identifies the set of structural param-
eters. I perform Montecarlo simulations using the model to generate an artificial
dataset from an arbitrary set of structural parameters, which for this exercise are
the “true” parameters. Once the artificial data is generated, I conduct the estima-
tion procedure starting from an initial guess, 20%, 40% and 100% deviated from the
“true” parameter and check for convergence. In Appendix B I show that the strategy
for model identification combined with a choice of a set of identifying moments do
a good job in identifying the “true” structural parameters.
2.6 Results
In what follows I present the estimation results organized in three sections. The
first section shows the Goodness of Fit, validating the model performance in the
replication of data patterns. In the second section I discuss the structural estimates.
I use these results to answer the first two research questions I attempt to address,
that is to say, the relative importance of preferences and wage returns for choices, and
the extent to which skill functions are diﬀerent across the formal and the informal
sectors. In the third section, I use the model estimates to assess how individuals
react to incentives in a dynamic context. By performing two simulation exercises,
here I address the third research question of the paper evaluating the eﬀects of labor
market expectations on choices. Moreover, as the counterfactual simulations are
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based on recently implemented policies by the Chilean Government, the predictions
are informative about the potential eﬀects of those policies on schooling attendance
and the size of the formal sector.
2.6.1 Goodness of Fit
First I evaluate the model fit. Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7 show the model fit for gross
log wages. Overall, simulated wages do a good job in replicating wage profiles by
schooling for the estimated sample, even though the fit is better for high school
degree and college levels. The sample data is added for reference in dotted lines. In
the case of less than high school level, there is a lack of data availability for informal
workers younger than 18 years old, which may be the reason why informal wages
for young workers are under predicted, while informal wages for older workers are
over predicted. A similar situation occurs with informal wages for college level, even
though in this case the model simulations seem to fit the general data pattern.
Figure 2.5: Model fit wages Less than High School level
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Figure 2.6: Model fit wages High School Degree level
Figure 2.7: Model fit wages College Level
Figure 2.8 shows the data and simulated informality rates by schooling. Overall,
the model seems to do a good job in fitting the general profile of sector participation
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by schooling, preserving both the rank and life-cycle profiles of data patterns as
shown in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.8: Simulated Informality Rates by education
Finally, Figures 2.9 and 2.10 report the model fit for unemployment/leisure/home
production and schooling participation. Model simulations of school attendance
show a good fit to the data. The model predicts that 37.9% of the simulated sample
finished secondary schooling, while this is true for 36% in the sample. In the same
way, the model predicts that 27.5% attended at least two years of college, while this
is true for 28.8% of the sample. With regard to non-labor participation, the model
is able to replicate the general patterns by age, but it somehow over-predicts the
fraction of individuals who stay out of the labor market when they are older.
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Figure 2.9: Model fit Unemployment/Home Production
Figure 2.10: Model fit Schooling Participation
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2.6.2 Structural Estimates
Table 2.4 shows the estimated preference parameters, which shed light about the
relative importance of wage returns and preferences for sector amenities, and the
estimated transition costs.
First, I assess the relative importance between wage returns and sector prefer-
ences by comparing wage valuations and fixed cost of working. Marginal valuation
of incomes are statistically larger than fixed cost of work for individuals with Less
than High School and High School degree, while they are similar for individuals with
College level. Therefore, less educated people seem to be more liquidity-constrained,
as their valuation for the cash-in-hand aspects of the job are more important. The
trends go in opposite directions looking at fixed costs to work. Individuals at higher
levels of education seem to value more the non-monetary aspects of the wage, no
matter the sector in which they participate.
Second, the comparisons of these two parameters across sectors within education
level brings important considerations. For Less than High School individuals, fixed
costs to work are fairly similar across sectors, while they tend to value wage returns in
informal activities more. These findings are consistent with previous evidence that
low-educated informal workers tend to value the possibility of evading taxes and
social security contributions from which they derive little value, and with evidence
that this education group not only participates more of informal activities, but
mobility rates between formal and informal activities are larger (Maloney (2004),
Pagés and Stampini (2007)). Moreover, while marginal valuation of income is similar
across sectors for individuals with High School degree and College level, fixed costs
of work are consistently larger in the informal sector for these education groups.
In summary, more educated workers face net costs in the informal sector, so the
participation of these workers in informal activities should be explained by other
reasons like returns to skills.
Third, predicted transition costs are larger for transitions towards the formal
sector either from informal jobs or from non-participation. As these mobility costs
have been estimated taking into account comparative advantage factors, preferences
and shocks, I interpret these findings as evidence of the presence of some barriers to
mobility to the formal sector.11
11Note that estimated switching costs are very large in all directions. Kennan (2008) argues
that when there are few transitions in the data, estimated switching costs are implausibly large,
because transitions must be attributed to unobserved payoﬀ shocks. Therefore, he notes that
observed switches must be attributed to unobserved payoﬀ shocks and in order to evaluate their
magnitude, one should evaluate how large the switching costs are conditional on the switch being
made. When shocks are drawn from the type I extreme value distribution, he shows that the
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Preference Parameters Working Sectors Formal Informal
Wage Valuation ( m2,Ed)
LHS 1.31 (0.09) 1.41 (0.1)
HS 1.21 (0.1) 1.20 (0.09)
Col 0.83 (0.09) 0.86 (0.1)
Fixed Costs ( m3,Ed)
LHS -0.62 (0.07) -0.63 (0.15)
HS -0.73 (0.04) -0.82 (0.04)
Col -0.74 (0.05) -0.89 (0.05)
Transition Costs (cij)
Formal to - -0.81 (0.09)
Informal to -0.98 (0.04) -
Unemployment to -1.06 (0.03) -0.15 (0.08)
Linear age eﬀects ( m4 ) 0.22 (0.04) 0.15 (0.03)
Quadratic age eﬀects ( m5 ) -0.0046 (0.0005) -0.0039 (0.0005)
Table 2.4: Estimated Preference parameters Working Sectors
Table 2.5 shows the estimated type-specific parameters, which provides hetero-
geneity in comparative advantage within the model, and allow to relate schooling
and labor choices. Consumption value of schooling is the underlying ability driving
schooling attainment, while the returns to initial endowments represent how these
abilities are rewarded across sectors. Among the unobserved types, type 2 is related
to higher levels of ability and accounts for 84% of the sample, as they face a lower
consumption value of schooling net cost of eﬀort both at high school and college
levels. Moreover, initial endowments have higher wage returns in the formal sector
for both types. However, the wage premium in the formal sector is larger for type 2
than for type 1. As type 2 individuals are the high ability types, one can conclude
that there is a positive association between ability and the formal wage premium to
initial endowments. A natural implication of this finding is that workers with higher
levels of ability, the ones who self-select into more schooling, are also the ones who
self-select more into formal activities as these abilities are better rewarded in this
sector.
average transition costs of moving from sector i to j are the estimated costs net of the diﬀerence
in payoﬀ shocks,
AV Costij = TRij   E[⌘jt   ⌘it | djt = 1]
As a result, the monetary magnitude of the estimated transition costs is much smaller once they
are adjusted by shocks.
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Unobserved
Heterogeneity
Structural Parameter Type 1 Type 2
Consumption
Value Schooling
( m1,k)
HS -1.18 (0.09) -0.35 (0.06)
Col -1.28 (0.1) -0.42 (0.05)
Returns to Initial
Endowments (↵m0,k)
Formal 8.32 (0.4) 8.97 (0.25)
Informal 7.69 (0.2) 7.31 (0.4)
Probability Type 1 0.84 (0.002)
Table 2.5: Estimated Preference parameters Non-working choices
Table 2.6 shows the estimated returns to schooling and experience across sectors.
Returns to high school degree are larger in the formal sector, but I find a wage
premium in the informal sector for college level. This result is in line with previous
evidence for LAC countries (Amaral and Quintin (2006)).Arbex, Galvao, and Gomes
(2010) argue that a wage premium in the informal sector for high-skilled workers has
to be the reason why there is persistent participation in informal activities at college
level, as these workers must somehow be compensated for giving up larger benefits in
the formal sector. This argument is consistent with my finding that more educated
workers value relatively more the non-wage attributes of formal jobs compared to
informal jobs, but they participate in the informal sector as a consequence of larger
returns to schooling. A second part of the explanation relies on composition eﬀects.
In my sample, more than 90% of informal workers over 40 years old and with post-
secondary education are self-employed. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the
premium is largely attributed to successful entrepreneurial activities.
Second, the estimated returns to sector-experience suggest that formal experience
is greatly valued in the formal sector at all education levels, but it is also valued in the
informal sector for the less-skilled. In contrast, informal experience is valued in the
informal sector only for the low-skilled, and it seems to be detrimental in the formal
sector. This is consistent with multiple evidence from LAC countries showing that
transitions between informal and formal jobs are larger for the less-skilled (Bosch,
Goni, and Maloney (2007)). Finally, the estimated distribution of sector wages
shows that productivity shocks are positively correlated across sectors, and that the
variance of informal wages is larger, presumably because of less availability of wage
data in this sector.
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Wage Returns Structural Parameter Formal Informal
Returns to Schooling
(↵m1 ,↵m2 )
High School 0.38 (0.025) 0.35 (0.03)
College 0.70 (0.03) 1.02 (0.03)
Returns to Formal Exp
(↵m3,Ed)
LHS 0.14 (0.01) 0.06 (0.008)
HS 0.13 (0.009) -0.06 (0.009)
Col 0.06 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01)
Returns to Informal Exp
(↵m4,Ed)
LHS -0.06 (0.01) 0.10 (0.01)
HS -0.047 (0.01) -0.02 (0.009)
Col -0.009 (0.008) -0.05 (0.009)
Shocks Autocorrelation (⇢m) 0.91 (0.04) 0.87 (0.09)
Std. innovation ( m) 0.25 (0.03) 0.27 (0.07)
Correlation 0.32 (0.03)
Table 2.6: Estimated Wage Oﬀers
2.7 Studying Segmentation and Dynamics
The structural estimates are used to answer two empirical questions. First, they
are used to assess the importance of labor market segmentation by comparing the
relative weights of human capital, preferences and mobility costs in determining
transitions from and towards the formal sector. Second, I simulate the eﬀects of re-
cently implemented schooling and labor subsidies to assess the empirical importance
of labor market expectations and dynamics.
2.7.1 Are labor markets segmented?
Magnac (1991) defines labor market segmentation as a characteristic of dual labor
markets in which the rewards in diﬀerent economic sectors may diﬀer for workers
with equal potential productivity and the entry of workers to the formal sector is
rationed. One way in which the model can be used to assess the degree of labor
market segmentation is by assessing the relative importance of mobility costs with
respect to human capital and preferences in determining changes in informality rates.
For illustration, suppose that labor markets are dual and there is no unem-
ployment. In that case, the probability of switching to the formal sector for an
individual of a given level of ability, education, accumulated experience and age can
be represented by
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P (dt = F |dt 1 = I) =
⇤
nh
WFt,k(X
F
t + 1)   m2,EdW It,k(XFt + 1)
i
 
h
 F3,Ed    I3,Ed
i
  cI,F +   ⇥Emax[V Ft+1, V It+1|dt = F ]  Emax[V Ft+1, V It+1|dt = I]⇤o
where ⇤ is the cumulative multinomial logit density function. In this expression,
transitions are driven by four elements. The first bracket represents the contribution
of higher accumulated experience in the formal sector that potentially pays oﬀ in
both sectors. These gains are positive as the estimated returns to formal experience
are larger in the formal sector (Table 2.6). Second, the contribution of larger job
amenities in the formal sector at diﬀerent levels of education. Estimates of  m3,Ed in
Table 2.4 show that fixed costs to work in the formal sector are smaller in the formal
sector. Third, workers pay the estimated transition cost from the informal to the
formal sector cI,F . And finally, the dynamic eﬀects resulting from the internalization
of expected future payoﬀs of current decisions.
Table 2.7 presents the elasticities of transitions to the formal sector (or the
reduction in informality rates) as a result of: (a) an 10% increase in the formal
wage; (b) a 10% increase in formal job amenities (or a 10% increase in  F3,Ed), and
(c) a 10% reduction in the transition costs towards the formal sector cI,F . In average,
changes in preferences for job amenities produce the largest reduction in informal
labor participation, followed by mobility costs and wages. Individuals with Less
than High School are the most responsive. In average, individuals with LHS level
would decrease informality rates by 4.1% in response to a 10% reduction in mobility
cost to the formal sector, a decrease of 12% in response to a 10% increase in formal
sector amenities, and a reduction of 2.2% in response to a 10% increase in the formal
wage. Individuals with HS degree would reduce participation in the informal sector
by 2.5%, 9.1% and 1.8% respectively, and individuals with College education by
1.5%, 7.5% and 1.0%.
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Table 2.7: % Change in informality rates due to changes in wages, preferences and
mobility costs
I use these simulations to define labor market segmentation as the relative eﬀect
of mobility costs with respect to comparative advantage (wages + preferences) in
explaining informality rates. Table 2.8 shows that mobility costs explain 28.1%,
23.6% and 16.9% in the variation of informality rates respectively for LHS, HS and
individuals with College education. In conclusion, barriers to mobility unexplained
by human capital accumulation and preferences are not as important as compar-
ative advantage in driving labor market participation, and they are decreasing in
education.
Table 2.8: % weight of Labor Market Segmentation explaining transitions to the
formal sector
2.7.2 The role of dynamics and labor market expectations
I use the model estimates in combination with recently implemented educational and
labor policies to assess the importance of labor market expectations and persistency
of choices in labor market participation. I first evaluate the incentives provided
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by a revenue neutral 20% wage subsidy aiming at supporting the incorporation of
disadvantaged workers between 19 to 26 years old in formal jobs.
Table 2.9 describes the eﬀects of such a subsidy on schooling participation. Over-
all, an exogenous increase in monetary incentives to participate in the formal sector
increases secondary schooling completion rates by 1.0%, but it slightly decreases the
incentives for college participation by 0.5%. In the case of high school graduates, the
interpretation is straightforward. Returns to secondary schooling are larger in the
formal sector, thus the subsidy increases the incentives for formal labor participation
as a high school graduate. In the case of college attendance, one plausible explana-
tion for this result is that the subsidy provides incentives to dropout of schooling
straight after high school completion and start working in formal activities. This is
particularly true for type 2, the high ability type, who are likely to succeed anyway
in the labor market even without a college degree.
Table 2.10 describes the eﬀects on sector participation. Overall, informality
rates decline substantially (2%) for workers within the targeted age group, and due
to dynamics, the decrease in informality rates continue until the end of the life-
cycle, although at lower levels. Informality decreases the most for the less-skilled
(2.7%), who are likely to value the monetary aspects of labor market incentives
more. Moreover, type 1 is more responsive to the tax reduction because the ability
premium in the formal sector for this group, although positive, is lower than for
type 2. Table 9 and Table 10 (Appendix C) simulate the eﬀects of extending the
tax reduction to the age of 40. In this scenario, the decrease in informality rates is
larger and more permanent for both types.
The simulation exercise shows that individuals would contemporaneously react
to future sector-specific labor market shocks and that their current choices would
remain persistent. This confirms the importance of labor market expectations and
dynamics in participation in informal labor markets.
Schooling Participation HS Col
Total Sample 1.0% -0.5%
Type 1 (low) 0.8% -0.3%
Type 2 (high) 1.9% -2.8%
Table 2.9: Eﬀects of a 20% wage subsidy to formal employment on schooling
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Total Sample Type 1 Type 2
Age LHS HS Col LHS HS Col LHS HS Col
14-17 -2.3% - - -2.1% - - -4.4% - -
18-22 -3.0% -2.1% - -2.9% -1.7% - -4.4% -1.8% -
23-26 -2.3% -1.7% -1.2% -2.3% -1.4% -1.7% -0.6% -0.7% -1.1%
27-30 -1.7% -1.2% -0.4% -1.8% -0.8% -0.7% -1.4% -0.5% 0.0%
31-35 -1.1% -0.5% -0.4% -1.2% -0.3% -0.7% -0.2% -0.4% 0.1%
36-40 -0.9% -0.2% -0.7% -1.1% -0.2% -1.0% -0.3% -0.1% 0.1%
41-45 -0.8% -0.1% -0.6% -0.9% -0.1% -0.8% -0.5% -0.1% 0.1%
46-50 -0.4% 0.0% -0.7% -0.6% 0.0% -1.0% -0.6% 0.0% 0.1%
51-55 -0.3% 0.0% -0.4% -0.5% 0.1% -0.6% -0.5% -0.1% 0.1%
>55 -0.3% -0.1% -0.2% -0.5% 0.0% -0.3% -0.4% -0.1% 0.2%
Table 2.10: Eﬀects of a 20% wage subsidy to formal employment on informality
rates
Finally, Table 2.11 assesses the redistributional eﬀects of the subsidy. If the sub-
sidy was allocated to all workers belonging to the targeted ages and the cost was
shared on a per-capita basis, the subsidy would have detrimental eﬀects, increasing
earning inequalities. Type 2 would benefit the most from the increase in monetary
incentives because this type has the largest ability premium in the formal sector,
so they would be formal anyway. In contrast, if the government was able to ob-
serve types and could target the subsidy only at Type 1, there would be a positive
redistributive eﬀect of such a policy.
In reality, types are not observable. One alternative to be explored is to exploit
further the data on the workers’ socio-economic background when they were children.
Individuals are required to report whether the family was poor or not poor when
they were young, the education of their mother and the education of their father. If
one estimates the probability of being certain type conditional on family background,
it would be possible to evaluate the redistributive eﬀects of the true means-tested
subsidy.
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Expected lifetime earnings at age 14 Overall Type 1 Type 2
Baseline 186,843 148,366 388,847
Standard wage subsidy 198,063 157,387 411,615
Gross Gain 11,220 9,020 22,768
Net gain -404 20,973
Standard wage subsidy only Type 1 194,420 157,387 388,847
Gross Gain 7,577 9,020 0
Net gain 2,656 -1,212
Table 2.11: Eﬀects of a 20% wage subsidy to formal employment on earnings in-
equality
I analyze how people would react to a monetary subsidy of 40% to finance college
education. Table 2.12 shows that such a subsidy would have a small positive impact
on college participation, increasing attendance by 1.8%, where the high ability types
would concentrate the largest increases (3.3%). This is strongly driven by the fact
that initial endowments by unobserved types are the main factor driving selection
into schooling.
College attendance %
Total Sample 1.8%
Type 1 (low) 1.5%
Type 2 (high) 3.3%
Table 2.12: Eﬀects of a 40% college subsidy on schooling
Table 2.13 shows the eﬀects of the subsidy on informality rates for workers at-
tending college. Interestingly, the monetary incentives do not have any eﬀect on
informality rates on average, but there are diﬀerences by ability type. Type 2, the
high-ability type, increase their informal labor participation between 0.5% and 0.7%
below age 30, in line with the findings that college returns in the informal sector
are larger. However, Type 1 workers decrease their participation in informal labor
markets by between 0.4% and 0.8% for the same age group. Limited impacts of
college subsidies on career progression in diﬀerent sectors have been also found in
the US by Keane and Wolpin (1997). In their findings, they note that initial endow-
ments at age 16 play a key role in determining selection into college and selection
into diﬀerent types of jobs, reducing the impact of exogenous monetary incentives
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that are allocated long after the most critical periods of skill formation have already
finished.
Age Average Type 1 Type 2
23-26 -0.1% -0.4% 0.5%
27-30 -0.1% -0.8% 0.7%
31-35 -0.1% -0.5% 0.4%
>35 -0.1% -0.3% 0.4%
Table 2.13: Eﬀects of a 40% college subsidy on informality rates
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2.8 Concluding Remarks
I contribute to the literature on labor informality in developing countries by studying
whether comparative advantage determines participation in informal labor markets.
I develop a life-cycle model building on a Roy Model extended to endogenous school-
ing decisions and also extended to compensating wage diﬀerentials, to analyze how
individuals with heterogeneous skills and preferences choose schooling and sector
participation based on their comparative advantage. The model is estimated by
exploiting rich cross-sectional and time-varied Chilean panel data on wages, sector
participation and school attendance.
My contribution to the literature also relies on the exploration of the diﬀerent
mechanisms by which comparative advantage might drive choices. First, a struc-
tural estimation allows me to disentangle the relative importance of wage returns
and preferences for non-wage attributes in driving decisions. More traditional ap-
proaches used to test whether comparative advantage drives informal labor partic-
ipation might have some limitations. For example, the study of wage diﬀerentials
between the formal and the informal sectors does not account for the fact that indi-
viduals might self-select into jobs based on utility diﬀerences, which are not captured
by wages. In addition, studies based on the analysis of mobility rates may not be
able to separately identify whether choices are driven by comparative advantage or
if they are a consequence of idiosyncratic or industry-specific shocks.
Second, some authors have emphasized that a key diﬀerence between the formal
and informal sectors is that they are likely to have diﬀerent production functions.
While formal firms are associated with larger size, higher capital-labor ratios, and
higher technology, and demand more skilled labor, informal firms tend to concentrate
unskilled labor-intensive economic activities and operate at lower levels of productiv-
ity. I test for this assumption in a partial equilibrium approach, by estimating skill
functions that may vary across sectors. I show that returns to abilities, schooling
and sector-specific experience largely diverge across the formal and informal sectors.
Third, I assess the extent to which labor market expectations matter for decision-
making. Model simulations show that individuals react significantly to labor market
expectations by making diﬀerent decisions regarding their schooling and participa-
tion in informal labor markets when the relative monetary incentives between the
formal and informal sectors change exogenously. The eﬀects of these incentives are
persistent over the life-cycle, which indicates the strong eﬀects of dynamics through
human capital accumulation. Finally, I test for the existence of barriers to mobility
by estimating transition costs that cannot be explained by skills, tastes or shocks.
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The modeling framework I propose incorporates some innovations. To my knowl-
edge, there is no previous literature that has studied participation in informal labor
markets using a life-cycle approach, in which the schooling decision is endogenous.
Moreover, the previous literature studying labor informality has largely stressed the
importance of heterogeneity in skills and preferences shaping comparative advan-
tage. I explicitly model unobserved heterogeneity by allowing initial endowments to
jointly drive selection into schooling and sector productivity.
Some estimation results are important to highlight. First, comparative advan-
tage is more important than labor market segmentation in driving participation in
informal labor markets. Model simulations show that mobility costs would explain
up to 25% of transitions to the formal sector while the rest is explained by human
capital accumulation and preferences for job amenities. The results also show that
there is a large heterogeneity in education. Less educated individuals attach more
value to monetary rewards than non-wage attributes, and the relative valuation of
wages for this group is larger in informal activities. These findings are consistent
with previous evidence that less educated informal workers tend to value the pos-
sibility of evading paying taxes and social security contributions from which they
derive little value. Instead, more educated individuals tend to attach more value
to the non-wage attributes of jobs relative to wage returns, and these benefits are
larger in the formal sector.
Second, the estimated sector-specific technologies of skill accumulation support
the hypothesis that the formal and informal sectors have diﬀerent production func-
tions. I find that workers with higher levels of ability are better rewarded in the
formal sector; returns to High School are larger in the formal sector; and, I find a
wage premium in the informal sector for post-secondary schooling. The latter result
explains why highly skilled individuals are found to participate in informal activities
despite the fact that, by so doing, they give up the large non-wage benefits attached
to formal contracts. Furthermore, in my sample, more than 90% of the highly skilled
informal workers over the age of 40 are self-employed, which suggests that highly
educated informal workers are actually people involved in successful entrepreneurial
activities.
Third, I use the model estimates to assess the importance of labor market ex-
pectations for schooling and labor decisions. I show that a revenue neutral wage
subsidy to formal youth employment would decrease informality by 2% for the tar-
geted age groups, but it would also persistently decrease informality rates for older
workers not aﬀected by the policy, which is a consequence of the dynamic eﬀects
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of the incentives through sector-specific human capital accumulation. Furthermore,
the subsidy would also increase the incentives to finish High School (1.5%), and
slightly decrease the incentives for college attendance. I also find that the incen-
tives provided by a college subsidy of 40% would increase college participation by
1.8%, with high-ability types being the ones who react the most to the incentives
(3.3%). On average informality rates would not be aﬀected, but the policy would
significantly reduction informality rates for low-ability types.
And fourth, the estimated transition costs from the informal to the formal sector
are substantially larger than in the opposite direction, while the re-entry costs from
non-labor participation in the formal sector are also larger. Given that, in general,
workers prefer to work in formal activities but transitions to this sector are more
costly, I interpret these findings as evidence of the existence of some barriers to entry
to the formal sector.
Finally, my research agenda incorporates two model changes intended to improve
the understanding of the eﬀect of comparative advantage on labor informality. The
first improvement relates to the incorporation of self-employment as a third sector.
As explained above, informality rates are larger for the elderly because of a compo-
sition eﬀect. While informality for salaried employees decreases over the life-cycle,
among the elderly a larger proportion are self-employed. Figure A.4 in the Appendix
shows that if all of the self-employed are now considered as another sector, the econ-
omy is composed of the salaried formal, the salaried informal and the self-employed,
and a clear rank emerges in terms of wage profiles. Remarkably, the formal salaried
face higher wage returns than those in the other two sectors, with slopes increasing
in schooling. And while, for individuals with less than High School level education,
the wage profiles for the informal salaried and self-employed are similar, at higher
schooling levels the self-employed become more similar to the formal salaried. This
suggests that the informal salaried and the self-employed have diﬀerent skill accu-
mulation processes, so it may worth modeling separately the three diﬀerent sectors.
The estimation of such a model is currently a work in progress.
The second improvement relates to the relaxation of some model assumptions.
As discussed above, risk neutrality is a relatively safe assumption if one is willing to
analyze the dynamics for young workers. However, an interesting extension of the
model is the incorporation of risk aversion alongside both private and pension savings
to analyze how schooling and labor supply will change in response to credit market
imperfections. Additionally, in the current modeling framework, I have also assumed
that individuals foresee perfectly, the returns to human capital accumulation across
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sectors. While most of the literature on dynamic models builds on this assumption,
recent modeling frameworks like the ones proposed by Altonji, Blom, and Meghir
(2012), emphasize the importance of incorporating the more realistic assumption
that individuals face uncertainty about their own preferences and the returns to
human capital accumulation. I intend to incorporate richer sources of dynamics in
wages and in the paths of human capital accumulation by modeling individuals that
learn their own preferences and the technology of skill formation by doing.
Chapter 3
Does the Timing of Parental Income
Matter?
3.1 Introduction
There is a large empirical literature examining the intergenerational transmission of
economic status (for recent surveys see Solon (1999), Black and Devereux (2011),
Björklund and Salvanes (2010)). It is possible to find estimates of intergenerational
mobility for various outcomes for virtually every country in the world where data
linking parents and children is available. Most estimates come from simple models
linking a measure of child income and a measure of parental income, where incomes
at a particular parental age window or life-time earnings are used.
Yi = ↵ +  Ii + u, (3.1)
where Yi is a measure of the child’s income, Ii is a measure of parental income, and
u is a residual.
Standard theoretical models of intergenerational transmission justify the use of
equation (1) (e.g., Becker and Tomes (1979), Becker and Tomes (1986)), but they
usually collapse the childhood years to a single period of life. More realistic models of
parental investments in children distinguish several stages of childhood (Cunha and
Heckman (2007), Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010)). They point out that
the whole history (in particular, the timing) of parental investments in children may
be as or more important that the total amount invested during the childhood years.
Therefore, if there is a link between shocks to family income and investments in
children, a simple model of parental income at one point in time may be misspecified.
This paper extends the literature on intergenerational transmission by examining
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the relationship between adult outcomes of children and the timing of parental
income during their childhood years. We use data from Norway for children born
during the 1970s, which allows us to link an individual’s outcomes as a young adult
to the whole history of parental income during the childhood and adolescence years.
We address the three research questions. First, we test for the empirical im-
portance of the timing of parental income relative to permanent income for human
capital formation of their children. In doing so, we rely on rich administrative data,
which allows us to estimate very flexible specifications without needing to assuming
strong parametric assumptions. Second, although causality of the timing of income
on human capital is hard to be argued for several reasons, we attempt to address
each of those concerns presenting a series of robustness checks. An third, we attempt
to understand the mechanisms by which the timing of income shocks matter for hu-
man capital formation of children, by developing and estimating simple models of
parental investments in children where parents face diﬀerent sources of uncertainty
and they are not perfectly insured against shocks.
Our sample consists of all individuals born in Norway between 1971 and 1980.
It is possible to link each individual to his mother and father and their respective
annual income for all years in this decade. We use this information to construct
maternal and paternal income histories from the birth of the child until the year
she was 17,1 which are linked to a set of human capital outcomes available for their
children in their 20’s (years of schooling, high school dropouts, college participation),
We also present the results for other available outcomes like IQ, income early in their
careers, a health index, and fertility.
Ideally, we would want to estimate flexible functions of outcomes in adulthood on
the series of annual incomes between the ages of 0 and 17 of the child. In practice it
is diﬃcult to implement such an estimator when the number of regressors is as high
as this (18). Therefore we group the childhood years into three periods: ages 0-5,
6-11, and 12-17. We construct the average deflated and discounted income for each
of these age groups, as well as a measure of permanent income during childhood
which takes the sum of discounted income over the three childhood periods. We
then estimate non-parametric regressions of each outcome on permanent income
and incomes in two out of the three periods of childhood (since the third would
be collinear), and semi-parametric models which allow the inclusion of parental
characteristics as controls.
We present our results through a series of two dimensional graphs. Take for
1In this paper, the 0-17 age interval constitutes childhood.
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example the case where we include as regressors permanent income, income at ages
6-11, and income at ages 12-17. We can fix, for example, permanent income and
income at ages 12-17, and see how changes in income at ages 6-17 translate into
changes in outcomes. This corresponds to the impact of shifting income between
ages 0-5 and ages 6-11 on the adult outcomes of children.
The main finding of the paper is that, for a given level of permanent parental
income, balanced income profiles lead to higher levels of education of the child
than income profiles subject to several fluctuations. This is because it is better
to smooth investments in children than to suﬀer large fluctuations (which are a
consequence of income shocks). This result also holds for related outcomes like high
school dropout and college enrollment. For other outcomes, such as earnings, IQ,
or teenage pregnancy, the picture can be slightly diﬀerent, indicating diﬀerences in
the production function for diﬀerent outcomes. In terms of magnitudes, although
permanent income is still more relevant in the production function of human capital
outcomes, the timing of income also matters. For example, increases in permanent
income of £100,000 would increase child earnings by age 30 in 10% and would
increase schooling attendance in 0.5 years, while if parents were able to shift the
same amount from when the child is in middle childhood (6-11 years old) to early
childhood (0-5 years old), earnings by age 30 would increase 5% and schooling
attendance would increase by 0.25 years.
Our second finding is regarding causality. We realize that households jointly
decide investments, consumption and labor supply, but investments are unobserved
in this sample. Therefore, the timing of income can be a function of changes to labor
supply for example because maternity leave choices for child nurturing, or because
there are heterogeneous age-earnings profiles which depend upon parental human
capital. We test for each of these concerns and find that the eﬀect of the timing of
income particularly on schooling is invariant to these additional controls.
In a third finding, we simulate models to explain why the timing of income
matters. If parents face income uncertainty and borrowing constraints, they might
not be able to smooth out income shocks, and they are transmitted into optimal
consumption and investment decisions. If it turns out that early and late investments
in human capital are complement in the technology of skill formation, then the
inability to smooth income shocks would lead to underinvestments (see Cameron,
Heckman, Journal, and April (1998), Cameron and Heckman (2001), Carneiro and
Heckman (2002), Carneiro and Heckman (2003), or Cunha and Heckman (2007),
among many others). We estimate a simple model of parental investment in children
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emphasizing borrowing constraints and income uncertainty, and we show that the
only technology of skill formation that is consistent with the data patterns is the
one that is complementary in parental investments across childhood stages.
A few other authors have explicitly examined the role of the timing of income in
the formation of human capital. Some of these focus on survey data from the US
and Germany, and rely on relatively small datasets (Duncan, Yeung, Brooks-gunn,
and Smith (1998), Levy and Duncan (2000), Jenkins and Schluter (2002), Carneiro
and Heckman (2003), Caucutt and Lochner (2012)). Others use much larger regis-
ter data for Denmark and Norway (Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage (2005), Humlum
(2011)), but nevertheless they estimate very restrictive models. In particular, all
these papers estimate regressions of child outcomes on the income of parents at
diﬀerent ages. Since the levels of income in diﬀerent periods enter in a linear and
additive way in these models, they are assumed to be “substitutes” in the produc-
tion of human capital. Relative to the papers using US and German survey data
our paper relies on much better data (larger samples and richer income histories),
which allows us to estimate much more flexible models with considerable precision.
This is also true when we contrast our analysis to the ones using register data for
Norway and Denmark. The flexible models we estimate allow us to construct a much
richer picture of the role of the timing of income than the one presented in previ-
ous work. This is important because the complementarity (or other interactions)
of investments in human capital across periods (Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach
(2010)) may translate into complementarity (or other interactions) of income shocks
across periods.
The empirical importance of permanent income relative to the timing of income
is likely to be dependent on the country that we study. In a country such as Norway
in the 1970s, where the welfare state was starting to develop but already had well
developed safety nets, it may be much easier to smooth fluctuations in income than
in other countries where insurance possibilities are more limited, because the welfare
system is not as generous, or capital markets are not as developed. The fact that
income fluctuations matter at all in Norway, suggests that they may be even more
important in poorer countries.
We realize that income fluctuations over the life-cycle are not entirely driven by
shocks, but they also reflect parental choices. However, we provide robust evidence
suggesting that the timing of parental income has long-term impacts on human
capital formation. For example, family income during the first years of life of the
child may be low because the mother decided to take maternity leave. Therefore, in
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our main specification we use father’s income alone, as opposed to mother’s income
or total family income. In addition we show that removing ages 0-2 from the data
(and redefining the age groups to be 3-7, 8-12, 13-17) leads to similar results as in
the main specification. The same happens when we include in the model controls
for the proportion of years the mother is not working in each period.
We also realize that income profiles depend on parental human capital, which
has an independent impact on child outcomes. Therefore we control for paternal
and maternal education, which is allowed to interact with paternal and maternal
age at birth. We also include controls for the slope of the income profile calculated
using prebirth income and income occurring right after the 17th birthday of the
child (outside the periods we use to construct income histories), so we can control
for whether the father is on a high or a low income growth trajectory (or even on
negative trajectory). Other controls include the birth year and gender of the child.
The combination structural estimation helps us to provide an interpretation of
our results linking the empirical analysis with the economic theory. If markets were
complete and there are no sources of uncertainty, then we should not find diﬀerential
eﬀects for the timing of income on human capital formation, even in the presence
of strong complementarities of investments across diﬀerent stages of childhood in
the technology of skill formation. Parents could borrow and save as much as they
want to smooth consumption and investments. However, if parents face borrowing
constraints and they face a negative income shock they cannot borrow from future
earnings or from child’s earnings, so investments would not be optimal. Moreover,
investments are reactive to income shocks in the presence of uncertainty, and savings
alone do not provide perfect insurance. For example, if there is income uncertainty
and investments are complementary, families with stable incomes do better as are
able to keep stable investments.
We develop and estimate a model of parental investments in children with multi-
ple periods of childhood, as in Cunha and Heckman (2007). In each period, parents
decide consumption, savings and investments in children. Human capital is a gen-
eral function of investments in diﬀerent periods, so the whole history of investments
potentially determines human capital formation (except in the special case where
there is perfect substitutability between investments in diﬀerent periods). Parents
are subject to shocks to income, which can be permanent or transitory. Markets
are incomplete, so there may be only partial insurance against shocks (as in, for
example, Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)). In sum, we add parental in-
vestments in children to a standard life-cycle model of consumption and savings,
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with imperfect insurance. Finally, we also explore the role of other type of shocks,
like uncertainty about the technology of skill formation, as it has been documented
that parents who face uncertainty about their child ability and/or the returns to
investing in their children, tend to delay those investments.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 3.2 we describe the data,
and in section 3.3 we present our empirical methods. Section 3.4 discusses our
results, and in section 3.6 we present simulations from dynamic models of parental
investments in children which help us interpret the results. Finally, section 3.7
concludes.
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3.2 Data
The data source is the Norwegian Registry data maintained by Statistics Norway
for the periods 1971 up to 2006. It is a linked administrative dataset that covers
the population of Norwegians and is a collection of diﬀerent administrative regis-
ters providing information about month and year of birth, educational attainment,
labour market status, earnings, and a set of demographic variables (age, gender) as
well as information on families including parents’ marital status. It is possible to
link individuals to their parents, and to gather labour market information for both.
For the bulk of the analysis we select all births in the period 1971-1980. In
particular, we construct annual paternal taxable earnings data for each year from
the three years preceding the child’s birth, through to their 20th birthday. An
additional child outcome is available for births up to 1986, test scores in high school.
Therefore, we map income data and parental characteristics for these additional
cohorts of children. This gives us information on 522,490 children.
The earnings values include wages and income from business activity but also un-
employment, and sickness benefits. Therefore, the selected income measures include
some degree of insurance against low income shocks, i.e. when workers temporary
out of work but still in the labor force, and consequently we expect the eﬀect of the
timing of taxable earnings to be lower than the eﬀect of labour earnings alone (which
we cannot measure). We discount all incomes to the year of birth of the child, using
a fixed real interest rate of 4.26% (Aakvik, Salvanes, and Vaage (2005)). However,
our results are robust to a wide range of real interest rates, and to time-varying
discount rates.
In order to construct a measure of income in each of the three periods we take the
average of discounted annual paternal incomes within each period (0-5, 6-11, 12-17).
Permanent income is then defined as the sum of income in the three periods.
Even though the main outcome of interest of this research is years of education,
we consider a large range of other child outcomes. The administrative data also
includes schooling outcomes like an indicator for dropping out of high school at the
age of 16, and college enrollment. Military service is compulsory in Norway for
males, and between the age of 18-20 males usually take an IQ test. This test is a
composite of arithmetic, words,2 and a figures tests3, all of which are recognized as
tests of IQ. We include also an indicator for teen pregnancy. This takes the value
of 1 if the individual has a child aged between 16 and 20. We measure additionally
2The word tests are most similar to the Wechsler Adult Intelligent Scale (WAIS).
3The figures tests are similar to the Raven Progressive matrix
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a health score taken from the military tests upon entry to the Army. This test is
designed to ascertain physical capabilities of the males. It is measured on a 9 point
scale, with the top score of 9 indicating health suﬃcient to allow military service.
Around 85% of individuals have the top score.
Finally, we construct a set of control variables, which are fundamental in the dis-
cussion of the causality eﬀects of the timing of income on human capital formation.
First, we build a measure of the heterogeneous income profile of households, as the
diﬀerence between income for child aged 18-20 and in the three years pre-birth4.
This allows us to control directly for the slope of the income profile throughout
the periods of childhood. Other controls include family background information
of parental years of education and age at birth, marital status and family size in
each year of the child’s life. We observe also the year of birth of the child and the
municipality of residence in each year of the child’s life.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
Let Yi be an outcome of child i (education, high school drop out, college attendance,
earnings, IQ, health, teenage pregnancy, grades in high school) in later adolescence
or young adulthood. We are interested in Yi as a function of the history of paternal
income Iit in each period t (t = 1, 2, 3), and permanent income of the parents, PIi.
Since PIi = Ii1 + Ii2 + Ii3 we drop one of the periods from the model, say Ii1.
Therefore, we write:
Yi = m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) + "i (3.2)
We allow m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) to be a non-parametric function of its arguments. The
relationship between the timing of income and child outcomes needs to be flexible.
Parents are faced with income shocks in each period and, in response, decide how
much to invest in children (and how much to consume and save). There is a tech-
nology that links the adult human capital of an individual to the whole history of
parental investments in childhood and adolescence. The link between income shocks
and child outcomes, described by equation (3.2), depends on many factors, including
preferences, technology, information, and the structure of credit markets (insurance
possibilities). Therefore, this relationship can be quite complex.
4A robustness check conditions instead for the growth rather than the level of pre- and post-
childhood income.
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We are particularly interested inm2(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) = @m(PIi,Ii2,Ii3)@Ii2 andm3(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) =
@m(PIi,Ii2,Ii3)
@Ii3
. m2(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) tells us the impact on outcome Yi of shifting in-
come from period 1 to period 2, since we are keeping PIi and Ii3 fixed (and
PIi = Ii1 + Ii2 + Ii3). In our empirical section we will present a series of graphs
relating Y and I2 (for diﬀerent outcomes Y ). The graphs will vary depending on the
values of PIi and Ii3 on which we evaluate this function. An analogous interpretation
and graphical representations of results can be given to m3(PIi, Ii2, Ii3).
"i should be interpreted as the unobserved heterogeneity that is left after control-
ling for permanent income in the model. Therefore, we assume that "i has a finite
conditional variance: E("2i |PIi, Ii2, Ii3)  C < 1 and that E("i|PIi, Ii2, Ii3) = 0.
We are interested not in the impact of PI itself on Y , but on the impact of the
timing of income (I2 and I3) on Y , after conditioning on PI. In other words, we
want to compare (the late adolescence or adult) outcomes of children whose parents
have the same level of permanent income between the ages of 0 and 17, but diﬀer
in the level of income they get in each period.
We would like to interpret I2 and I3 as income shocks orthogonal to other deter-
minants of outcomes Y , conditional on PI. It is likely that PI absorbs much of the
relevant unobserved heterogeneity across parents (correlated with the overall level
of their income), but one may still be concerned that parents facing diﬀerent income
profiles may be also diﬀerent in many other dimensions.
In order to address this issue we start by excluding maternal income from the
model, and rely only on paternal income to construct (PIi, Ii2, Ii3). Maternal income
in each period could be very much related to decisions of staying at home caring
for children instead of work, which is likely to aﬀect child outcomes (e.g., maternity
leave; see Carneiro, Lø ken, and Salvanes (2011)). On the other end, paternal income
is much less likely to be aﬀected by these choices.
In addition, we condition on paternal education interacted with paternal age
at birth (by including dummies for years of education and age at birth interacted
with each other). This controls for diﬀerent age-education profiles across fathers.
Moreover, we construct a measure of paternal income growth between the ages of 0
and 17 of the child, based on income 1 to 3 years before birth (pre-birth income),
and income 1 to 3 years after age 17 (post-17 income). This means that we explore
fluctuations in income around deterministic age-income profiles which are allowed
to vary with education, after accounting for heterogeneous income growth (and, of
course, keeping fixed permanent income). The remaining controls in the model are
maternal age at birth interacted with maternal education, and birth year and gender
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of the child. Therefore, we extend equation (3.2) to include a large set of controls
(Z):
Yi = m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3 | Zi) + Zi  + "i (3.3)
Our argument is that I2 and I3 are uncorrelated with "i after conditioning on PIi
and all the controls just mentioned. One implication of this argument is that pre-
birth investments should be uncorrelated with the timing of income, but may still
aﬀect child outcomes. We test this by examining the relationship between having a
low birth weight baby and the subsequent timing of parental income. We show below
that, although low birth weight is strongly correlated with Pi, it is uncorrelated with
I2 and I3. In addition, in order to control for heterogeneous human capital life-cycle
profiles of parents that can interact with the timing of income, instead of using the
income measures described above we construct the income residuals from a regression
of income on age-education dummies and father fixed eﬀects, and we estimate the
role of the timing of income residuals by including these residuals in equation (3.3),
instead of PIi, Ii2 and Ii3.
Finally, the household characteristics Zi can aﬀect the outcomes directly or by
interacting with the timing of income. Therefore, we estimate semi-parametrically
the function m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) for diﬀerent groups of household characteristics. For
example, we divide the sample in above/below permanent income, above/below
median age of the father and median age of the mother, above/below parental years
of education and so on. The results are robust to this exercise.
3.3.2 Multivariate Local Linear Regression
Equation (3.3) is a partially linear regression model. We adopt a two step method
for estimating this model. In the first step we estimate   (the coeﬃcients on Z) by
using a series approximation for m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3).5 In the second step we estimate a
local linear regression of Yi   Zi ˆ on (PIi, Ii2, Ii3).
We follow Ruppert and Wand (1994) and to define the multivariate local linear
regression estimator. Let Ii = (PIi, Ii2, Ii3). Our goal is to estimate the conditional
mean function m(Ii) = E(Y |Ii = x) for a vector x, where i = 1, .., n. The solution
5In particular, we approximate m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) as:
m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) = ↵0 + ↵1PIi + ↵2I2i + ↵3I3i + ↵4PI
2
i + ↵5I
2
2i + ↵6I
2
3i
+ ↵7PI
3
i + ↵8I
3
2i + ↵9I
3
3i + ↵10PIiI2i + ↵11PIiI3i + ↵12I2iI3i
+ ↵13PI
2
i I2i + ↵14PI
2
i I3i + ↵15I
2
2iI3i + ...
(include all two-way and three-way interactions between (PIi, Ii2, Ii3, P I2i , I2i2, I2i3, P I3i , I3i2, I3i3)).
Then we can estimate equation (3.3) by least squares.
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is the value which minimizes the weighted least squares objective function
nP
i=1
{Yi   ↵  (Ii   x) }2KH(Ii   x)
whereH is a 3x3 diagonal bandwidth matrix andK(.) is defined as the 3-dimensional
product of a univariate uniform kernel function:
K(s) =
8>>><>>>:
0.5 if |s| < 1
0 otherwise
where s = Ii xh and h is the bandwidth.
This results in the estimator for each x
↵ˆ = eT
 
ITxWxIx
  1
ITxWxY
where eT is the vector with 1 in the first entry and 0 in all others and Wx is the
weighting function at the point x.
The choice of kernel is not important for the asymptotic properties of the es-
timator, as long as it is chosen to be a symmetric, unimodal density, such as the
uniform kernel. However, there exists a trade-oﬀ in the choice of the number of
observations entering the local kernel regressions, determined by the bandwidth h.
A larger bandwidth increases the bias of the estimate but reduces the variance. We
expect that h! 0 as n!1.
We use the following formula to choose our bandwidth, for each covariate:
hj = C ⇤ 2 ⇤  xjh
 1
7 (3.4)
where C denotes a constant and  xj the standard error of component j of vector I.
We allow C to vary between 0.5 and 4, in order to examine the robustness of our
results to the choice of bandwidth.
Finally, we calculate the standard errors using the formula from Ruppert and
Wand (1994).
var {mˆ(x,H)|I1, .., In)} =
n
n 1|H| 12 R(K)/f(x)
o
v(x) {1 + op(1)}
where R(K) = KH(s)2ds, f(x) denotes the conditional density of x and v(x) =
V ar(Y |I = x) denotes the conditional variance of the outcome. We estimate the
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conditional density and variance as follows:
df(x) = 1
nhd
nP
i=1
1
h1h2h3
K
✓
Ii1   x1
h1
,
Ii2   x2
h2
,
Ii3   x3
h3
◆
dv(x) = eT  ITxWxIx  1 ITxWx✏ˆ2
where ✏ˆ2 = Yi  [m(x)
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Figure 3.1. There are
522,490 child level observations, which are all individuals born in Norway between
1971 and 1980 for whom we were able to collect paternal income data, plus those
born in 1986. The average permanent income of the father (in the period between
the ages of 0 and 17 of the child) is about £306,100. There is substantial income
dispersion (the standard deviation is £116900). Income in each period (1, 2, and 3)
falls with the age of the child because of discounting (we discount all incomes to age
0).
Mothers have on average 11.14 years of schooling, which is slightly lower than
the average years of education of the fathers (11.45). Mothers are much younger
than fathers at birth (26 vs 29 years of age).
The average years of education of the children in our sample is 12.73. 21% of
children drop out from high school, but 39% attend college. The average annual
earnings of these children at age 30 is £19,930. As noted above, IQ is only available
for males and takes values on a 9 point scale, with a sample average of 5.25, and a
standard deviation of 1.79. The average health score for the males is 8.44, indicating
that the majority of children achieve perfect physical health on this scale (which has
a maximum score of 9). Teen pregnancies occur for 8% of the females in our sample.
Finally, the cohort of children for whom we have 10th grade exam information have
an average score of 42.75 (out of 60) in all exams combined, and 14.71 (out of 24)
in the core exams of Norwegian, English and Mathematics.
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Figure 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
3.4.2 Parametric Estimates
We first present basic patterns from parametric regressions which then are compared
to the semi-parametric estimates. It is particularly interesting to start with a simple
version of equation (3.2) where we ignore the timing of income, and consider only
the relationship between an outcome of the child, Y , and the permanent income of
the father, PI. Although it is common to estimate linear models, we will allow the
relationship between Y and PI to be more flexible. Instead of including PI linearly
in the model, we construct indicator variables, qkPI,i, that take value 1 if the paternal
income of individual i is in percentile k of the distribution of PI in the sample, with
k = 1, ..., 100:
Yi =
100X
k=1
 kPIq
k
PI,i + "i (3.5)
The empirical results in this paper will be presented through a series of graphs.
We start by focusing on years of education as the outcome of interest. Figure 3.2
plots the relationship between years of education of the child and paternal income
constructed from the estimates of equation (3.5). The estimated function is mono-
tonically increasing (except at the very high end) and concave. Increasing paternal
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permanent income from £200,000 to £300,000 translates roughly into an increase
of 0.5 years of schooling for the child. Figure 3.3 plots the relationship between
earnings by age 30 and permanent income. The same increase in permanent income
translates into an increase of 10% in earnings of the child by age 30.
Figure 3.2: Years of schooling v/s pa-
ternal Permanent Income.
Figure 3.3: Earnings by age 30 v/s
paternal Permanent Income
Note: Graphs plot individual coeﬃcients from regression of decile bins for Permanent Income upon child human
capital. Income in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s.
Panel B.1 in the Appendix B plots the estimates of equation (3.5) for each of
the remaining outcomes. High school dropout rates are declining with PI for values
of PI below £400,000, and flat after that (remarkably, not going much below 10%).
College attendance rates increase substantially throughout the distribution of PI,
and so do IQ scores. Log earnings at age 30 rise steeply with PI for values of PI
below £400,000, and much more slowly after that. This pattern is somewhat similar
to the one we find for high school dropout rates, and curiously, for teenage pregnancy
as well. Estimates for the health index are erratic but roughly display an increasing
pattern with PI. All these panels show patterns as expected, and the magnitudes
of the relationships between the diﬀerent outcomes and PI are very substantial.
The following model introduces the incomes in two periods of childhood (leaving
a third out of the model, because of collinearity). One flexible parametric approach
of equation (3.3) is the one in which the function m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) is separable in its
three arguments: m(PIi, Ii2, Ii3) = m1(PIi) +m2(Ii2) +m3(Ii3). The sub-functions
mj(PIi) are approximated using dummies for each percentile of the distribution of
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PI. In other words, we estimate the following model:
Yi =
100X
k1=1
 k1PIq
k1
PI,i +
100X
k2=1
 k2I2 q
k2
I2,i
+
100X
k3=1
 k3I3 q
k3
I3,i
+ Zi  + "i (3.6)
where qk1PI,i is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the father of child i has permanent
income in percentile k1 of the distribution of PI and 0 otherwise. qk2I2,i and q
k3
I3,i
are
defined analogously.
We now turn to the main empirical finding of this research, looking at the ef-
fects of the timing of income on outcomes. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 relate years
of schooling, and the timing of income, represented respectively by m2(Ii2), and
m3(Ii3). We plot m2(Ii2) keeping the values of all other variables in the model fixed
at their means, and analogously for m3(Ii3). Since the model is separable, each of
these functions shows us the partial derivative of the outcome with respect to income
in each period, keeping all else fixed.
Figure 3.4: Years of schooling v/s pa-
ternal Income age 6-11
Figure 3.5: Earnings by age 30 v/s
paternal Income age 12-17
Note: Graphs plot individual coeﬃcients from regression of decile bins for Permanent Income upon child human
capital. Income in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s.
Both m2(Ii2), and m3(Ii3) are inverse U-shaped. This means that education
is maximized when there is some balance between paternal income across periods.
It is not desirable (in terms of schooling attainment) to have all father’s income
concentrated in one period of childhood, regardless of whether it is ages 0-5, 6-
11, or 12-17. Below we discuss why this might be the case. Not surprisingly, we
have similar findings when we use high school dropout or college attendance as the
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outcomes (Panel B.2 and Panel B.3 in the Appendix B). We can reject the hypothesis
that m2(Ii2) (m3(Ii3)) is flat. In particular, we test whether the coeﬃcients  k2I2 ( 
k3
I3
)
are all equal to each other (across diﬀerent values of k2 (k3)). The test is robust to
when we drop the coeﬃcients  k2I2 ( 
k3
I3
) which are at the extremes, i.e., for very low
or very high values of k2 (k3). The IQ graphs also display an inverse-U shape, both
for income at 6-11 and at 12-17, although they have a fairly long increasing section.
Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 relate log earnings at age 30 and the timing of income.
The shapes of the graphs are quite diﬀerent. Child earnings are decreasing with
income at ages 6-11, which says that shifting money away from the first period and
towards the second period of childhood results in lower labor market outcomes for
the child. Child earnings are roughly increasing in income at ages 12-17.
Figure 3.6: Earnings by age 30 v/s
Paternal Income age 6-11
Figure 3.7: Earnings by age 30 v/s
Paternal Income age 12-17
Note: Graphs plot individual coeﬃcients from regression of decile bins for Permanent Income upon child human
capital. Income in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s.
Panel B.2 and Panel B.3 in the Appendix B also plot the parametric estimates
of teenage pregnancy and health. With regards to teenage pregnancy, there is not
much of a gradient with income at 6-11, and a pronounced and declining relationship
with income at 12-17. This suggests that positive income shocks in the last period
of childhood may be particularly important to prevent teenage pregnancy. In terms
of self-reported adult health it also seems to be beneficial to shift income towards
late childhood.
When we examine grades in high school, it is useful to shift income from ages
6-11 to ages 0-5, indicating that the early years are important. But at the same
time it is also important to shift income towards ages 12-17. Notice that, for grades
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in high school, we increase the size of the bins over which we evaluate (PIi, Ii2, Ii3).
This is because the sample size is so much smaller for this outcome.
Finally, from this section we can conclude that despite the fact that permanent
income is more important than the timing of income for all the outcomes, the timing
of income is still relevant. We have seen that an increase in permanent income from
£200,000 to £300,000 leads to an increase in earnings by age 30 of 10% and 0.5 in
years of schooling. But similar shifts of per-period incomes lead to sizable eﬀects. A
shift in paternal earnings from age 0-5 to age 6-11 from £100,000 to £200,000 leads
to a decrease earnings by age 30 in 5% and to a decrease in 0.2 in years of schooling.
A shift in paternal earnings from 0-5 to12-17 from £100,000 to £200,000 leads to an
increase of 1-2% in earnings by age 30 and to a decrease in 0.3 years of schooling.
3.4.3 Semi Parametric Estimates
In this section we present semi-parametric estimates of m(PI, I2, I3), following the
method laid out in section 3.3.2. In order to implement it we need to first create
a grid of evaluation points for m(PI, I2, I3), which is tridimensional. We take 19
points for each income variable (PI, I2, I3), corresponding to the ventiles (1/20) of
each variable’s distribution. This gives us a tridimensional grid with 6,859 points
(= 19 ⇤ 19 ⇤ 19).
It is standard practice to trim the data so to avoid spurious results driven by
small cells. Therefore, we drop 2% of observations, corresponding to the cells with
the smallest number of observations. In our main results we use a uniform kernel
and choose the bandwidth using the formula in equation (3.4), setting C = 1. Below
we show that our results are robust to the choice of kernel and bandwidth.
The estimates of m(PI, I2, I3) are presented through a series of two dimensional
graphs, where the y-axis is the outcome of interest, and in x-axis is one of the income
variables. The downside of this type of presentation is that we can only vary one
of the incomes being considered at a time, which means that we need to fix the
remaining two variables (we also fix the remaining control variables at their mean
values). Therefore, we need to use multiple figures for each outcome. The advantage
of such an apparently cumbersome approach is that the graphs are straightforward
to read.
For each outcome, we present three sets of graphs. In the first set, we fix PI and
I3 at three diﬀerent values each (the third, fifth, and seventh deciles of the distri-
bution of each variable), and vary only I2, for a total of nine possible combinations.
These are presented in nine diﬀerent panels, which plot m(PI, I2, I3) against I2 (for
3 Does the Timing of Parental Income Matter? 70
given values of PI and I3). At the top of each panel we display the values at which
we are keeping PI and I3 fixed.
Since PI = I1+I2+I3, if we keep PI and I3 fixed then it is not possible to vary I1
and I2 independently. Therefore, as we move towards the right in the x-axis we see
how the outcome varies as we shift income from period 1 to period 2. The support of
I2 over which we can evaluate m(PI, I2, I3) is not the same across all panels because
there are either infeasible values for I2, or values of I2 which are feasible but for
which there are no observations in the sample (for given combinations of PI and
I3). The second set of panels keeps PI and I2 fixed, and varies I3 (so we are shifting
income from period 1 to period 3). The third set of panels keeps PI and I1 fixed,
and varies I2 (so we are shifting income from period 3 to period 2).
Below each panel we display two other parameters and respective standard errors,
↵1 and ↵2. For each panel, let H be the highest point of support for the income
variable being used in that panel, let L be the lowest point of support, and M be
the median point of support (which would correspond to exactly the 50th percentile
of the distribution of that income variable if all graphs had full support). Take the
case where we fix PI = PI and I3 = I3, and we let I2 vary. Then we define:
↵1 = m(PI,M, I3) m(PI, L, I3) (3.7)
↵2 = m(PI,H, I3) m(PI,M, I3).
↵1 is the diﬀerence between the values the outcome takes in the median and lower
extreme of the support of I2, while ↵2 is the diﬀerence between the values the
outcome takes in the median and upper extreme of the support of I2. Ifm(PI, I2, I3)
did not vary with I2 (in which case the timing of income is irrelevant, at least when
we compare first and second period incomes) we would expect ↵1 = ↵2 = 0, so these
parameters help us quantify the importance of the timing of income.
3.4.3.1 Schooling Attainment
We begin by focusing on years of schooling of the child as the outcome of interest.
Figure 3.8 plots years of schooling against m(PI, I2, I3), fixing PI and I3 at their
median values. The interpretation of this graph is how schooling varies when I1 is
shifted to I2 at the median values of PI and I3. The solid line (with the dashed
standard errors) corresponds to m(PI, I2, I3). The scale of this line is given on the
vertical axis located on the left of the graph. The dotted line which is declining
in every panel corresponds to the missing income. In this case, it is equal to I1 =
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PI   I3   I2. The scale of this line can be read on the vertical axis located at the
right of the graph. Figure 3.9 plots years of schooling against m(PI, I¯2, I3), fixing
PI and I2 at their median values. The interpretation of this graph is how schooling
varies when I1 is shifted to I3 at the median values of PI and I2. Finally, Figure
3.9 plots years of schooling against m(PI, I¯2, I3), fixing PI and I2 at their median
values. The interpretation of this graph is how schooling varies when I1 is shifted
to I3 at the median values of PI and I2.
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Figure 3.8: Schooling Attainment v/s
Paternal Income age 6-11. PI and In-
come age 12-17 fixed at the median
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Figure 3.9: Schooling Attainment v/s
Paternal Income age 12-17. PI and In-
come age 6-11 fixed at the median
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Figure 3.10: Schooling Attainment v/s Paternal Income age 12-17. PI and
Income age 0-5 fixed at the median
Note: Straight lines are the semi-parametric estimates of schooling attainment. Dashed line is Mean Income of
the period of reference. 95% confidence intervals shown. Income in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s. Estimates control for
dummies for paternal education interacted with age and maternal education interacted with age, paternal income
profile, gender and child year of birth.
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Remarkably, the figures display an inverse U-shape, the same as the parametric
plots. We compute ↵1 and ↵2 for each panel, and we are able to reject that the
slope of these functions is equal to zero. What this says is that across diﬀerent
values of PI and I3 the years of schooling of the child are maximized when there is
some balance between period 1 and period 2 income. If income is too concentrated
in either period 1 or period 2, then one can improve education outcomes of children
by shifting income towards the other period. The (discounted annual) level of I2
at which the maximum is achieved is roughly between £8000 and £12000 (a little
higher for richer households, and lower for poorer households).
We obtain the same data patters if we present the same plots for the figures above
but fixing permanent income and the per-period income that is left aside at diﬀerent
deciles. Panel B4 shows how years of schooling change with I2, relative to I1. Panel
B5 shows how years of schooling change with I3, relative to I1, and Panel B6 shows
how years of schooling change with I3, relative to I2. At the top of each panel
we display the values at which we keep PI and the income that is left aside fixed,
which are either the third, fifth or seventh deciles of the respective distributions.
We compute ↵1 and ↵2 (from equation (3.7)) for all panels, and we find statistically
significant upward and downward slopes for each figure. This indicates that these
curves are definitely not flat.
These results imply that the timing of income shocks is relevant for human
capital formation. If the timing of income was irrelevant then all these graphs
would be horizontal lines, with only permanent income being relevant for human
capital outcomes. Most likely, the reason why timing matters is that the timing
of income shocks aﬀects the timing of investments in human capital. This will
happen if parents have imperfect insurance possibilities against income shocks, and
if the technology of skill formation is complementary in investments across diﬀerent
periods of childhood.
In a scenario where parental investments will react to income shocks, the shape
of the curves in panel B4 will tell us something about the technology of skill forma-
tion. So suppose we compare children in families with very volatile incomes, and
therefore, volatile investments, with children in families with stable incomes (be-
tween periods 1 and 2). Then the latter will do much better, keeping constant total
(permanent) income across the childhood years, if the technology exhibits comple-
mentarity between period 1 and period 2 investments, since in that case, you will
want to maintain a stable flow of investments over the life of the child. All these
mechanisms will be analyzed in light of simulations of a dynamic structural model
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of parental investments in children with a technology of skill formation, extensively
discussed in 3.6.
Panel B5 examines the trade-oﬀs between periods 1 and 3 income (keeping fixed
period 2 income and permanent income) and show a similar inverse-U shape, al-
though it is less pronounced that in the previous figures. Some of the graphs display
curves that are mainly monotonically decreasing. Again, if we take the view that
uncertainty and partial insurance cause investments in children to react somewhat
to income shocks, these figures are telling us something about the technology. In
particular, they are telling us that investments in the early years are particularly
productive (or particularly cheap) relatively to parental investments in the adoles-
cent years, and that investments very early and very late in the life of the child may
be quite substitutable.
Finally, Panel B6 examines trade-oﬀs between periods 2 and 3 income (keeping
fixed period 3 income and permanent income). Most of the figures still display an
inverse-U shape, although a few indicate that it is better to delay income from period
3 to period 2.
3.4.3.2 Log Earnings at age 30
Next we present results for the case where the outcome is log annual earnings at
age 30. Some of them are shown in the next figures, but the full set of figures are
shown in panels B7-B9 of Appendix B. Keeping PI and I3 fixed, shifting income
away from period 1 and towards period 2 leads to a sharp reduction in log earnings,
followed by a flattening of the relationship. When we shift income from period 1
to 3 log earnings seem to be slightly increasing meaning that late investments are
comparatively better rewarded. However, when we shift income from period 2 to 3,
we observe similar patterns we had for education.
The slopes of these curves are remarkably steep. For low values of I1, a £100000
shift in income from I1 to I2 (keeping PI and I3 fixed) leads to a 5-15% decline in
wages. A shift of either £100000 in I1 or I2 towards I3 generates gains in earnings
close to 5%. These figures are very large, especially in light of the fact that a £100000
increase in PI is associated with a 10% increase in log earnings at age 30.
3.4.3.3 High School Drop Out and College Attendance
Instead of years of schooling, it is useful to consider high school dropout rates
and college attendance rates separately, since they correspond to two groups of
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Figure 3.11: Earnings by age 30 v/s
Paternal Income age 6-11. PI and In-
come age 12-17 fixed at the median
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Figure 3.12: Earnings by age 30 v/s Pa-
ternal Income age 12-17. PI and In-
come age 6-11 fixed at the median
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Figure 3.13: Earnings by age 30 v/s Paternal Income age 12-17. PI and
Income age 0-5 fixed at the median
Note: Straight lines are the semi-parametric estimates of earnings by age 30. Dashed line is Mean Income of the
period of reference. 95% confidence intervals shown. Income in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s. Estimates control for
dummies for paternal education interacted with age and maternal education interacted with age, paternal income
profile, gender and child year of birth.
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individuals, one in the lower tail and the other in the upper tail of the education
distribution. Here we show just two examples of our results plotting outcomes
against period 2 income, fixing permanent income and period 3 income at the median
values. However, all the trends are the same as schooling attendance, no matter
which income is shifted. In panels B10 and B11 we just plot the data patterns when
income is shifted from period 1 to period 2.
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Figure 3.14: High School Dropout rates
v/s Paternal Income age 6-11. PI and
Income age 12-17 fixed at the median
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Figure 3.15: College attendance v/s
Paternal Income age 6-11. PI and In-
come age 12-17 fixed at the median
Note: Straight lines are the semi-parametric estimates of child’s human capital measures. Dashed line is Mean
Income of the period of reference. 95% confidence intervals shown. Income in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s. Estimates
control for dummies for paternal education interacted with age and maternal education interacted with age, paternal
income profile, gender and child year of birth.
Not surprisingly, results are quite similar to the ones we showed for years of
education. High school dropout rates are minimized, and college attendance rates
are maximized, when incomes are balanced between the early and middle childhood
years (periods 1 and 2), keeping permanent income and income in adolescence fixed.
When we increase income in adolescence (period 3), educational outcomes appear
to improve when this is done at the expense of early childhood but worsen when at
the expense of middle childhood income.
Again, we can clearly reject that these curves are flat, by computing both ↵1 and
↵2 for each panel. The magnitudes of these impacts are substantial. An increase
in permanent income of £100000 is associated with roughly a 10% decline in high
school dropout rates and a 10% increase in college attendance rates. In comparison,
a £100000 shift in income from period 1 to period 2 leads roughly to a 4% decrease
in high school dropout and a 6% increase in college attendance.
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3.4.3.4 Other Outcomes
Panels B12-B14 also summarize some of the semi-parametric estimates of the remain-
ing outcomes. Because of space concerns, we only show data patterns evaluated at
median permanent income and per period incomes left aside. Panel B12 shows the
trade-oﬀ between I1 and I2, Panel B13 the trade-oﬀ between I1 and I3, and Panel
B14 the trade-oﬀ between I2 and I3.
IQ estimates do not deliver an obvious pattern when we study the trade-oﬀ
between I1 and I2. However, when we study the trade-oﬀs between I1 and I3 , and
I2 and I3, the results clearly indicate that shifting income towards adolescence is
associated with higher and lower levels of IQ respectively.
With regards to health, and in contrast to what we have seen so far, delaying
income from I1 to I2 seems to lead to poorer health outcomes although the patterns
are not clear. We cannot reject that about half the curves are flat lines. The
estimates are also relatively more imprecise in this case than for the outcomes studied
so far.
Teenage pregnancy is minimized when there is a balance between I1 and I2, and
when there is a shift in income from I1 to I3, and a balance between I2 and I3.
Nevertheless, because teenage pregnancy is only observed for females, and that it
is a relatively infrequent phenomenon, these estimates are more imprecise than the
ones presented above for other outcomes.
Unfortunately the nonparametric results for grades in school are too imprecise
to be informative.
3.5 Tackling Endogeneity
In our main empirical specification we can’t really argue that the error term is
orthogonal to the timing of income, even after controlling for permanent income
and household characteristics. The true production function driving final outcomes
is a function of investments, which are unobserved, and households jointly decide
investments, consumption and labor supply according to many factors like prefer-
ences, the underlying technology or budget constraints. Therefore, it is likely that
the timing of income is a function of labor supply, correlated to investments. We
focus on three reasons why this can happen. First, if the household temporarily
changes labor supply and the timing of income is a choice. One clear example of
this is when family income in the early years of childhood adjusts in response to
maternity leave choices. If the mother chooses to take a prolonged period of leave,
3 Does the Timing of Parental Income Matter? 77
paternal income may increase in response. Second, the timing of income is also
endogenous if age-earnings profiles are heterogeneous. Particularly, income paths
can be front-loaded or backloaded depending on the level of human capital. For
example, parents who are high-school degree are likely to start earlier in the labor
market but their income profiles are less steeper than college graduates, who start
later. Third, income profiles can be endogenous to family-specific unobserved pref-
erences over child-rearing. Below we discuss each of these issues using the human
capital outcome years of education.
3.5.1 Maternity leave choices
The first strategy already implemented in the previous estimates is to use only
father’s incomes, which are usually more stable in the labor market. However, we
cannot rule out that paternal labor supply choices are also aﬀected by child-rearing
activities. In Figure 3.16 we show one of the results of re-estimating the model
excluding income in years 0-2 when schooling is plotted against income in period 2
at median values of permanent income and income in period 3. The eﬀect of the
timing of income is estimated now defining income in the three periods as 3-7, 8-12
and 13-17 with permanent income defined as the sum across these periods. The
results look very similar, showing if anything more definition in the curvature of the
inverse u-shape relationship. Figures 3.17 and 3.18 show the same idea but shifting
income from periods 1 to 3 and 2 to 3 respectively. The inverse u-shape remains
statistically significant.
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Figure 3.16: Schooling attainment v/s
Paternal Income age 6-11 excluding
age 0-2, PI and Income age 12-17
fixed at median values
5
10
15
M
ea
n 
in
co
m
e 
Pe
rio
d 
1
12.00
12.25
12.50
12.75
13.00
13.25
0 5 10 15 20
Period 3 income £10,000
Figure 3.17: Schooling attainment v/s
Paternal Income age 12-17 excluding
age 0-2, PI and Income age 6-11 fixed
at median values
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Figure 3.18: Schooling attaintment v/s Paternal Income age 12-17 excluding
age 0-2, PI and Income age 0-5 fixed at median values
Note: Straight lines are the semi-parametric estimates of child’s human capital measures. Dashed line is Mean
Income of the period of reference. 95% confidence intervals shown. Income in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s. Estimates
control for dummies for paternal education interacted with age and maternal education interacted with age, paternal
income profile, gender and child year of birth.
3.5.2 Heterogeneous age-earning profiles
To address these concerns we adopt three strategies. First, it could be that paternal
incomes are front-loaded or backloaded as a consequence of heterogeneous human
capital. We estimate the same model using schooling attainment as outcome but
controlling for father and mother education, interacted with father and mother’s age
at birth. The set of plots (not shown) look very similar to those discussed above, and
the inverse U-shape is robust and significant. Second, it could be that heterogeneous
income profiles are driven by unobserved individual-specific life-time income trends.
We address this concern by reconstructing income profile of fathers calculating the
diﬀerence between income post-childhood (using age 18-20) and pre-childhood (three
years prior to birth). We then use as per period incomes the deviations from indi-
vidual trends. Again, we draw the same conclusions as in the main specification.
Finally, the remaining endogeneity may take the form of diﬀerential variance of in-
come. It could be that parents with less volatile income profiles are "better" parents
than those with fluctuating income profiles. We control for this by running a fixed
eﬀect regression of fathers’ income on dummy variables for education and age. We
then calculate for each individual the error term in each period and take the variance
of this as an additional control in the main semi-parametric regressions.
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3.5.3 Heterogeneous preferences
We test our semi-parametric estimations against heterogeneous preferences. In par-
ticular, we tackle unobserved family preferences towards child-rearing potentially
correlated to the timing of income by exploiting within family variation. The idea
is to capture diﬀerential eﬀects of the timing of income in human capital across
siblings of diﬀerent ages. Figures 3.19 and 3.20 show the estimations of equation
3.3, showing that our results are robust.
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Figure 3.19: Schooling attainment v/s
Paternal Income age 6-11 controlling
for Fixed Eﬀects, PI and Income age
12-17 fixed at median values
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Figure 3.20: Schooling attainment v/s
Paternal Income age 12-17 controlling
for Fixed Eﬀects, PI and Income age
6-11 fixed at median values
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Figure 3.21: Schooling attainment v/s Paternal Income age 12-17 control-
ling for Fixed Eﬀects, PI and Income age 0-5 fixed at median values
Note: Straight lines are the semi-parametric estimates of schooling attainment. Dashed line is Mean Income of
the period of reference. 95% confidence intervals shown. Income in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s. Estimates control for
dummies for paternal education interacted with age and maternal education interacted with age, paternal income
profile, gender and child year of birth.
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3.5.4 Further Robustness checks
We subsequently control for additional sources of bias that could potentially drive
our results. First, as discussed in section 3.2, we have used a fixed discount rate
to construct our measures of per period income and permanent income. To ad-
dress concerns that the chosen discount rate is not appropriate for our panel we
repeat estimations using diﬀerent fixed rates (0%,2%,4%,6%,10%,15%), and we also
re-estimate the model using time-varying discount rates using oﬃcial real interest
rates data for Norway between 1971 and 1998. In all the cases the shapes are
preserved.Second, we control for household composition variables like marital sta-
tus and the number of children. These are likely to interact with the relationship
between the timing of family income and child outcomes, but are endogenous to
family income and therefore excluded from the specification. Third, we test for the
robustness of the results to bandwidth choice, firstly reducing and then increasing
the bandwidth. Using equation (4), bandwidth in the main paper is defined by
setting C equal to 2. We varied this by re-estimating using the smaller bandwidth
defined by C = 1 and the larger bandwidth defined by setting C = 3. Results using
the smaller bandwidth are more noisy, but the general patterns remain. Finally,
in the main specification we only take income from biological fathers, irrespective
of marital break up and further family formation. This may lead to problems if
for example mothers re-marry, in which case income from the non-biological father
becomes the main income source. We re-estimate our model selecting only families
which do not experience marital break-up. The patterns remain remarkably similar.
Finally, one implication of our assumptions is that income fluctuations should
not predict pre-birth investments, unless they are related with permanent traits of
parents which also would have independent eﬀects on all the outcomes we consider.
We test this using an indicator for low birth weight, which is strongly correlated with
our permanent income measure. We find that the timing of income fluctuations does
not predict whether a child is low birth weight. Figures 3.22 and 3.23present results
from a regression of a low birthweight dummy on (PI, I2, I3). It is not possible to
reject that these lines are flat, suggesting that our methodology is indeed valid.
As a summary, the conclusions of our paper are robust to a range of checks for
our identification strategy and specification of the human capital equation. Where
we do find deviations, it tends to be in the direction that the robustness checks find
stronger evidence of inverse u-shaped relationships between the timing of income
and child education.
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Figure 3.22: Low birth weight v/s Pa-
ternal Income age 6-11, PI and In-
come age 12-17 fixed at median values
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Figure 3.23: Low birth weight v/s Pa-
ternal Income age 12-17, PI and In-
come age 0-5 fixed at median values
Note: Straight lines are the semi-parametric estimates of low birth rates. Dashed line is Mean Income of the period
of reference. 95% confidence intervals shown. Income in 2000 prices, £ 10,000s. Estimates control for dummies for
paternal education interacted with age and maternal education interacted with age, paternal income profile, gender
and child year of birth.
3.6 The Mechanisms
Why the timing of income drives human capital formation of children when they
become adult after controlling for permanent income? In this section we attempt to
address this question by estimating dynamic behavioral models of parental invest-
ments that allow us to understand the inverse U-shapes found in diﬀerent schooling
outcomes. For example, one can think that the downward sloping section is driven
by credit constraints. If the technology of skill formation is complementary in in-
vestments across periods and credit constrained parents cannot borrow enough from
the future the level of investments during the early childhood would be sub-optimal.
It is also interesting that there is an upward sloping section in each curve. One
would think that, for a given level of permanent income, it should not be worse to
receive all of the income in the first period than to receive it in spread out payments
over diﬀerent periods of childhood. If permanent income is fully available at time
zero then one can allocate it freely across periods just by saving the appropriate
amount, regardless of whether or not one can borrow. However, this reasoning ig-
nores that parents face multiple sources of uncertainty when they make investment
decisions. One of them is income uncertainty. When faced with income shocks,
parents change their investments in children, unless they have perfect insurance.
Savings alone cannot provide perfect insurance. Another one is uncertainty about
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the ability of the child or about the technology of skill formation. If parents are not
sure about the ability of the child, parents may want to postpone investment until
more of this uncertainty is revealed (see Altonji, Hayashi, Kotlikoﬀ, Journal, and
December (1997)).
Furthermore, there could be issues related to preferences. For example, the
parents’ objective function may include other arguments beyond child’s schooling,
so depending on how the marginal rate of substitution between parental consumption
and investments in children changes with the child’s age, delayed parental income
could lead to higher investments in children. We discuss these ideas in detail in this
section, where we simulate diﬀerent models of parental investments in children, and
examine their implications for the impact of the timing of income shocks on human
capital formation.
3.6.1 A simple model
The true production function of child outcomes when they become adults is a com-
plex function of parental investments in children across diﬀerent childhood stages.
Furthermore, we know from the literature of the economics of child development that
the timing of parental investments in children matter for the process of skill forma-
tion if investments have some degree of complementarities across ages 6. There
is a wide evidence from this literature that diﬀerent types of skills are formed in
sensitive and critical periods, and therefore parental investments are dynamic com-
plementary. This means that under-investments in early childhood are harder to be
remediated with later investments, in the same way that early investments need to
be followed-up in the next childhood stages, so human capital is maximized when
investments across periods are balanced.
We realize that if the timing of income matters for human capital formation is
because income shocks are likely to be correlated with parental investments. With
complete markets and no uncertainty, there should be no diﬀerential eﬀect of the
timing of income and the slopes of our two-dimensional graphs should be horizontal.
Parents can borrow and save to smooth consumption and their investment decisions
in child human capital. Consequently, for a given level of permanent income, shifting
income across periods of childhood should have no eﬀect upon child human capital.
Unfortunately, in the data we do not observe parental investment directly, but
parental income, so we support our data findings building in theoretical models
6Examples are Cunha and Heckman (2006), Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010), Cunha
and Heckman (2009)
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of parental investments in children. In these models, parents decide consumption,
savings and child investments in each period of the childhood according to a budget
constraint which includes shocks to income and borrowing constraints. Parental
investments in every period drive child’s human capital accumulation entering as
inputs of a technology of skill formation.
We perform a simple estimation exercise of such models using the data of school-
ing attainment to investigate the extent to which complementary investments are
responsible for schooling being maximized when the timing of income is balanced.
Two arguments emerge from these models. First, if the technology of skill formation
is complementary in investments, credit constrained parents would like to invest
more and borrow against their permanent income but they can’t, so they become
reactive to income shocks. If these credit constraints were released, then shifting
disposable income from the future to the present could explain the decreasing part
of our inverse U-shaped curves. Second, for now we investigate the role of income
uncertainty explaining the upward slopes of our graphs. Parents that are risk averse
and face uncertainty about their future income may decide not to invest optimally
and over-save in the presence of positive income shocks.
Consistently with the empirical strategy, we aim at estimating the technology
of skill formation for a four-period model, three periods for the childhood stages
and a terminal period for the realization of the child’s human capital when she
becomes an adult. Preference parameters and the income process are calibrated so
that reproducing the income support found in the data. Uncertainty is incorporated
through income shocks, which requires a recursive numerical solution using dynamic
programming techniques.
The technology of skill formation
Cunha, Heckman and Schennach (2010) estimate a technology of skill formation
with US data proposing a cobb-douglas functional form. In our setup, we use a CES
production function, a more flexible specification that do not impose an ex-ante
level of substitutability across investments. In this specification, human capital at
age (t + 1), (ht+1), is a function of the current human capital stock (ht) and the
investment (xt)
ht+1 =  
h
 th
 
t + (1   t)x t
i ⇢
  (3.8)
Under this specification, (  t) is the self-productivity of the current stock of hu-
man capital in (t) as opposed to the productivity of new investments, (⇢ ) denotes
3 Does the Timing of Parental Income Matter? 84
the degree of concavity of the production function, and ( ) the degree of complemen-
tarity of investments across periods, where (1/1   ) is the elasticity of substitution.
If investments are perfect substitutes then (  = 1) and (  =-1) if investments are
perfect compliments. Investments are said to be dynamic complementary if the
change in returns to early (late) investment by increasing the level of later (early)
investment is positive, that is, if  2ht xi xj > 0 and viceversa. Finally, (  ) is a scale
parameter that anchors unobserved skills into observable outcome measures (years
of schooling).
We aim at estimating this flexible technology calibrating the rest of the parame-
ters for preferences. For robustness, we try estimation changing the rest of calibrated
parameters one at a time and we always find that the technology is complementary
in investments.
Preferences
We impose the assumption that households are indivisible decision-maker units with
standard CRRA preferences of the form
u(ct) =
c1  t
1    (3.9)
where (ct) is per-period household consumption. Under this specification, house-
holds can react to income uncertainty over-saving if they face positive income shocks.
Accumulated assets are described by the standard budget constraint
at+1 = (1 + r)at + y("t)  pxt + ct (3.10)
where (p) is the relative price between investment and consumption, (at) is the
current stock of assets, and (y("t)) is the per-period income, which is a function of
iid income shocks ("t), minimum income (wmin), and a flat wage (w).
We add further heterogeneity in incomes to match the support of schooling and
per-period incomes found in the data by including three unobserved types. We split
the sample intro three groups of equal size and we estimate diﬀerent wage slopes
and initial endowments by type. Denoting the types by (k) and the type-specific
wage slope by (wk), the income process is defined by
yk("t) = wmin + wk exp("t) (3.11)
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As we find that diﬀerent types have significant diﬀerences in average years of
schooling, we run regressions of wage growth on average schooling to obtain estimates
of diﬀerences in years of schooling across types. We use estimated diﬀerences w.r.t
to type 1 as the initial endowment for the underlying process of skill accumulation
(H0,k).
The household problem
As a matter of simplification, we model consumption and savings at the household
level and each household has only one child. The recursive formulation then becomes,
Vt(ht, at) = Maxct,it
8<: c1  t1    +  
Z
"t+1
[Vt+1(h
0, a0|"0)] d"
9=;
s.to.
ct + pit + at+1 = yt + (1 + r)at
yt,k = wmin + wke
"t
ht+1 =  
h
 th
 
t + (1   t)i t
i⇢/ 
h0
ct, it, aT > 0
at >  a
VT (hT , aT , "T ) = ⌘
(hT )1  
1    + ⌧ [(1  exp( aT )]
We solve the model incorporating diﬀerent parameters for borrowing constraints.
The results we show below relate to a = 0 (no credit capacity). At each childhood
stage parents schooling of their children, assets and income shocks, and decide con-
sumption and investments taking into account expected incomes. The state space
is given by (⌦t = {ht, at}) and the value function (V (⌦t)).
The model is solved by backward recursion using numerical methods, where par-
ents maximize the bellman equation subject to the budget constraint, the technology
of skill formation, and a parametrized terminal value function in (T = 4), in which
parents value both the level of human capital acquired by their children when they
become adults (hT ), and household assets (aT ).
Table 3.1 shows the set of calibrated parameters for estimation.
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Parameter Value
Risk Aversion ( ) 0.5
Discount factor ( ) 0.96
Interest rate (r) 0.5
Relative price investment/consumption (p) 1
Parental valuation of child’s total years of schooling (⌘) 12
Parental valuation of assets when children become adults (⌧) 12
Minimum wage (wmin) 1
Wage slopes by type (wk) {7,7.65,11}
Variance of income shocks ( 2") 0.1
Initial endowment (H0,k) {1,1,0282,1.0483}
Table 3.1: Calibrated Preference Parameters
3.6.2 Solution and Estimation
The model is solved by backward recursion integrating the value function in the
next period (Vt+1) over income shocks by using standard Gauss-Hermite quadrature
methods. In each period, optimal investments and consumption involves the approx-
imation of the expected value function for each possible combination of assets and
human capital, which evolve according to the optimal decisions and the equations
governing dynamics (the budget constraint and the technology of skill formation).
In order to handle a large state space, we approximate the expected value func-
tion (EVt+1) by using Cheyshev Polynomials. The chebyshev coeﬃcients by each
period are used to evaluate the Bellman equation and solve for the optimal policy
functions of investments and savings (i(ht, at, "t) and a0(ht, at, "t)) . We use these
policy functions to simulate data from 100,000 random draws of income shocks "t
for estimation. The details of approximation procedure are shown in the Appendix
B.
We estimate the model by Simulated Method of Moments (Gourieroux, Monfort,
and Renault (1993)). The set of data moments is ↵, and for a given value of the
structural parameters ✓ = { ,  t,  }, the model is used to simulate the same set of
moments ↵s(✓) so that minimizing
Min✓(↵  ↵s(✓))W (↵  ↵s(✓)))
where W is a weighting matrix.
By using our policy functions derived from the solution, we simulate a large
dataset incomes and human capital {I1, I2, I3, P I,H} which is then used to estimate
the same Local Linear Regressions used with the actual data, and to construct the
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analogous two-dimensional graphs shifting incomes from period 1 to 2 at fixed deciles
of (I3) and (PI) and shifting income from period 1 to 3 at fixed deciles of (I2) and
(PI). We match the mean value of years of schooling for five percentiles 10, 25, 50,
75 and 90 of income in period 2 (shifted income from period 1 to 2), and the same
five percentiles of income in period 3 (shifted income from period 1 to 3). We use as
a weighting matrix the diagonal of the optimal weighting matrix, which is computed
using the standard errors of the income percentiles from the data.
W = diag(V CV (↵) 1)
3.6.3 Results
Our estimation results of the technology of skill formation are shown in Table 3.2.
Self-productivity parameters  t show that the current stock of human capital is
relatively more important than additional investments in period 1 and 3 of childhood,
while they are more balanced in period 2. The production function is concave as
⇢ < 1 and we find clear evidence of complementarities of investments across stages
of childhood. The estimated elasticity of substitution (1/(1  ) = 1.7) implies that
the technology of skill formation is strongly complementary in investments across
periods. We also find evidence of dynamic complementarity at the optimum as cross
derivatives  2ht xi xj are always larger than zero for tall combinations of periods i and
j.
Parameter Estimates
 1 0.5991
 2 0.4602
 3 0.6194
  0.4282
⇢ 0.7487
  2.23
Table 3.2: Estimated Parameters for the Technology of Skill Formation
For robustness checks we estimate the technology parameters under diﬀerent
combinations of the main calibrated parameters. We try with diﬀerent CRRA
coeﬃcients   = {0.5, 1.0, 1.5}, we change the variance of income shocks using
 2" = {0.1, 0.3, 0.8} and we change the parameters of the Terminal Value Function
(⌘, ⌧).Even though our estimates slightly change, the same patterns remain. Com-
plementarity of investments across diﬀerent periods of the childhood are persistent
in the technology of skill formation.
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We construct the analogous two-dimensional graphs we use for our data but
with our simulations at the optimal structural parameters. In all the cases, our
simple model is able to replicate the main finding that schooling is maximized when
the timing of income is balanced. Figure 3.24 replicates the simulated schooling
attainment if income is shifted from I1 to I2 holding I3 and PI at median values.
Figures 3.25 shows the results when income is shifted from I1 to I3. The full set of
simulations are shown in panels B15-B16. In all cases simulated patterns of schooling
are inverse U-shaped, and our tests reject monotonicity and horizontal slopes.
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Figure 3.24: Simulated schooling at-
tainment and Income age 6-11, PI
and Income age 12-17 fixed at median
values
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Figure 3.25: Simulated schooling at-
tainment and Income age 12-17, PI
and Income age 6-11 fixed at median
values
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Figure 3.26: Simulated schooling attainment and Income age 12-17, PI and
Income age 0-5 fixed at median values
Note: Simulated schooling attainment is shown with 95% confidence intervals. Simulated incomes in £ 10,000s.
Plots based on 100,000 simulated income draws evaluated at the estimated technology of skill formation.
We use our simulations to investigate the mechanisms behind the inverse U-
shapes. First we tackle the role of credit constraints. If parents are credit con-
strained, optimal investments should be reactive to income shocks, anytime the
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technology is complementary in investments. In the next figures we study the re-
action of investments to income shocks. Figure 3.27 shows the eﬀects of shifting
income from I2 to I1 holding I3 and PI fixed at median values. As parents are
credit constrained, previous to the shift they were underinvesting in early childhood
(x1) and over-investing in middle childhood (x2). As income shifts from middle to
early childhood parents adjust their choices increasing investments in the first period
and decreasing investments in the second period, while investments in adolescence
remain non-reactive. Figure 3.28 shows the eﬀects of shifting income from I3 to I1
holding I2 and PI fixed at median values. Parents take advantage of an increase
in disposable income in early childhood borrowed from adolescent years and would
invest more in early childhood and less in adolescence, while investments in middle
childhood remain fairly flat. Figure 3.29 shows the eﬀects of shifting income from
I3 to I2 holding I1 and PI fixed at median values. Here investments in middle
childhood increase, investments in adolescence decrease and investments in early
childhood do not react as a consequence of the shift. The patters are the same when
incomes left aside are fixed at diﬀerent deciles, as shown in Panels B17 and B18 in
Appendix B.
Figure 3.27: Simulated Investments
and Income age 6-11, PI and Income
12-17 fixed at median values
Figure 3.28: Simulated Investments
and Income age 12-17, PI and Income
6-11 fixed at median values
We further investigate the role of uncertainty. Uncertainty in income shocks
and a technology of skill formation which is complementary in investments may
potentially produce that parents would not invest optimally in early childhood even
if they are given all the money upfront. In other words, parents may over-save
because of precautionary motives. This is supported by our findings about how
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Figure 3.29: Simulated Investments and Income age 12-17, PI and Income
0-5 fixed at median values
Note: Simulated per-period investments. Simulated incomes in £ 10,000s. Plots based on 100,000 simulated income
draws evaluated at the estimated technology of skill formation.
savings react to income shocks. Figure 3.30 shows how savings react to shifts in
income from I2 to I1 holding I3 and PI fixed at median values. Savings in early
childhood increase in reaction to income shocks, while savings in the future remain
unchanged. Figure 3.31 shows that if income is shifted from I3 to I1 holding I2 and
PI fixed at median values, then parents increase savings in both early and middle
childhood for precautionary motives. Finally, Figure 3.32 shows that if income is
shifted from I3 to I2 holding I1 and PI fixed at median values, parents over-save in
middle childhood, while investments in early childhood are non-reactive.
Figure 3.30: Simulated Savings and
Income age 6-11, PI and Income 12-
17 fixed at median values
Figure 3.31: Simulated Savings and
Income age 6-11, PI and Income 12-
17 fixed at median values
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Figure 3.32: Simulated Savings and Income age 6-11, PI and Income 12-17
fixed at median values
Note: Simulated per-period savings. Simulated incomes in £ 10,000s. Plots based on 100,000 simulated income
draws evaluated at the estimated technology of skill formation.
In summary when the technology of skill formation is complementary in invest-
ments, there is income uncertainty and parents are credit constrained, the timing of
income is easily transmitted into human capital through investment decisions. The
simulated eﬀects of the timing of income in per-period investments suggest that a
policy that alleviate credit constraints or facilitate inter temporal income transfers
would prevent sub-optimal investments. This could partially explains the inverse U-
shape of human capital outcomes when income is shifted across periods, particularly
the downward sloping part of the data patterns for schooling outcomes. However,
the role of uncertainty also plays a role beyond the existence of credit constraints.
Income uncertainty leads parents to over-save in reaction to positive income shocks,
which could harm their ability to invest in the human capital of their children opti-
mally. This is a particularly useful argument to explain why we observe an upward
sloping portion of the behavior of human capital when parents are able to borrow
money from the future.
3.6.4 Sensitivity
The analysis performed before is of course conditional to a technology that is com-
plementary in parental investments. Many of the preference parameters used in the
model are not possible to be identified from our data, so we calibrate them. However,
we test that the estimated technology is robust to the calibration by re-estimating
the model under diﬀerent scenarios of preferences, and lifting credit constraints.
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Table 3.3presents the estimated technologies for the diﬀerent scenarios. In all cases
the estimated elasticities of substitution of investments support a technology of skill
formation which is complementary in investments.
Parameter Benchmark No Credit
Con-
straints
Low Elasticity
of
Consumption
(  = 0.95)
High Elasticity
of
Consumption
(  = 0.1)
High valuation of
child’s human
capital relative to
assets ( ⌘⌧ = 5)
Low valuation of
child’s human
capital ( ⌘⌧ = 0.2)
 1 0.59 0.39 0.54 0.37 0.48 0.42
 2 0.46 0.69 0.48 0.53 0.63 0.53
 3 0.62 0.56 0.63 0.70 0.73 0.43
  0.43 -0.31 -0.36 0.30 0.49 0.50
⇢ 0.75 0.52 0.58 0.71 0.69 0.49
  2.23 2.97 3.60 2.45 3.03 2.56
1/(1   ) 1.75 0.76 0.73 1.42 2 2
Table 3.3: Sensitivity of the Estimated Technology of Skill forma-
tion under diﬀerent calibrated preference parameters
3.7 Concluding Remarks
The question of whether early or late income is most productive in producing child
human capital is important in order to further our understanding of how the stock
of adult human capital accumulates. Should policy be targeted towards very young
children, or adolescents, in order to reduce child inequalities in achievement later
in life? Our dataset consists of the population of children born in Norway in
the 1970s. The large scale of this allows us to estimate the relationship between
child’s education and the income received in their early years from 0-5, the middle
period aged 6-11 and during adolescence aged 12-17, in a semi-parametric setting.
The benefits of this choice of methodology are evident from the subtleties of the
interactions between income in the three periods that can be evaluated. We find
that early years income (age 0-5) is as important in general as income aged 6-
11 and as income during adolescence. One exception to this rule is that for the
outcome college attendance, an increase in adolescent income at the expense of
early income will raise participation at college. There are complementarities across
adjacent periods, suggesting that an even bundle of income across periods is optimal,
compared to extreme levels. Put another way, when income in any period falls below
a threshold, it does so to the detriment of child human capital. These results are
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robust to the choice of bandwidth and to a semi parametric specification where we
control for a detailed set of family inputs.
That we do not find a strategically diﬀerent pattern for the poorer families, likely
to face credit constraints is not entirely surprising. In their test of a prediction of
the permanent income hypothesis, that contemporary consumption responds only to
unpredictable changes in income, Shapiro and Slemrod (1995) and Souleles (1999)
all find the same pattern for credit constrained households as all others.
Simulations of behavioral models of parental investments in children emphasiz-
ing credit constraints and income uncertainty shed light about why the timing of
income matters for human capital formation. In the presence of credit market im-
perfections and income uncertainty, income shocks are transmitted into parental
decisions about investments in human capital and savings. This is true when invest-
ments across diﬀerent stages of childhood are complement, meaning that if parents
do not invest optimally in early childhood because of those market imperfections,
this has detrimental eﬀects in the accumulation of skills that cannot be remediated
later at the same cost.
There are policy implications from the results of our study. In fact, we find that
even in the setup of a developed welfare state as in Norway in the 70’s there is
ground for public policies that provide insurance against income shocks and allow
parents to borrow from their future earnings or even from their children’s future
earnings. And if these types of policies can alleviate the negative eﬀects of income
fluctuations in the long-term human capital formation in Norway, they may be even
play a more important role in poorer countries.
Chapter 4
The Role of Beliefs in Parental
Investments and Child Development
4.1 Introduction
There is abundant evidence from the literature on child development that the early
years of an individual’s life greatly influence one’s life trajectory. Socioeconomic gaps
in early childhood widen over the life-cycle in both developed as well as in developing
a countries (See Fernald, Weber, Galasso, and Ratsifandrihamanana (2011), Moon
(2010) and Schady, Behrman, Araujo, Azuero, Bernal, Bravo, Lopez-Boo, Macours,
Marshall, Paxson, and Others (2014)) so there is high potential returns to interven-
tions supporting poor families and their investments in children. High quality early
childhood programs have been shown to lead to gains in child development and even
longer term outcomes, especially for disadvantaged children.
A traditional approach to deal with early childhood poverty (and its conse-
quences) has been the provision of financial resources. The literature has recog-
nized that this approach is largely insuﬃcient (Paxson and Schady (2007), Heckman
(2011), Cunha and Heckman (2009), Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013)). Even though
poor parents do suﬀer from a lack of resources, when these are made available their
use would greatly depend on parental beliefs and preferences towards child-rearing,
alternative uses of resources (both time and money), information on the best use of
resources, and expectations of returns to investments in children. Therefore, there
are potential high returns to the improvement of parenting skills in poor families.
There is wide agreement among economists, child development specialists, policy
makers, and international financial organizations, that more research is necessary
to understand by how much and by which channels parenting aﬀects the process of
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human capital formation both in cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions.
Putting this in a broader context, there are two important challenges driving the
current research agenda in early child development. First, it has become a priority
to evaluate potentially scalable parenting interventions which are sustainable in the
long-run by either involving the local communities in the implementation, or by
nesting them in the formal structure of public services. Second, we need a deeper
understanding of the factors, mediators and constraints by which better parenting
translates into investment in children￿s human capital and child development. One
way to do so is to evaluate experimentally multiple policies with many treatment
arms in diﬀerent contexts, each covering a diﬀerent potential mediator or constraint,
but this is costly and hard to implement at scale. A complementary approach to
understanding child investments is to evaluate simpler and ongoing interventions
which attempt to modify parental behavior, and use the experimental design to-
gether with very rich data to investigate those channels with an insightful empirical
approach or by estimating realistic behavioral models of parental decisions in child
investments; realistic in the sense that parents face multiple sources of uncertainty,
multiple forms of investments, and child outcomes have multiple dimensions.
The objective of this work-in-progress research is to go beyond the analysis of
how financial constraints impact parental investments in children, and to understand
how parenting, in particular the role of parental beliefs and attitudes towards child-
rearing, determines investments in children and their subsequent development. To
do so, we rely on the impact evaluation of “Nadie es Perfecto” (NEP hereafter),
a nationally-scaled group-based intervention nested in the Chilean public health
system that provides parents from poor economic backgrounds with information and
support about the benefits of positive parenting strategies, encourages improvements
in home environments, and fosters parental self-esteem in the child-rearing task.
Our main goal is to use the experimental data from this intervention to uncover the
pathways and mechanisms relating parental beliefs and expectations are related to
child investments, parenting practices, and child outcomes, and use this knowledge
to evaluate cost-eﬀective and potentially transferable ECD policies in the context of
poor and middle income countries.
Our research innovates in four aspects, concerning both data and methods. First,
we collect new data measuring parental beliefs and expectations, which are rarely
available, along with standard measurements of parental investments and child out-
comes. We consider three types of beliefs, which complement each other, and to-
gether form a much more complete core set of beliefs than ever considered before.
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There are beliefs about how adequate are diﬀerent styles of interacting with chil-
dren, such as being authoritarian or being permissive. There are beliefs about one’s
own ability to be an eﬀective parent, or perceived self-eﬃcacy. And there are beliefs
about the expected returns to cognitive and non-cognitive stimulation of children
building on Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013), who develop a new instrument for
the elicitation of parental perceptions regarding the returns to cognitive stimulation
among low income mothers in the US. They recover maternal perceptions regarding
cognitive stimulation by asking mothers for cognitive developmental milestones chil-
dren should achieve under diﬀerent scenarios for home stimulation. We adapt a new
version of this instrument, previously piloted for the Chilean context, and extend it
to two dimensions of parental stimulation: cognitive (language) and socio-emotional
(nurturing and disciplinary strategies).
Second, collecting this new data in a setting where we observe exogenous changes
in parental beliefs, allows us to identify their impact on diﬀerent dimensions of
parental investments and child development. Even with very detailed measurements
of beliefs, there may be unobservable determinants of parental beliefs that aﬀect
both parents in children. Furthermore, we control for further sources of bias that
are not usually accounted for like measurement error. To do so, we formulate a
technology of skill formation of diﬀerent dimensions of child outcomes, investments
and beliefs, and we estimate it with a dynamic factor model as in Cunha, Heckman,
and Schennach (2010). Diﬀerently from them, in our setup we do not need to impose
some exclusion restrictions when we estimate the latent factors for investments and
beliefs, because we can exploit the exogenous variation from the RCT.
Third, we use our factor model to investigate the links between parental beliefs
and parental investments, and the links between investments and child outcomes, by
using econometric mediation analysis proposed by Heckman and Pinto (2013). In
this approach, we show that we can decompose treatment eﬀects between indirect
changes in child outcomes through changes in investments, and direct eﬀects through
changes in the productivity of those investments, under relatively weak assumptions
given the extensive number and quality of measurements we have available. This
way, we can minimize the set of unobserved inputs that can potentially make this
decomposition diﬃcult.
Fourth, we go beyond the understanding of the pathways in the technology and
we formulate and estimate a dynamic structural model of parental investments in
children to separately identify the role of preferences and expectations in shaping
behavior (Cunha and Heckman (2007)). The estimation of such policy-invariant
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structural parameters will ultimately be useful to assess the cost-eﬀectiveness of the
current policy and simulate alternative new policies that are more cost-eﬀective. In
our model, parents won’t fully know the technology of skill formation but they will
learn about it in several ways (through information provision, or just through the
act of parenting itself, in a learning by doing framework as in Badev and Cunha
(2012)). Here, the elicited perceptions with the instrument adapted from Cunha,
Elo, and Culhane (2013) will allow us to separately identify the role in outcomes of
maternal perceptions regarding the returns to investments from actual behavior.
Such a complete treatment of the determinants of parental investments in chil-
dren is not available elsewhere in the literature, because it is extremely diﬃcult to
put together the elements just described. We are in a unique position to do so. This
work will contribute to a unique understanding of the mechanisms through which
parenting influences the lives of children, which is essential if we want to design new
interventions in this field. The evidence systematically organized by Engle, Black,
Behrman, de Mello, Gertler, Kapiriri, Martorell, and Young (2007) and Engle, Fer-
nald, Alderman, Behrman, O’Gara, Yousafzai, de Mello, Hidrobo, Ulkuer, Ertem,
and Others (2011) in the LANCET (2007, 2011), is weak on the eﬀectiveness and
cost-eﬀectiveness of scaled-up parenting interventions and on the pathways through
which they potentially work. This research focuses its contribution in addressing
these two research gaps.
4.2 The intervention
Nadie es Perfecto is a group parenting intervention adapted by the Chilean gov-
ernment from Nobody’s Perfect, a parenting education program developed by the
Public Health Agency of Canada since the early 1980s. NEP has been selected as
a cornerstone parenting intervention within their new nationwide early childhood
policy, Chile Crece Contigo. The program has been gradually rolled it out within
the country since 2010. NEP attempts to promote positive parenting skills in care-
givers, the use of non-violent disciplinary strategies, helping caregivers to acquire
new techniques oriented to manage child behavior and to foster positive parent-child
relationships. The methodology aims at improving improve parental self-esteem and
problem solving skills, as well foster social support and networks.
NEP targets mainly parents with children aged 0 to 5 who live in poor and
isolated conditions. It takes place in a group setting of 6-8 weekly group sessions of
6-10 parents. The key innovation of the approach lies in a flexible curriculum that
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can be tailored to the group interests and needs, combined with facilitators trained
during 6-8 weeks in each of the NEP topics and in how to manage group dynamics.
The premise of the intervention is that to translate knowledge and beliefs into real
behavioral change, participants need not only to increase their knowledge about the
optimal practices and about themselves as parents, but also to emotionally connect
to the way themes are discussed with other parents facing similar problems.
An existing combined qualitative and quantitative evaluation (Chislett and Ken-
nett (2007); Skrypnek and Charchun (2009)) of the Canadian NEP program shows
a decrease in negative or punitive practices, and improved parental ability to cope
with parenting stressors, problem solving ability and perceptions of social support.
Yet, the evaluation fails to rigorously examine whether these changes in parent-
ing practices translate into gains in child development outcomes. Furthermore, it
also fails to account for the relevant role of parental beliefs in triggering changes in
parental behavior.
NEP has several potential features that make it an attractive model to be eval-
uated, both in the Chilean context as well as for the early childhood development
literature in general:
1. Scaled-up intervention: As highlighted in many of the LANCET (2007, 2011)
meta-analysis on early childhood developments, there is a dearth of research of large
scale programs that have the potential for having an impact of child development.
NEP is rolled-out at the local health centers and the sessions are delivered by trained
health workers. NEP uses the infrastructure and human resources already existing in
the health network with no further monetary and organization costs beyond training
and material printing.
2. Cost eﬀectiveness: the standard version of NEP costs only 10% per family
attended compared to home visits, while according to LANCET 2011, expected ef-
fect sizes lie between 25%-50% of home visits. Hence, NEP could imply a relative
gain in cost-eﬀectiveness of about 2.5-5 times. This is all based on the premise
that parenting programs have significant impacts on child development, which is
what we propose to test. Given the mixed evidence in the literature on parenting
programs only providing information to parents, compared to more eﬀective inter-
ventions that combine parent-child interaction, we developed an intensive version
of the intervention as a new arm as part of the evaluation. This version of NEP
(called NEP Intensive) adds sessions with direct interactions between parent and
child focused on the importance of language and play. The intensive version could
represent a gain in relative cost-eﬀectiveness of about 4 to 9 times compared to home
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Figure 4.1: Cost-eﬀectiveness Nadie es Perfecto vs Home Visits
visits as it costs only 1/3 more than the standard version (NEP basic) per family
attended, implying and an additional gain of about 3 times compared to NEP Basic
(see Figure 4.1).
The meta analysis in the Lancet Review showed that parenting programs includ-
ing the opportunity to practice with their children tend to show larger eﬀect sizes
(median of 0.46, range 0.04-0.97) than for those providing only information to care-
givers (median 0.12, range 0.03-0.34). Even though the review shows more significant
eﬀects in home visits1, there is also positive evidence from community-based trials
both including parent-child interactions and focused only on the caregiver, although
stronger eﬀects are found in the former case2. Finally, the evidence on scaled-up
parenting only programs is still rather scarce and mixed3.
1Cooper et al (2009) reports significantly positive eﬀects in South Africa measuring the quality
of mother-infant interaction and infant attachment (range 0.24-0.86). Janssens and Rosemberg
(2011) report significant improvement in child cognitive development in St. Lucia. Bentley et
al (2010) report that home visits in India aiming to teach parents about complementary food,
responsive feeding and play, improve significantly child mental development.
2Aboud and Akhter (2011) compare child outcomes between an intervention giving only in-
formation to parents on health and nutrition of children, to one including also coached practice
with children. Results show a larger language development in the latter case, but in both cases
maternal knowledge is significantly improved. Among interventions focused only on parents, Kag-
itcibasi (2009) reports that training mothers in Turkey improved children long-term outcomes as
college attendance, educational attainment and higher status occupations. Al-Hassan and Lans-
ford (2010) report that center-based parenting groups in Jordan significantly improved parental
reports of cognitive and social activities with their children, along with discipline and knowledge.
3Engle et al (2011) report results from the Ecuadorian program “Educa a tu hijo” (Educate
your child), which combines health care with a structured parenting program coordinated by the
health sector and delivered at the community level. Children in the program had higher cognitive
scores than those not in the program. Nodira et al (2009) report results from the Family em-
powerment program, a large-scale community-based health and nutrition program in Uzbekistan,
which shows some significant improvements in parent skills and knowledge, but not eﬀects in child
development outcomes. Engle et al (2010) also report results from the parenting program Care
for Development Intervention in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, where children from treatment areas
showed significantly higher communication, gross motor and social development.
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4.3 Literature Review
This research builds up on the developmental and economic literature of the role of
beliefs shaping parenting investments, on the policy perspective for the importance
of investing in parenting interventions, and on the literature on structural behavioral
models for policy evaluation.
4.3.1 Beliefs and attitudes about child rearing
NEP looks to encourage parents to improve cognitive and emotional stimulation
of their children by changing parental beliefs and attitudes towards child-rearing,
and by improving their mental health and perceived social support. Through these
mechanisms, the program is expected to aﬀect long-term outcomes like the home
environment, parent-child interaction, and child development. The child develop-
ment literature has highlighted two sets of beliefs and expectations: parental beliefs
about the best ways to raise children, or the core set of beliefs about the role of
parenting, and beliefs of how able parents think they are for child-rearing.
(i) core set of beliefs about the role of parenting and parenting styles.
Conditional on the belief that parents can activate actions on parenting, the influ-
ential work by Baumrind (1966, 1968, 1973, 1989), also also reviewed by Bornstein
(2001), suggest that parents have ideas about raising children that translate into one
of three parenting styles: authoritarian, permissive and authoritative. Authoritarian
parents exhibit high levels of structure and control in children, many times involv-
ing harsh disciplinary strategies, but low levels of warmth and communication. The
opposite is thought for permissive parents. Authoritative or democratic parenting
combines high and balanced levels of warmth and control and it has been associated
with positive child development outcomes. She found that children in authorita-
tive homes performed better in standardized tests, were more friendly with peers,
more independent and assertive, cooperative with parents, and more achievement
oriented. In contrast, children from authoritarian homes were more hostile and/or
shy with peers, more dependent on parents, and less achievement-oriented. Chil-
dren in permissive homes exhibited very similar patterns as those from authoritarian
homes. Baldwin (1948) finds that children from homes with high levels of control
and democracy were more cooperative, engaging and curious.
In the context of our intervention, participating parents are challenged to re-
visit their parenting styles and mindset about parenting along many dimensions.
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Given the promotion of positive parenting is a key objective of the intervention,
we expect the NEP to induce program participants to move towards more demo-
cratic/authoritative parenting. However, in order to adjust to cultural contexts, we
use the baseline survey to adjust the original scales to more suitable measures of the
two underlying dimensions of parenting styles.
(ii) beliefs about themselves as parents.
This dimension of beliefs is grounded in social cognitive theory, aligning with Ban-
dura (1995)’s theory, in which self-eﬃcacy is “the belief in one’s capabilities to orga-
nize and execute the courses of action required to manage prospective situations”.
In other words, self-eﬃcacy is a person’s belief in his or her ability to succeed in a
particular situation. Parents with the same beliefs regarding their children might
have diﬀerent views about their own ability to translate beliefs into practices. Born-
stein, Haynes, Azuma, Galperín, Maital, Ogino, Painter, Pascual, Pêcheux, Rahn,
and Others (1998) show that high levels of perceived self-eﬃcacy serve mothers to
engage more intensely in the parent role investing more eﬀort in parenting.
In our intervention, at least one third of the sessions target at promoting partici-
pants self-care and at improving their self-image as parents. In the group dynamics,
parents learn to recognize and reinforce their strengths as individuals, how to avoid
harsh self-judgement, and discuss some basic strategies that will help them solve
daily problems and reduce parental stress. Another important channel by which
NEP improves parental self-esteem and perceived self-eﬃcacy is by creating net-
works of social support. Usually caregivers participating in the sessions come from
very disadvantaged backgrounds with little or none social support. Participants
usually create among themselves a supporting network with other parents that face
similar problems, that usually remain active after the end of the intervention.
From our baseline data, we find strong associations between SES and beliefs,
in line with the literature. Our hypothesis is then to understand whether parental
beliefs are at the core of SES gradients in investments and child outcomes widely
reported. In fact, our baseline data provides useful insights to this regard. For
example, we find that higher SES caregivers tend to be more authoritative, or they
tend to combine in a more balanced way warmth and structure ideas about par-
enting. Furthermore, they feel more self-competent in the child-rearing task and
perceive a higher social support. In contrast, lower SES caregivers tend to be more
authoritarian or permissive, perceive themselves less competent as parents, perceive
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dramatically lower levels of social support and face higher parental stress4.
iii) Perceived Returns to Investments
We study how subjective expectations about the returns to investments shape
behavior. By sharing the personal experiences about parenting within a group set-
ting, NEP is likely to raise parental awareness that their actions can aﬀect specific
domains of child development. This change is beliefs is an important pathway for
sustained change over time, as the awareness of how one’s own parenting aﬀects your
child (and the possibility of change) is likely to be internalized with the families even
after the short exposure to the intervention.
If parental awareness is shifted as a consequence of the policy, we should observe
a shift in the distribution of perceived returns to investments when comparing treat-
ment and control groups. Subjective returns to investments will of course depend
on whether parents believe intelligence is malleable or fixed, or the belief they can or
cannot aﬀect child academic achievement; and whether they believe temperament
is malleable or not, or the belief they can aﬀect emotional development. Wentzel
(1998) shows that parents who believed that intelligence is malleable also believed
they could aﬀect their children academic achievement and had higher educational
aspirations for their children. Teti, O’Connell, and Reiner (1996) show that mothers
who believe they can or cannot change infant personality or intelligence modify their
behavior accordingly. Parents may have a perspective of how fixed vs. malleable
intelligence is: the cognitive dimension; or how fixed their personality/temperament
is: the socio-emotional dimension.
Manski (2004) argues that the only way to separately identify preferences and
subjective beliefs without assuming that people have specific expectations is to di-
rectly ask individuals their subjective probability distributions about outcomes. He
also argues that subjective expectations should be retrieved in a probabilistic form
because: i) probabilities have well-defined scales for responses and are interper-
sonally comparable, ii) we can use algebra of probabilities to examine the internal
consistency of expectations, and iii) one can compare subjective probabilities with
known even frequencies and check for the accuracy of those expectations.
Unfortunately, our psychology-grounded measure on parenting styles and per-
ceived self-eﬃcacy, while intended to capture awareness at least partially, are not
a good starting point to recover subjective probability distributions. These self-
reported scales, while showing high levels of internal consistency, were not built
with the purpose of recovering probability distributions so it’s hard to use them to
4See Annex 6.b: Baseline results.
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infer expected returns to parental behavior. Because of this we build on an innova-
tive instrument to elicit subjective beliefs about the returns to investments, which
was specially built to recover probability distributions in the context of models of
parental investments in children like in Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach (2010).
The purpose of the instrument, adapted from Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013), is
to resemble for the case of parental investments in children what has been done
in the context of subjective returns to schooling since the 90’s (Jovanovic (1979);
Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang (2012), and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009)). The
instrument is explained in section 4.5.4
4.4 The Evaluation Design
4.4.1 Target Population
The target population of clinics includes basic family health care, rural health clinics,
urban health clinics and health establishments with minimal service complexity:
this corresponds to about 600 clinics in Chile belonging to the primary health care
network, covering 342 municipalities. While Chile is a middle-upper income country,
the intervention draws from the poorest section of the population, with more than
half of the target population in the bottom quintile of the income distribution.
The primary health care system in Chile is accessed only by the bottom income
quintiles. In fact, more than 50% of the target beneficiaries live with less than
US$ 90 a month per capita. Moreover, 30% of the children in our sample exhibit
socio-emotional problems and language delays in the baseline survey. Most of these
children are concentrated among families belonging to the poorest 50% of our sample.
Therefore, the magnitude of the developmental risks among the poorest household
in Chile, which are the ones targeted by NEP, makes the analysis relevant from a
developmental perspective and salient for other middle income countries. For more
details, see Annex 10.1.
4.4.2 Sampling
A three-stage clustered sampling strategy was implemented. In the first stage, a rep-
resentative sample of clinics stratified by the type of health center was chosen from a
set of 612 health centers located in both urban and rural areas all over the country.
The stratification was conducted fixing the fraction of rural and urban clinics, and
the type of clinics which included family health centers, general health centers and
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small hospitals, which may diﬀer in the infrastructure and human resources available
to deliver the program.
In the second stage, within each health center a sample of 18 families was ran-
domly drawn from a potential wait-list of participants (usually between 45 and 60
potential participants per center). These long wait-lists were formed by the facil-
itators previous to the baseline survey. Families were put on waiting lists after a
regular health visit to the center, conditional on satisfying the inclusion criteria for
eligibility into the program as assessed by the health professional.
Finally, in a third stage, the 18 families selected to participate in the evaluation
were randomly allocated to treatment and control groups. 6 families were oﬀered
NEP basic, other 6 families were oﬀered to participate in NEP intensive, and a
third randomly selected set of families served as a control group. They were oﬀered
to participate in NEP but only after the finalization of the evaluation, and they
signed and consent form authorizing this delay. The process of random assignment
to treatment groups was web-based and centralized in the Ministry of Health, so
no one apart from our fieldwork coordinator had control over the randomization
process. The compliance to the assignment within centers was strictly monitored in
conjunction with the local program administrators.
This is a very natural way to design the evaluation, taking advantage of the
limited program coverage. It implies only a very small change in the way families
are selected to participate, and it has very limited ethical problems. It gives us the
possibility of having a very rigorous study, where treatment and control populations
will be identical by virtue of randomization. It is an evaluation design that is a
consequence of a perfect marriage of implementation and evaluation concerns right
from the start of the program.
4.4.3 Power Calculations
Each parenting course is given to a group of 8 to 12 parents. It was agreed that
each facilitator would invite about 20 people, and from these 20 a random sample
of 6 will be used for the study. The expectation was that, at least three out of these
six would eﬀectively participate in the program. Similarly there will be about 20
parents in the control group for each facilitator, of which 6 parents were sampled for
the study. Our original goal was to detect an impact of the program of at least 0.25
SD on diﬀerent indicators of parental beliefs and practices, and child development
Yi.
We expected compliance rates of roughly 40% among individuals randomized
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in and full-compliance among randomized out. This implied a total sample of 162
centers and 2,916 families evaluated. Due to implementation problems, a sample
of 20 centers were not able to participate in the evaluation, and compliance rates
were roughly 35%, which led us to decrease our expectations about the impacts to
be detected for the follow-up survey. Under our new power calculations, we would
be able to detect an impact of the program of 0.35 SD on diﬀerent indicators of
parental beliefs and practices, and child development, which is still in line with the
findings of the literature.
According to The Lancet series, even though an eﬀect size of 0.35SD is above the
median for interventions only working with parents, it is far below the median for
interventions including parent-child interactions, which is one of the main targets of
our impact evaluation design. Therefore, we are confident that at least in NEP
Intensive we will be able to easily detect eﬀect sizes that are relevant from an
economic point of view.
Nevertheless, we have adopted two strategies to improve the precision of our
estimates. First, we include measures of maternal IQ and personality traits. These
variables have been reported to be highly predictive of child development outcomes
in the Chilean context. And second, an important reason why we collected such
a detailed baseline survey is that we can improve even more the precision of our
estimates by estimating value added models including the baseline test scores as
controls. The inclusion of past test scores should absorb an important proportion
of the variance of our treatment eﬀects.
Adopting these two approaches, we are confident we will be able to detect at
least our original eﬀect sizes of 0.25 SD for our ITT parameters, or even lower
To incorporate real compliance rates into power calculations we follow an IV
approach to the computation of standard errors. In this approach, Ti = {0, 1} is
the a dummy variable taking value 1 if the caregiver eﬀectively received treatment
or not, and Zi = {0, 1} is the original random allocation. We want to estimate the
following model for the eﬀect of the intervention
Yi =  0 +  1Ti + ui
We use Zi as an instrument for eﬀective treatment. This is a good instrument as long
as cov(Z, u) = 0, which is ensured by random allocation process, and cov(Z, T ) 6= 0,
which is satisfied as long as a big enough fraction of individuals randomized in do
comply with treatment. In a standard clustered approach, where Ncis the number of
clusters (health centers) andM the size of the cluster equal for control and treatment
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Table 4.1: Power Calculations
arms, it can be shown that the variance of the IV estimator is
var( IV ) =
 2
NcM
⇤ (1 + (M   1)⇢u) ⇤ 1
corr(Z, T )2
(4.1)
Where we consider an intracluster correlation ⇢u = 0 , compliance rates of 35%,
and the variance of outcomes,  2, has been standardized to 1. We compute the
number of centers and the sample size per treatment arm in each center for a level of
significance of ↵ = 5% and a power of the test p = 80%. The results are summarized
in Table 4.1:
Under these assumptions, in using 6 individuals per facilitator and treatment arm
we included 150 facilitators in order to detect an eﬀect size of about 0.35 SD. This
implies a sample size of 150 (facilitators) * 6 (parents per facilitator and group) * 3
(treatment 1 (basic), treatment 2 (intensive) and control groups) = 2,700 (parents).
In sum, the sample was comprised of: 150 health clinics, stratified by type of health
center, rural/urban; 300 facilitators (150 for the basic NEP and 150 for the enhanced
NEP intensive); 18 households total per health center (6 treatment NEP basic + 6
NEP intensive + 6 control).
4.4.4 Measurements
The impact evaluation has been designed as a randomized control trial with two
observations over time: a baseline survey before the intervention, which took place
during June-September 2011, and a follow-up survey 18 months after the interven-
tion (Oct 2013-March 2014). The target population are mothers and caregivers of
children 0-6 that are participating in the Chile Crece Contigo system. Most of the
variables and instruments described below were already applied in the baseline sur-
vey, and we will explicitly mention those who are added to the follow-up to estimate
the behavioral model.
A first group of variables measure diﬀerent dimensions of parental beliefs, atti-
tudes and expectations. The first two groups of scales are our psychology-grounded
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measures of parental beliefs, while the third one refers to the adapted instrument to
recover parental perceptions about returns to investments.
Measures of beliefs and expectations:
1. Beliefs of parental self-eﬃcacy: we have already collected data on the baseline
survey with standard instruments measuring sense of competence (Parenting
Sense of Competence Scale (Ohan, Leung, and Johnston (2000)) and parental
stress (Parenting Stress Index, Short form).
2. Core set of beliefs about parenting: We measure ideas about structure and
warmth and the three parenting styles proposed by using Ideas About Parent-
ing (IAP) questionnaire. This measure can be used to characterize parenting
in terms of authoritarian, authoritative, permissive, and neglectful. In order to
adapt the scale to the Chilean cultural context we used Item Response Theory
to translate the original parenting styles into the two dimensions of parent-
ing proposed by Baumrind (1968). We construct two sub-scales, warmth and
structure, which are the ones used in the model.
3. Instrument to Elicit subjective expectations about the returns to investments:
we adapt the scale to elicit beliefs of Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013), which
has been pre-tested in November 2012 to the sample of NEP with the target
of eliciting parental beliefs regarding the benefits of providing children better
cognitive stimulation, and the benefits of using non-violent/harsh disciplinary
strategies to manage child behavior. (Further details in section 4.5.4).
Measures of parental investment:
1. Non-cognitive stimulation: In the baseline we used two sub-scales of the Parent
Behavior Checklist (Fox, 1994).
(a) Nurturing, Communication and Socio-emotional stimulation: the Parents
were asked to indicate how frequently, rated along a 5 point scale rang-
ing from “never” to “many times each day”, they engaged in 16 diﬀerent
activities with their child over the past couple of weeks.4 Example items
include: “How often did you and your child laugh together?”; “How often
did you play games with your child?”; and “How often did you praise
your child for learning new things?” Higher scores reflect more frequent
engagement in nurturing parenting behavior.
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(b) Discipline Practices: Parents were asked to indicate how frequently, rated
along a 5 point scale, ranging from “never” to “many times each day,” they
behaved in a variety of ways when their child broke the rules or did things
the parent did not like. Example items include: “Ignore it, do nothing”;
“Spank your child”; “Use time out.” Higher scores indicate greater fre-
quency of engaging in that type of response to children’s misbehavior.
2. Cognitive stimulation: In the baseline we used the Family Care Indicators
(Unicef, validated by Hamadani, Tofail, Hilaly, Huda, Engle, and Grantham-
McGregor (2010)), which measures the quality time spent with children in
learning and playing activities for young children at home. Examples of ques-
tions are how often parents take children out to the park, cinema or other
recreational activities, whether there is always an adult looking after children,
the frequency of learning and play activities with children, and the amount
and variety of play and learning materials. In the follow-up we will pre-test
a revised version of the FCI and the HOME-SF (play material and cogni-
tive stimulation components) to be adapted to the older age group, as well
as an adapted HOME scale by Aboud (2006), that combines self-report and
observation.
Measures of child development outcomes:
We consider those developmental domains that are expected to be aﬀected by the
intervention, and which have been described in the literature to have predictive
power on adult measures of human capital :
1. Language: We have measured both receptive and expressive language. We
use the Spanish version of the Preschool Language Scale (PLS-4). The PLS-4
has been preferred to the commonly used PPVT (Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test) because it includes both receptive and expressive vocabulary and because
it allows evaluating all age groups relevant for the intervention.
2. Executive functions: these are the cognitive aspects of self-regulation (Blair
and Ursache (2011), Blair and Razza (2007)) and defined as working mem-
ory, inhibitory control, and attention shifting, which have been proved to be
important predictors for children’s social and academic development. We will
continue using the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task, appropri-
ate for longitudinal uses starting from age 2 ½ until young adulthood. For
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younger children, we use the A-not-B task (Diamond (1985)) which captures
both working memory and inhibition.
3. Maladaptive Behavior: There is conclusive longitudinal evidence that inter-
ventions working with children with highly disruptive behavior had positive
implications in future labor market outcomes, decrease in criminal rates and
improvements in social skills. Qualitative evidence from focus group discus-
sions and feedback from the NEP facilitators have highlighted a high demand
of caregivers to treat children behavioral strategies in the sessions. Program
beneficiaries are looking for tools for solving behavioral issues with their chil-
dren so we include this non-cognitive measure as one of the outcomes. We
measure maladaptive behavior by using the CLBC Achenbach Child Behavior
Checklist, which captures internalizing and externalizing behavioral problems.
4. Socio-emotional development: In order to measure positive dimensions of how
the child establish personal relationships with peers and with adults, and to
encourage comparability with other nationally representative surveys on the
same target population. The main instrument is the Battelle scale, social-
personal dimension. It measures positive social development of children, as
reported by their caregiver.
Parental Traits
We include the following set of cognitive and non-cognitive parental traits:
1. Maternal depression: We collected data on symptoms of depression using the
widely Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD).
2. Maternal Distress : Measured with the Parenting Stress Index
3. Perceived Social Support: Preliminary structured interviews in Chile from the
group interaction lies in the perceived social support that beneficiaries report
to have improved as a result of their participation to the group parenting
program.
4. Maternal IQ : Maternal IQ has been proved to be highly correlated to child
skills. We adopt the Wechlser Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) which has al-
ready been validated for the Chilean population in the nationally representa-
tive child development survey (Encuesta Longitudinal de la Primera Enfancia,
ELPI). The scale has two sub-dimensions: Language and Digit Span.
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5. Personality Traits: Measured by the “Big Five” test, including the sub-scales
of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness and lower
levels of Neuroticism. All these sub-scales have been found associated with
cognitive and non-cognitive child skills.
Administrative and socioeconomic data
Socio-demographic characteristics of the family are obtained from a socioeconomic
survey. We collect rich data for all the household members about labor and non-labor
incomes, transfers, family composition, employment status, wealth and housing con-
ditions, access to health and community services, disability and health shocks. The
baseline survey shows that NEP works with the poorest segments of the income
per capita distribution, emphasizing the potential of the policy to alleviate early
disadvantages.
The survey data will also be merged to detailed administrative data on each
child-mother pair. Crece Contigo has a unique feature of a longitudinal follow-up
of each child with key administrative data on maternal pregnancy, birth outcomes
and health visits linked for each child. It will be therefore possible to access ret-
rospective history on risk factors and health outcomes for each child by collecting
information on the personal national identification number. An informed consent
was administered to parents to be able access the health records of their children
in the health clinics. The detail on the key retrospective outcomes will be obtained
from the clinical folder for each child/mother dyad includes maternal psychological
evaluations, postnatal depression scales, and child’s anthropometrics.
4.5 Treatment Eﬀects
In this section we describe how treatment eﬀects are estimated and how we can
decompose changes in child outcomes. We will assume a linear framework because
it facilitates reliable estimation in small samples. The analysis is divided in four
parts. First, we discuss the overall estimation of treatment eﬀects accounting for
selection bias. Individuals are selected at random either to participate in NEP or to
go on a wait-list, therefore selected individuals can then decide or not to participate
in the program. The oﬀer of the program is randomly assigned in a population of
eligible individuals, but the take-up of the program is not random.
Second, we discuss how potential changes in child outcomes due to treatment
will be decomposed by using Mediation Analysis (Heckman and Pinto (2013)). In
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this framework, parental beliefs that are directly aﬀected by the policy can aﬀect
outcomes in three possible ways: i) an indirect eﬀect by changing measured parental
investments; ii) a direct eﬀect changing unobserved parental investments; and iii)
a direct eﬀect changing the the technology that maps investments into output, i.e,
the productivity of such investments. We discuss under which assumptions we can
separately identify these channels using our data.
Third, most of our outcomes and inputs are measured with error, potentially bi-
asing the estimation of overall treatment eﬀects and the decomposition. We propose
a latent factor model from our set of measurements, and we discuss the conditions
for identification of the latent factors. After identifying the latent factor model we
discuss estimation.
Finally, we propose the estimation of a full behavioral model in which parental
beliefs will have two central roles in explaining how parents invest in children. First,
our psychology-grounded measures of beliefs about how to raise children and about
themselves as parents will drive both the level of investments and the productivities
of those investments. Second, parents will have subjective expectations about the
technology and we collect data to elicit them. This will allow us to identify a model
in which there is heterogeneity both in preferences and expectations, and where
parents learn about the consequences of their actions.
4.5.1 Identifying treatment eﬀects
Let t denote the timing of the baseline data and t + 1 the follow-up data. ✓Od,t+1 is
an error-free outcome of interest at follow-up which can vary with treatment arm d.
In the context of our study, we call outcomes to any variable that can be aﬀected
by treatment. Therefore, they can include inputs like beliefs (B) or investments
(I), or outputs like child skills (K). Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2011)
present the idea of Sequential Ignorability, under which counterfactual outputs and
counterfactual inputs are independent of treatment conditional on pre-program vari-
ables. For our purpose, we have three types of pre-treatment variables: ii) ✓Ot are
error-free measured outcomes at baseline; i) ✓Pt are error-free maternal cognitive and
personality traits; and iii) Xt is a vector of household characteristics. Finally, let D
an indicator variable denoting participation in NEP, and Z is an indicator variable
denoting whether an individual was invited to enroll in NEP, or whether he was put
on a wait-list. The treatment eﬀects on outcome O = {K, I,B} is recovered from
the following two-stage estimation
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✓Od,t+1 = ⌧0 + ⌧D +  d✓
O
t + ↵d✓
P
t +  dXt + "d,t+1 (4.2)
D = a0 + a1Z + a2✓
O
t + a3✓
P
t + a4Xt + ⌘t
where we allow treatment to change directly the eﬀect on outcomes, but also change
the productivity of pre-treatment variables. In this setup, the gains from treatment
are then represented by
E[✓O1,t+1   ✓O0,t+1] = ⌧ + ( 1    0)E[✓Ot ] + (↵1   ↵0)E[✓Pt ] + ( 1    0)E[Xt] (4.3)
Notice that the allocation to treatment Z needs to be a good predictor of program
participationD, i.e., conditional on being invited, the take-up of the program is high.
Low take-up rates may lead to large standard errors in the estimates of ⌧,  d,↵d,
and  d. Moreover, if these estimates vary in the population, and there is non-
compliance only for those who are invited to participate in NEP, but who never
take it up, E[✓O1,t+1   ✓O0,t+1] measures the average treatment on the treated. An
analysis of the take-up rates allow us to rule out non-compliance for those who are
not invited to participate, but who make their way into NEP.
4.5.2 Decomposing treatment eﬀects
Changes in child outcomes
We want to go beyond the estimation of treatment eﬀects and we attempt to inves-
tigate the mechanisms by which the policy can potentially impact child outcomes.
As shown above, the treatment eﬀects of the program on child outcomes can be
estimated under weak assumptions. However, these estimates tell us little about
which mechanisms may be important for producing impacts on children. Under
slightly stronger assumptions it is possible to make substantial progress on the issue
of mechanisms, even without a fully specified behavioral model.
We are interested in estimating the channels through which NEP aﬀects child
outcomes. Our hypothesis is that NEP changes exogenously parental beliefs and
expectations, which in turn can influence child outcomes in three possible ways:
i) indirectly encouraging measured stimulating parenting practices (change in in-
vestments); ii) directly changing child outcomes by aﬀecting how productive those
investments become; and iii) shifting other unobserved inputs. We investigate such
mechanisms by estimating the following linear technology of skill formation
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✓Kd = ⌧d + ⌧
I
d ✓
I
d + ⌧
B
d ✓
B
d +  d✓
K + ↵d✓
P +  dX + "d (4.4)
where for simplicity of notation we have dropped the time indexes. In this for-
mulation, ✓Kd are child cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes measured at follow-up
K = {C,N}; ✓Id are parental investments in children measured at follow-up, where
for now we consider only one dimension of stimulation; ✓Bd are parental beliefs mea-
sured at follow-up, where beliefs are our psychology-grounded measures of parenting
styles and perceived self-eﬃcacy, and the elicited maternal perception about the re-
turns to investments; finally, ✓K are child cognitive and non-cognitive skills measured
at baseline. Under this specification, participation into treatment can shift measured
inputs like beliefs and investments, can change unobserved inputs (⌧d), and can also
induce a change in the productivity of inputs and pre-treatment variables.
In the standard potential framework, we can write ✓Kd as
✓Kd = D✓
K
1 + (1 D) ✓K0
and similarly
✓Id = D✓
I
1 + (1 D) ✓I0
✓Bd = D✓
B
1 + (1 D) ✓B0
"d = D"1 + (1 D) "0
so the treatment gains are
E
 
✓K1   ✓K0 | ✓K , ✓P , X
 
= (⌧1   ⌧0)
+ ⌧ IdE
 
✓I0
 
+
 
⌧ I0 + ⌧
I
d
 
E
 
✓I1   ✓I0
 
(4.5)
+ ⌧Bd E
 
✓B0
 
+
 
⌧B0 + ⌧
B
d
 
E
 
✓B1   ✓B0
 
+ ( 1    0) ✓K + (↵1   ↵0) ✓P + ( 1    0)X
That is to say, the program can aﬀect inputs (for example through a change in
their expected returns to such inputs), and the productivity of inputs (for example,
by teaching parents how to better use their time with the child). In the case of
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inputs that can change with treatment (like investments and beliefs), we can actually
decompose the gains into pure changes in quantities, pure changes in productivity,
and the interaction between changes in quantities and productivities.
Changes in inputs
In order to decompose the gains in the equation above, we need to understand what
drives parental investments and beliefs, and to what extent the change in beliefs
induced by the program can explain the change in parental investments in children.
Let E
 
✓I1   ✓I0
 
be the impact of treatment on parental investments and E
 
✓B1   ✓B0
 
the impact of treatment on parental beliefs. In the same way we did it for child skills,
we can write the policy functions for investments and beliefs as
✓Bd = ⌧
B
d +  
B
d ✓
B + ↵Bd ✓
P +  Bd Z + !
B
d (4.6)
✓Id = ⌧
I
d + ⌧
I
d ✓
B
d +  
I
d✓
I + ↵Id✓
P +  IdZ + !
I
d
where ✓B and ✓I are the measurements of beliefs and investments at baseline, and
Z and X can have common variables.
We will assume that the marginal productivities of these equations are invari-
ant to treatment (we can relax that assumption later). Then we can compute the
treatment gains as
E
 
✓B1   ✓B0
 
=
 
⌧B1   ⌧B0
 
+  BE
 
✓Bbas
 
+ ↵BE
 
✓P
 
+  BE (Z)
E
 
✓I1   ✓I0
 
=
 
⌧ I1   ⌧ I0
 
+ ⌧ IE
 
✓B1   ✓B0
 
++ IE
 
✓Ibas
 
+ ↵IE
 
✓P
 
+  IE (Z)
which can then be used to estimate the decomposed treatment gains for child skills.
Changes in productivities
As discussed above, NEP not only aﬀect inputs but also has the potential to change
the returns to investments and beliefs. In that case, equation 4.4 becomes analogous
to the following linear technology
✓Kd = ⌧d
 
✓Bd , ✓
P , Z
 
+ ⌧ Id
 
✓Bd , ✓
P , Z
 
✓Id +  d
 
✓Bd , ✓
P , Z
 
✓K +  d
 
✓Bd , ✓
P , Z
 
Xd + "d
(4.7)
4 The Role of Beliefs in Parental Investments and Child Development 115
where now the productivities to each of the technology inputs are a function of
pre-program variables, and a function of parental beliefs.
⌧d
 
✓Bd , ✓
P , Z
 
= µ⌧d + ⌫
⌧
d✓
P + ⌘⌧d✓
B
d + ⇣
⌧
dZ + ⇢
⌧
d (4.8)
⌧ Id
 
✓Bd , ✓
P , Z
 
= µId + ⌫
I
d✓
P + ⌘Id✓
B
d + ⇣
I
dZ + ⇢
I
d
 d
 
✓Bd , ✓
P , Z
 
= µ d + ⌫
 
d ✓
P + ⌘ d ✓
B
d + ⇣
 
dZ + ⇢
 
d
 d
 
✓Bd , ✓
P , Z
 
= µXd + ⌫
X
d ✓
P + ⌘Xd ✓
B
d + ⇣
X
d Z + ⇢
X
d
Identification of the mechanisms
As noted by Heckman and Pinto (2013), estimating the equation (4.7) is problematic
if observed and unobserved inputs are correlated. In that case, measured inputs
are not statistically independent of counterfactual child outcomes conditional on
treatment status and pre-treatment variables. In our case, this means that the eﬀect
of both investments and beliefs in child outcomes would measure a combination of
the impact of these inputs, with a projection of them on correlated unobserved
inputs ⌧d.
Identification of the eﬀects of beliefs on investments, and the eﬀects of beliefs
and investments on outcomes becomes diﬃcult in this case. This happens because
of three reasons: 1) outcomes can change both because of changes in the returns
(which are a function of beliefs), and because of direct changes in inputs; 2) observed
and unobserved inputs are correlated, and unobserved inputs are also a function of
changes in beliefs; and 3) unobserved inputs change with treatment too.
To achieve identification, one needs to minimize the number of unobserved inputs
potentially correlated to observed inputs that vary with treatment. We follow two
strategies. First, we collect a very rich set of inputs both at baseline and at follow-up
that can vary with treatment. Regarding beliefs, we include psychology-grounded
measures of parental beliefs about how to raise children, perceived self-eﬃcacy, per-
ceived social support, and we elicit perceived returns to investments, instrument
which provides an additional powerful of identification of productivities (the in-
strument is described in section 4.5.4) In terms of parental investments, we collect
extensive data about the home environments, the quality of time spent in nurturing
activities with children, disciplinary strategies, expenditures in children, child care,
and we merge our data with administrative records informative of the child’s health
care and the use of social services. Finally, we collect information about important
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parental mediators like depression and parental stress. With such an amount of
measures, potentially unobservable inputs that may be changing with treatment are
very few. And second, even if there are some unobservable inputs which are left
behind, we have incorporated baseline measures in all the production functions (for
both inputs and outputs), so we can control at least for all unobservable inputs that
time invariant. Given that the time window between the baseline and follow-up
surveys is 18 months, these two strategies reduce the number of unobservable inputs
varying with treatment to a reasonably low level so our assumptions, while stronger,
are likely to hold.
4.5.3 The latent factor model
Measurements
Child outcomes, investments, beliefs and parental traits are likely to be measured
with error. It is standard in the literature of cognitive and non-cognitive skills to
use more than one measure to identify a single latent construct. This is done by
specifying a latent factor model in which the signal of each measure is splitted from
the error in order to identify the distribution of a latent factor. This methodology
might involve some concerns though. One the one hand, if diﬀerent measures sup-
posedly identifying a single latent construct are highly correlated with each other,
then measurement error is not a problem, as they are all noisy measures of the same
outcome. On the other hand, if the correlation is too low, we are potentially forc-
ing diﬀerent measures to identify a single latent construct when in reality they are
measuring diﬀerent things. 4.2 indicates that correlations among the diﬀerent child
outcomes are not too high but also not too low, which justifies the assumption of
at least one underlying latent factor. However, relatively high correlations between
cognitive and non-cognitive measurements require to study correlations among sub-
scales in order to make sure we can really identify two and not only one single latent
factor for skills.
Child Outcomes Language Exec. Functions Disruptive Behavior Socio-emotional
Cog - Language 1
Cog - Executive Functions 0.2999 1
Non Cog - Disruptive Behavior -0.1451 -0.1083 1
Non Cog - Socio-emotional 0.4177 0.1653 -0.1217 1
Table 4.2: Correlations measures of cognitive and non-cognitive skills
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Similarly, 4.3 and 4.4 show the correlations among measures of investments and
beliefs, respectively. The magnitude of the correlations are not high enough to
assume that these measurements are just noisy signals of the same latent construct,
so their inclusion in a latent factor model is justified.
Parental Investments HOME test PBC Nurturing PBC Neg.Discipline PBC Pos.Discipline
HOME test 1
PBC Nurturing Practices 0.4337 1
PBC Harsh Discipline -0.1354 -0.1498 1
PBC Positive Discipline 0.1622 0.3447 0.185 1
Table 4.3: Correlations measures of parental investments and practices
Parental Beliefs Autoritarian Style Autoritative Style Permissive Style Perceived Self-eﬃcacy
Autoritarian Style 1
Autoritative Style 0.4395 1
Permissive Style 0.237 0.3441 1
Perceived Self-eﬃcacy 0.0531 0.3052 0.0791 1
Table 4.4: Correlations measures of parental beliefs
Identification
The first step before estimation is to summarize multiple measures of child develop-
ment and parental investments into a low dimensional vector of factors and account
for measurement error. Our measurement system is:
MKd,j,t =  
K
j,t + '
K
j,t✓
K
d,t + ⌘
K
j,t (4.9)
M Id,j,t =  
I
j,t + '
I
j,t✓
I
d,t + ⌘
I
j,t
MBd,j,t =  
B
j,t + '
B
j,t✓
B
d,t + ⌘
B
j,t
MPd,j,t =  
P
j,t + '
P
j,t✓
P
d,t + ⌘
P
j,t
In this system, MKd,j,t denotes the j-th measurement of cognitive or non-cognitive
child outcomes ✓Kd,t; M Id,j,t is the j-th measurement of cognitive or non-cognitive
parental stimulation ✓Id,t; MBd,j,t is the j-th psychology-grounded measurement of
parental beliefs ✓Bd,t; and MPd,j,t is the j-th measurement of parental traits ✓Pd,t. We
should notice that ✓Kd,t, ✓Id,t, ✓Bd,t and ✓Pd,t can be vectors or scalars, which means that
we estimate flexible specifications where each measure can be a function of more
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than one factor.Furthermore, we will assume that factor loadings ' will not not
depend on treatment D. This assumption implies that the eﬀect of treatment on
the measurements operates only through the latent factors and not the measurement
system. This assumption can be easily tested estimating the measurement system
separately for treatment and control groups and comparing the intercepts and slopes.
The factor structure is characterized by the means factors E[✓Kd,t], E[✓Id,t], E[✓Bd,t], E[✓Pd,t]
and the variance covariance matrix across factors, treatment arms and periods ⌃✓.
The measurement system described above requires some conditions for identifi-
cation
• The model is flexible to include several factors by measure. This is particularly
useful for some developmental scales which are likely to be related to both
cognitive and non-cognitive skills. However, we need to restrict that at least
one measure per latent factor is exclusive to that factor.
• We set the factor scale, which means we need to standardize the factor loading
of one measure per latent factor and per period equal to 1, or 'K1,t = 'I1,t =
'B1,t = '
P
1,t = 1.
• We set the factor location by setting the intercept of the first measures to zero,
 K1,t =  
I
1,t =  
B
1,t =  
P
1,t = 0
• The measurement error ⌘Kj,t is a mean-zero error term independent of the latent
factors and of each other, E[⌘Kj,t] = E[⌘Ij,t] = E[⌘Bj,t] = E[⌘Pj,t] = 0
We proceed in several steps:
1. Identification of factor means: This is achieved by using the factor locations
of the first measure and the independence of measurement error
E[MKd,1,t] = E[✓
K
d,t]
E[M Id,1,t] = E[✓
I
d,t]
E[MBd,1,t] = E[✓
B
d,t]
E[MPd,1,t] = E[✓
P
d,t]
2. Identification of factor covariances: We use the covariances of the measurement
system. For example, let’s assume for now that each measurement is related
to only one factor, and we want to identify the factor loadings for child skills
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'Kj,t. If we have three measures for child skill K then we can write
MKd,1,t =  
K
1,t + ✓
K
d,t + ⌘
K
1,t
MKd,2,t =  
K
2,t + '
K
2,t✓
K
d,t + ⌘
K
2,t
MKd,3,t =  
K
3,t + '
K
3,t✓
K
d,t + ⌘
K
3,t
taking covariances we obtain
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,1,t) = cov(✓
K
1,t, ✓
K
0,t)
3. Identification of the factor loadings
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,2,t) = '
K
2,tcov(✓
K
1,t, ✓
K
0,t)
'K2,t =
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,2,t)
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,1,t)
in the same way we find
'K3,t =
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,3,t)
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,1,t)
4. Identification of the variance of each factor
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
1,2,t) = '
K
2,tvar(✓
K
1,t)
var(✓K1,t) =
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
1,2,t)
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,2,t)
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,1,t)
in the same way
cov(MK0,1,t,M
K
0,2,t) = '
K
2,tvar(✓
K
0,t)
var(✓K0,t) =
cov(MK0,1,t,M
K
0,2,t)
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,2,t)
cov(MK1,1,t,M
K
0,1,t)
5. Identification of the variances of measurement error: Is achieved using the
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factor loadings and variance of factors achieved in 3. and 4.
var(⌘Kj,t) = var(M
K
d,j,t)  ('Kj,t)2var(✓Kj,t)
6. Identification of the measurement means: As we have identified the factor
loadings and the mean factors, their identification is straightforward
 Kj,t = E[M
K
d,j,t]  'Kj,tE[✓Kj,t]
7. Identification of the production function: We want to identify the parameters
⌧d, ⌧ Id , ⌧Bd ,  d and ↵d from the production function
✓Kd,t+1 = ⌧d + ⌧
I
d ✓
I
d,t+1 + ⌧
B
d ✓
B
d,t+1 +  d✓
K
t + ↵d✓
P
t +  dXt + "d,t+1
Here we follow the same logic as in previous steps. Child skills at follow-up
are also measured with error, therefore the identification of each parameter is
achieved taking covariances between measurements of outputs and measure-
ments of inputs. For example, to identify ⌧ Id we first compute
cov(✓Kd,t+1,M
I
d,1,t+1) = ⌧
I
d cov(✓
K
d,t+1, ✓
I
d,t+1)
where the covariance across latent factors has been achieved in 2. We can
perform the same analysis for the remaining parameters of the production
function.
Estimation
The estimation procedure in a linear framework is a simple three-stage approach.
In the first stage, we estimate the measurement system specified in equation 4.9. In
our framework, the selection of factors is rather straightforward. We have defined
two factors per child skills (cognitive and non-cognitive) both at baseline and at
follow-up. Regarding parental investments, we will start simple by estimating only
one factor for child stimulation. Provided our data variability is good enough, we
will extend the analysis to two factors, one for cognitive stimulation and one for
non-cognitive stimulation. Regarding parental beliefs, we will include both factors,
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one for parenting styles, and one for perceived self-eﬃcacy. Finally, our data of
parental traits allows us to measure one factor for parental cognitive skills (based
on measures of language and quantitative skills), and one factor for non-cognitive
skills (based on personality traits and scales of stress and depression).
In the second stage, we use the set of measures, the factor loadings and the
identified covariance matrix of measurement errors to compute unbiased estimates
of the vector of latent factors for each individual. Heckman and Pinto (2013) show
that the unbiased estimator of the vector of factors is given by
✓i = ('
0⌦ 1') 1' 1⌦ 1Mi
where ✓i is the vector of latent factor of dimension dim(✓),Mi is the vector of stacked
measures for each participant subtracting the intercepts, whose dimension is the sum
across latent factors for all the available measures per factor; ' is the matrix of factor
loadings, whose dimension is dim(M)⇥ dim(✓); and ⌦i is the covariance matrix of
the measurement error.
Finally, in the third stage we use the estimated factor scores to estimate by
using standard least squares the equation 4.8 governing the productivity of inputs,
equation 4.6 determining inputs, and equation 4.7 estimating the linear technology
4.7.
4.5.4 A Structural Model of Parental Investments in Chil-
dren
The framework developed in section 4.5 provides a first look at the mechanisms
underlying program impacts. Although it is a statistical framework, it is very much
motivated by economic concerns, since what we essentially model a production func-
tion and a policy function for investments and beliefs. In this section we fully specify
a model of parental investments in children where beliefs and expectations have a
central role in generating the investment function as optimal behavior. If we can
estimate such a model we can then use it to simulate new policies.
To be specific, we plan to estimate a model in the fashion of Cunha and Heck-
man (2007) and Cunha and Heckman (2006) in which parents make choices about
consumption and child investments at diﬀerent child ages, and as a result of those
investments child cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes accumulate according to a
technology of skill formation. However, we depart from the standard approach by
explicitly incorporating our psychology-grounded measures of beliefs entering the
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technology, and by using the elicited perceived returns as determinants of the het-
erogeneity in parental investments (Badev and Cunha (2012)). Building on Cunha,
Elo, and Culhane (2013), the returns to child investments are uncertain to mothers.
From the perspective of the mother, returns are a random variable, mothers have
prior beliefs about them, and they are updated by a learning process after realizing
the child development status in the next period. Mothers have prior perceptions
about the mean and the variance of returns which are normally distributed, which
lends itself to a standard updating process using Bayesian methods.
We consider two dimensions of parental investments, cognitive and non-cognitive
stimulation. Non-cognitive aspects of investment are related to the behavioral man-
agement and socio-emotional stimulation, while cognitive aspects of investments
are more related to learning activities and language stimulation. These two latent
factors are extracted from the measurement system detailed in section 4.5.3.
Preferences
At each age of the child a the household value household consumption, ca, and
child’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills ✓ka, through a cobb-douglas utility function
u(ca, ✓
C
a , ✓
N
a ) = ↵1ln(ca) + ↵2ln(✓
C
a ) + ↵3ln(✓
N
a ) (4.10)
where the decision unit is the household as we are not able to identify time use of
mothers and fathers in the data. Our data on investments is related to the principal
caregiver, which in 95% of the cases is the mother.
In this specification, parental preferences for child human capital captured by
parameters ↵2 and ↵3 can be a function of observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
Including unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, and as discussed below, in ex-
pectations, makes identification very diﬃcult. But we discuss our strategy to solve
for this issue below. Denoting ba the household’s assets, ✓IC,a cognitive stimulation
and ✓IN,a non-cognitive stimulation, the budget constraints is defined by
ba+1 = (1 + r)ba + ya   ca + ⇡c✓IC,a + ⇡N✓IN,a (4.11)
where household income is stochastic and follows an AR(1) process
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ya = ⇢ya 1 + "a
"a s N(0,  2")
The technology of skill formation
Child’s cognitive and non-cognitive skills accumulate according to a Cobb-Douglas
technology of skill formation which is estimated separately for both treatment and
control groups. In further, we omit the index for treatment to simplify notation.
ln(✓ka+1) =  
k
1 ln(✓
C
a ) +  
k
2 ln(✓
N
a ) + ⌧
k
1 ln(✓
I
C,a) + ⌧
k
2 ln(✓
I
N,a) + ⌘
k
a (4.12)
The main diﬀerence with equation 4.7, is that now we depart from a linear
framework and we estimate a more flexible specification for the technology. We now
need to determine how our psychology-grounded measures of parental beliefs, ✓B,
and parental traits ✓P , enter the model. We allow them to enter the technology by
aﬀecting both the level of investments and the productivity of such investments. We
adopt a linear policy function for investments varying with beliefs, parental traits
and other observables characteristics like
✓Ik,a =  k,0 +  k,1✓
P
a +  k,2✓
B
a +  k,3Xa + ⌫k,a (4.13)
However, parental beliefs and other pre-treatment variables will also determine
the productivity of the stock of skills and the productivity of investments through
the following equations
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where again Z and X can have common variables.
In the framework laid out so far, the only sources of uncertainty are given by
income shocks and shocks to technology inputs. This means we are assuming that
the production function is fixed, i.e., parents know the returns to the relevant inputs.
This is a strong assumption, as parents usually take investment decisions with certain
level of uncertainty about the returns. It is therefore more realistic to assume that
4 The Role of Beliefs in Parental Investments and Child Development 124
the returns are probabilistic and parents learn about them as they observe the
outcomes of their previous investment decisions.
We model this in the following way. Parents have prior perceptions about the
parameters of the production function, which are probabilistic. In particular, we
collect data on subjective probabilities they put on the returns to cognitive and
non-cognitive stimulation ⌧ k1 and ⌧ k2 , so they have certain probabilistic distribution
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From either of these models we can derive reduced form relationships between
investments and beliefs, which we can then match with the data to try to back out the
parameters of the model. However, it is hard to separate unobserved heterogeneity
in preferences from unobserved heterogeneity in perceptions, unless they can be
assumed to be independent. Furthermore, parental beliefs cannot aﬀect preferences,
but only the levels of investments and the perceptions about the parameters of the
production function. This is itself a strong assumption.
In order to allow unobserved heterogeneity drive both preferences and expecta-
tions, we follow the approach of Badev and Cunha (2012) collecting expectations
data directly, as described in the next section.
Eliciting perceived returns to parental investments
We attempt to separately identify heterogeneity in preferences and expectations by
collecting expectations data about the returns to investments. In practice, this is
only going to be possible for few parameters, so we focus on the returns to cognitive
and non-cognitive stimulation.
The idea to collect data that allows us to directly recover:
f
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 
Then, using choices and budget constraints, one could in principle back out the
parameters of the utility function. But again one needs assumptions, if there are
unobserved input about which one is not expressing expectations on, or unobserved
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endowments. So this data will help a lot, but we still need some orthogonality
assumptions.
The target of collecting data about the vector of perceived returns to investments
{⌧ k1 , ⌧ k2 } is to identify a prior distribution that then we can use as a starting point
for the learning process. We assume the vector of priors is normally distributed
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(4.15)
The prior distribution is then updated using standard bayesian rules for the mean
and variance of normally distributed variables.
We now proceed to describe how the instrument to elicit perceived returns helps
us identify the prior distributions of the returns to cognitive and non-cognitive stim-
ulation.
We start by noting that the mother doesn’t know the technology, so she thinks
this is
E[ln(✓ka+1)] =  
k
1 ln(✓
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a ) +  
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2 ln(✓
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If we identify the prior distribution, we will also be able to estimate a production
function in which the mother learns about the returns to investments. In a setup with
one investment and one developmental measure, Cunha, Elo, and Culhane (2013)
show they can identify the means and variances characterizing the distribution of
returns by collecting data of expected developmental milestones in two investment
scenarios and two levels of initial endowments (health at birth). This approach is
useful if one is interested in estimating a production function with only one measure
of investment.
In our model, we are interested in cognitive and non-cognitive investments so we
construct four diﬀerent home environments, combining high/low cognitive stimula-
tion with high/low application of positive disciplinary strategies. To characterize a
rich/poor home environment for cognitive stimulation, we analyzed the HOME test
and analyzed parental behaviors belonging to the p75/p25 of the overall score. We
followed the same strategy to characterize rich/poor home environments for positive
disciplinary strategies, analyzing the scale Parenting Behavior Checklist, sub-scale
Discipline.
For each of the four home environments, we then ask the mother to report the
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minimum and the maximum age in which a child of certain age should be able to
achieve successfully a certain lists of tasks, which were carefully taken from the list
of tasks that a child of that age should be able to complete successfully 12 months
after in the language and the socio-emotional tests. The idea is to be able to anchor
maternal beliefs about child development to the actual development of the child we
will observe in the follow-up survey.
For example, suppose we ask the mother: “If the child is currently between 12
and 17 months-old, what do you think is the youngest age and the oldest age a child
learns to recognize body parts such as nose, eyes, feet, hands, mouth, etc?”. We
ask the mother to answer the age range for each of the four home environments.
Suppose the mother response to this task for one particular home environment
(for example rich/cognitive and rich/positive discipline) is{18, 28}. If we assume a
uniform distribution between the min/max age, then we should conclude that the
probability that the child completes successfully that task at age 24 is 0.5.
For illustration of how the instrument identifies the distribution of returns,
suppose [✓¯IC , ✓
I
C ] are the high/low cognitive stimulation scenarios and [✓¯IN , ✓
I
N ]the
high/low non-cognitive stimulation scenarios. From mothers responses about age-
specific developmental tasks we can recover the expected outcomes under diﬀer-
ent combinations of scenarios E[✓ka | ✓¯IC , ✓¯IN ], E[✓ka | ✓¯IC , ✓IN ], E[✓ka | ✓IC , ✓¯IN ], and
E[✓ka | ✓IC , ✓IN , ]. Using the technology specification we can write for example
E[✓ka | ✓¯IC , ✓¯IN ],=  k1 ln(✓Ca ) +  k2 ln(✓Na ) + µk0,1ln(✓¯IC,a) + µk0,2ln(✓¯IN,a) (4.17)
This expectation can be recovered from our elicited subjective probabilities by
using IRT methods. The idea of the methodology is to provide a map between
an underlying factor and the probability with which some particular values of that
trait occur. Here we take advantage of the fact that mothers have provided us
subjective probabilities about developmental tasks that we actually assess in children
of the same age and similar household characteristics. Therefore we can map those
probabilities with expectations in equation 4.17 in the way it is shown in Figure 4.2
Once the expectations have been recovered, it can be shown that
µk0,2 =
E[✓ka | ✓¯IC , ✓¯IN ]  E[✓ka | ✓¯IC , ✓IN ]
ln(✓¯IN)  ln(✓IN)
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Figure 4.2: Mapping Subjective Probabilities to Conditional expectations through
IRT models
and
µk0,1 =
E[✓ka | ✓¯IC , ✓¯IN ]  E[✓ka | ✓IC , ✓¯IN ]
ln(✓¯IC)  ln(✓IC)
4.6 Baseline Data
In this final section we discuss the main insights of the baseline data, describing
the target population, the balance of the sample, the socio-economic gradients for
the main inputs and outputs, and we provide multivariate correlations setting the
ground for the empirical analysis when the follow-up data is available (October
2014).
4.6.1 Target Population
NEP serves the poorest socio-economic groups who are attended in the public health
system. The average monthly income per-capita of the household in our baseline
sample is Ch$85.960 (US$ 171.9). In contrast, the monthly average household in-
come per capita of the Chilean population in 2011 was Ch$ 243.670 (US$ 487.3),
according to the CASEN 2011 survey. NEP participants are much poorer than the
Chilean population and than the standard user of the public health system, which
makes this evaluation more interesting from a developmental perspective. In fact,
52.1% of our sample are in the first quantile of the national income distribution, and
only 1% in the fifth quantile. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of incomes.
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Figure 4.3: Income per capita in CLP: i) National, ii) National users of the public
system, iii) NEP
4.6.2 Data descriptives
Sociodemographics
Table 4.5 presents the main descriptive statistics and sample balance for the 2,916
principal caregivers and 3,597 children participating in the evaluation. Among them,
53.38% are males, and the average age was 27.96 months. The majority of children in
the study were below 2 years old (47.4%), however the age distribution is widespread.
We don’t find significant diﬀerences across groups nor in gender or in the order of
the child among all siblings, but for children below 12 months old in the Control
group. Caregivers are mostly mothers (94%), followed by grandmothers. We find a
very low presence of the father in our sample (1.5%), which is consistent with the
data from the program. The average age of caregivers is 28.94 years old. The biggest
proportion of our sample of caregivers are between 21 and 30 years old. Regarding
education, roughly 60% of our sample finish secondary school, and 16% has some
level of College. As discussed above, the representative family in our sample is very
poor, with an average per-capita household income of 86 US$/month. Participant
families are in a large proportion bi-parental non-extended (presence of the father
and the mother, with no other adults at home). 10% of the sample are mono-parental
non-extended (single mothers with no presence of other adults).
It’s important to notice that except from the youngest age group of children,
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our sample is balanced across treatment groups for all the main socio-demographic
characteristics of participants.
Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics and Sample Balance Socio-demographic variables
Note: (*) significant diﬀerences across treatment groups at 10%; (**) significant diﬀerences at 5%
Beliefs and Investments
Table 4.6 describes basic descriptive statistics and sample balance for parental beliefs
and investments. The IRT estimates of the scale Ideas About Parenting measuring
parenting styles do not show significant diﬀerences across treatment arms. We also
do not find significant diﬀerences in raw scores across groups in parental perceived
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self-eﬃcacy, nor in perceived social support. Regarding investments, IRT estimates
of the HOME scale do not show significant diﬀerences across groups. The same is
true for the PBC Nurturing and Discipline scales.
Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics and Sample Balance Beliefs and Investments
Note: (*) significant diﬀerences across treatment groups at 10%; (**) significant
diﬀerences at 5%
Child outcomes
Finally, Table 4.7 describes child outcomes and our baseline sample balance. The
first panel shows child’s performance in language development measured with the
scale PLSIV. A 70% of our sample between 3 months and 5 years old are diagnosed
in the normal range, while 4,5% are diagnosed with clinical delays. We do not find
significant diﬀerences across groups in any sub-scale.
The second panel describes executive functions measures, which are defined as
the cognitive aspects of self-control like working memory, inhibitory control and
attention shifting. The Dimensional Card Sort scale (DCCS) measures executive
functions performance in children older than 24 months old. In the test, if the
child doesn’t pass the first stage, she cannot be evaluated, which means that her
performance is too low to be measured by the scale. If the child passes the first stage,
she is evaluated as “Normal” if she completes the task, or “Altered” if she leaves the
task incomplete. The table shows the proportion of children with “Altered” results
out of those who passed the first stage. We din’t find any significant diﬀerences in
the diagnostic across groups, except for the age groups 24-25 and 60-72 months.
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The last two panels shows our measures of non-cognitive development. The pos-
itive aspects of socio-emotional development are measured with the Battelle scale.
In our sample, 73,3% of the children 0 to 5 years old showed a normal performance.
Some negative aspects of emotional development are captured by the CBCL scale
measuring behavioral problems with pairs and adults, and it is applied to children
between 18 months and 5 years old. In our sample, more than 28% of the sam-
ple shows some mild or severe level of alteration. We do not find any significant
diﬀerences in scores or diagnostic across groups in these two dimensions.
Table 4.7: Descriptive Statistics and Sample balance child outcomes
Note: (*) significant diﬀerences across treatment groups at 10%; (**) significant
diﬀerences at 5%
4.6.3 Socioeconomic Gradients
The importance of socio-economic gradients in explaining early gaps in cognitive
and non-cognitive child outcomes in developing countries is well documented in
the literature of child development (see for example Fernald, Weber, Galasso, and
Ratsifandrihamanana (2011) andSchady, Behrman, Araujo, Azuero, Bernal, Bravo,
Lopez-Boo, Macours, Marshall, Paxson, and Others (2014)). By showing that these
socio-economic gradients also occur at the level of parental investments, some au-
thors have emphasized the role of credit constraints driving sub-optimal parental
investments in children. Yet there is much about the role of family background that
we still do not understand, in particular the role of parental beliefs and attitudes.
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In this section, we provide evidence that parental beliefs and expectations are po-
tentially at the root of the sharp socioeconomic diﬀerences found in outcomes and
investments.
Figure 4.4 documents SES gradients in child’s cognitive skills. Panel a) exam-
ines language development. Children of more educated mothers obtain significantly
higher standardized scores in both receptive and expressive language. If we plot the
same figure but using parental income quintiles instead, the graph shows exactly
the same patter. Panel b) presents the SES gradients for child’s performance in
executive functions, where the y-axis measures the number of unsuccessful trials in
the task before performing it correctly.
Figure 4.4: SES gradients in cognitive skills; a) Language; b) Executive functions
Figure 4.5 documents SES in non-cognitive skills. Panel a) presents the results
for maladaptive behavior measured with the CBCL scale, which basically test the
negative aspects of socio-emotional development. Children of more educated moth-
ers present less behavioral problem, trend that is repeated among all the sub-scales
of the test (somatization, sleeping problems, attention disorders, emotional reac-
tive, etc). Panel b) presents the gradients for the Battelle test, which measures
the positive aspects of socio-emotional development. Again, children of more edu-
cated mothers show larger social abilities in dimensions like interactions with adults,
interactions with peers and social adaptation.
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Figure 4.5: SES gradients in non-cognitive skills
Figure 4.6 confirms previous findings of sharp socioeconomic gradients in cog-
nitive and non-cognitive parental investments (Moon (2010)). Panel a) presents
describes the gradients for non-cognitive stimulation strategies. The Parenting Be-
havior Checklist sub-scale Nurturing, which measures socio-emotional stimulation
and positive reinforcing of desirable child behavior, is strongly positively correlated
to maternal education. Instead, the sub-scale of Discipline, which measures the use
of harsh disciplinary strategies to correct for undesirable disruptive behavior of the
child, is negatively associated to maternal education. Panel b) presents the SES
gradients for cognitive stimulation strategies measured with the Family Care Indi-
cators scale. The test, which includes measures of the number of books and and
magazines at home, the time spent with children in learning and play activities, and
the variety of materials for learning and play, is positively correlated to maternal
education.
Figure 4.6: SES in parental investments a) Non-cognitive stimulation; b) Cognitive
stimulation
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Finally, Figure 4.7 present the SES gradients for our psychology-grounded mea-
sures of beliefs. Panel a) shows that more educated parents tend to see their role as
parents less associated to authoritarian and permissive styles, and more associated
to the authoritative style. Recall that the latter parenting style is associated to
positive parenting and combines warmth and structure in a balanced way. The pat-
terns are identical if the scales are plot agains household income. Panel b) presents
the SES gradients for perceived self-eﬃcacy. More educated mothers also perceive
themselves more competent and have higher self-esteem in the child-rearing task.
Figure 4.7: SES gradients in parental beliefs a) parenting styles; b) perceived self-
eﬃcacy
4.6.4 Stylized Facts
The baseline data suggests that some strong associations between parental cognitive
and non-cognitive stimulation and our psychology-grounded measures of parental be-
liefs. Note that we cannot include data on elicited perceived returns to investments
because this data is only collected at follow-up. Table Regressions Parental Invest-
ments on Psychology-grounded parental beliefs presents multivariate regressions of
error-free IRT estimates of investments on error-free estimates of parental beliefs.
We control for family socioeconomic background and demographics, family compo-
sition and caregiver mental health. Some interesting results can be noticed. The
authoritative style, which is associated to positive parenting, is positively associated
to cognitive stimulation (home environment scales) and socio-emotional stimulation
(PBC Nurturing scale). The authoritarian style is negatively associated to both
cognitive and socio-emotional stimulation, but is positively associated to the use
of harsh disciplinary strategies. Regarding perceived self-eﬃcacy, correlations with
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investments go in the proposed directions: parents who perceive themselves more
competent or have higher self-esteem in the parental task also stimulate more their
children and apply less harsh disciplinary strategies.
Table 4.8: Regressions Parental Investments on Psychology-grounded parental be-
liefs
Table Regressions Child Outcomes on parental investments and parental beliefs
presents correlations between diﬀerent dimensions of child outcomes and parental in-
vestments (specification 1), and the same associations but including our psychology-
grounded measures of parental beliefs (specification 2). Most of the associations go
in the directions proposed by our model of change. For example, cognitive stim-
ulation (FCI scale) is positively correlated to language, executive functions and
socio-emotional development, while it is not associated to maladaptive behavior
(positive scores of this scales are related to worse outcome). Socio-emotional stimu-
lation (PBC Nurturing scale) is positively correlated to socio-emotional development
and negatively correlated to maladaptive behavior, correlations that remain stronger
even after including parental beliefs. Disciplinary strategies are positively correlated
to maladaptive behavior, even though they are also positively correlated to language
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development and socio-emotional development. Analysis from a factor model shows
that the reason for this result is because this scale actually entails two latent fac-
tors, one related to positive disciplinary strategies and another related to punitive
disciplinary strategies. The first factor correlates to language and socio-emotional
development, while the second factor correlates to maladaptive behavior.
Tables Regressions Parental Investments on Psychology-grounded parental beliefs
and Regressions Child Outcomes on parental investments and parental beliefs shed
light about the role of parental beliefs in child development. Beliefs are strongly cor-
related to parental investments, supporting the idea of the indirect eﬀect of beliefs
in child outcomes through investments discussed in section Decomposing treatment
eﬀects. But after controlling for parental investments, beliefs also have significant
eﬀects in child outcomes, suggesting that there might be a direct eﬀect for exam-
ple through changes in the productivity of investments. Moreover, the correlations
below go all in the proposed directions: authoritative parents have children per-
forming significantly better in language, executive functions and socio-emotional
development. Instead, children of authoritarian show lower language development,
and children of permissive parents have higher levels of behavioral problems. Fi-
nally, perceived self-competence is strongly associated to socio-emotional develop-
ment and perceived social support is positively associated to executive functions and
socio-emotional skills.
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Table 4.9: Regressions Child Outcomes on parental investments and parental beliefs
4.7 Concluding remarks
Investments in human capital are central for economic growth and for the reduction
of inequality. They are particularly relevant for improving the situation of the poor
and breaking the intergenerational transmission of poverty. That said, the question
of how best to foster human capital formation among the most disadvantaged is
not an easy question to answer. There exists increasing evidence that high quality
early childhood investments produce gains in child development that translate into
improved long-run outcomes. However, much less is known about the channels
through which these programs operate, and how high quality investments can be
fostered in the family. Moreover, the provision of additional financial resources to
poor families does not automatically translate into better development (e.g., Mayer
(1997)). This demands a shift in research focus, from understanding the impacts of
resources, to understanding the determinants of behaviors.
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We attempt to address these questions by conducting the impact evaluation
of a nationally-scaled center-based parenting program in Chile using Randomized
Control Trials methods. The intervention is likely to change three dimensions of
parental beliefs: beliefs about what is the best way to raise children, beliefs about
how confident parents feel about the parenting task, and parental perception about
the returns to investments in children. By collecting pre and post-treatment data
from a sample of more than 3,000 households, we investigate the eﬀects of these
beliefs on parental investments and on child development.
Our project has several innovations. First, this is the first work collecting several
measures of beliefs that complement each other, forming a much more complete set
of beliefs than ever considered before. Second, we use the exogenous variation of
beliefs provided by the intervention to investigate treatment eﬀects controlling for
measurement error. Third, we investigate the indirect eﬀects of beliefs in outcomes
by changing parental investments and the direct eﬀects by changing the productivity
of those investments under relatively weak assumptions. Fourth, we take advantage
of the experimental data to separately identify heterogeneous preferences and expec-
tations in the estimation of a model of parental investments in children in which we
emphasize that parents are uncertain about the returns to investments in the tech-
nology of skill formation. Such a model will be potentially useful for the simulation
of more cost-eﬀective early child development policies.
Evidence from the baseline data is encouraging about the potential findings.
First, the randomization worked across all our measurements. Second, evidence
from the socio-economic gradients show that parental beliefs might be at the root
of the well documented gradients in child development and parental investments,
which we also find in our data. Third, the policy works with the most disadvantaged
sectors of the Chilean population, so the potential returns of the intervention are
big, and externally valid to the poorer segments of other countries. And finally,
the multivariate associations are supportive of our modeling framework. Parental
beliefs are strongly correlated (in the right directions) with parental investments,
and parental investments strongly correlated to several dimensions of child outcomes,
which is line with the suggested indirect eﬀects of beliefs in outcomes. Moreover,
we also find some evidence of a direct eﬀect of beliefs in child outcomes, which is
line with the idea that beliefs and attitudes also modify the productivity of such
investments.
Chapter 5
A Collective Model of Labor
Informality and Self-employment
5.1 Introduction
In this work in progress I sketch a model that studies comprehensively all the in-
teracting incentives to work informally and in self-employment activities over the
life-cycle in developing countries. I focus the analysis on four driving forces. The
first one is comparative advantage, where I assess how sector-specific returns to hu-
man capital and preferences for job amenities jointly determine self-selection into
schooling and into a particular sector of employment. The second one is the design
of the welfare system. I assess how contributed-based pension and health systems
and diﬀerent conditional and unconditional welfare influence sorting into informal
jobs or self-employment. Third, I study the extent to which informality and self-
employment are the result of optimal collective decisions maximizing the output of
home production, which could happen either because of these labor markets are
more flexible and then more compatible with home production tasks like child-
rearing, or simply because of by choosing diﬀerent working sectors there is optimal
intra-household risk sharing. Finally, I assess the importance of capital accumulation
through asset holding for self-employment.
The modeling framework is a life-cycle model in which single-earner and double-
earner households jointly decide schooling, labor supply and consumption. Individu-
als are heterogeneous in skills and preferences, feature that is modeled as permanent
unobserved heterogeneity. Individuals start making decisions early in the life-cycle,
so schooling is endogenous to sector-specific labor market expectations and poten-
tially influenced by marriage prospects. The schooling decision involves to complete
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secondary education or not, and to attend diﬀerent types of post-secondary educa-
tion, which are associated to substantial diﬀerences in labor market returns. Work
participation involves four exclusive sectors: formal salaried employment, informal
salaried employment, self-employment, and home production/non-participation. A
key aspect of our model is that family composition is determined endogenously. Indi-
viduals get marriage according to an unobserved match quality preferences, which is
adjusted dynamically throughout time as single individuals learn about their outside
option.
This work in progress attempts to answer the general research question of why
people sort into the informal sector and into self-employment. In particular, it will
tackle the following specific questions:
1. Does comparative advantage, and in particular education, provide access to
better jobs particularly in the formal sector?
2. Do individuals self-select into informality and self-employment based on un-
observed skills and preferences?
3. How do the incentives provided by a fully-funded pension and health system
aﬀect informlaity and self-employment?
4. How do the incentives provided by welfare schemes like unemployment insur-
ance and wage subsidies aﬀect informality and self-employment?
5. What’s the role of intra-household specialization in home and market activities
and the role of flexibility in determining gender-specific work participation in
the informal sector and in self-employment?
6. What’s the role of asset accumulation in the size of self-employment?
As in Chapter 1, the model will be estimated using the same longitudinal household
survey data from Chile, but now including both males and females. The survey
retrieves detailed information on educational choices at the secondary and post-
secondary levels, sector-specific labor supply, wages, family assets and debts, and
household composition. Data on social security contributions and welfare benefits
is merged from administrative records.
This work intends to contribute to the literature of informality and self-employment
in four aspects. First, I disentangle informality from self-employment. Informal
workers are salaried employees hired without a contract and who are not paid the
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social security contributions (illegal informality), while the self-employed are inde-
pendent workers or firm-owners who have the choice to contribute or not to the
welfare system. These two types of labor have been traditionally pooled in the liter-
ature of labor informality but they diﬀer in observed and unobserved characteristics
and life-cycle participation show opposite patterns. Informal employees are usually
young workers that accept jobs oﬀers without a contract as an entry cost to labor
markets, and as they gain experience, they move to formal jobs. Thus informality
decreases over the life-cycle. Instead, the self-employed usually start working in
the formal sector and as they gain experience and accumulate capital, start run-
ning their own businesses. Therefore, self-employment increases over the life-cycle.
Self-employment is often associated to a choice based on entrepreneurship skills and
capital accumulation (Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007); Bosch and Maloney (2007))
while salaried informality is often related to labor market segmentation.
Second, there is still little evidence on how schooling is associated to informality
and self-employment in a dynamic context. Few papers have documented that edu-
cation is a passport to better jobs in the formal sector using longitudinal data, but
they either consider education as exogenous or they fail to control for unobserved fac-
tors interacting with the schooling decision. For example, returns to human capital
in self-employment activities require taking into account the role of entrepreneurship
abilities. Or there may be little scope for educational policies reducing informality
if sector-specific labor supply is a choice based on unobserved skills. In this work,
individuals can self-select into higher education and into diﬀerent types of college
based on sector-specific returns, there is an explicit role for unobserved skills linking
schooling and sector-specific comparative advantage, and I allow for expectations
about marriage to aﬀect the schooling decision.
Third, I study labor informality and self-employment in the context of endoge-
nous labor supply and family formation decisions, features that have not been studies
together before but they are supported by data decriptives. While female labor sup-
ply is only 44% (compared to 73% for males), females tend to work more informally
and self-employed than males at all education levels, suggesting an important degree
of intra-household specialization of labor supply not only in the extensive margin,
but also in the choice of a particular sector. Informal jobs and self-employment
are often associated with more flexible working hours, which may make these jobs
more compatible with home production. Therefore, the dynamics of family composi-
tion would be endogenously determined along labor supply and consmption/savings
decisions. With regard to marriage, it will be assumed that in an eﬃcient frame-
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work single individuals match optimally with another single household according
educational group and match quality preferences. Divorce is determined optimally
comparing current situation with the outside option (Voena and Bayok (2014),Maz-
zocco, Ruiz, and Yamaguchi (2014),Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002),Pistaferri,
Meghir, Voena, and Low (2013)).
The final intended contribution is regarding the policy evaluation dimension.
Such a model will allow me to perform the ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of several
policies. One of them is the reform to pension system. Joubert (2010),Joubert and
Todd (2011) and Attanasio, Meghir, and Otero (2011a) study a first reform imple-
mented in 2008 but in their papers they do not account for the diﬀerence between
self-employment and salaried informality, they disregard human capital accumula-
tion, and the dynamics of family formation is purely exogenous. In this work I put
all these elements together and therfore a comprehensive evaluation of the eﬀects on
informality of changes to the social security system can be made. Moreover, as the
contributed-based pension system is obligatory for salaried workers but voluntary
for the self-employed, I will be able to simulate a forthcoming reform starting in 2015
making the contributions compulsory for the self-employed, which potentially can
change the incentives from the welfare system to informality and self-employment.
A second important forthcoming reform is the reform to the post-secondary educa-
tion system. College education is very expensive in Chile (45% of average annual
wage rates) and there is a high degree of heterogeneity in returns to diﬀerent types
of degrees and types of institutions comparable to the US. A new reform starting in
2015 will make College education for free for the first three income quintiles of the
income distribution aﬀecting all types of College institutions. Such a sharp exoge-
nous change in the direct costs to schooling is expected to produce a sharp change
in the distribution of college enrollment and in labor market participation.
Regarding ex-post policy evaluation, I will be able to estimate the long-term
eﬀects of recently implemented reforms. First, the introduction of an unemployment
insurance scheme in 2002, which is partially financed by workers, the employer and
the Government. Workers can claim the subsidy after having worked formally and
contributed to the system for 12 months (over the last 24 months). The long-term
eﬀects of the policy and the change of incentives for human capital accumulation
have never been evaluated before. Second, the implementation of an employment
subsidy for young workers introduced in 2008. This means-tested subsidy is oﬀered
to workers between 18 and 25 years old belonging to the first two income quintiles.
The scheme operates like a standard tax credit scheme changing the slope of the
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budget constraint at diﬀerent income ranges. Bravo and Rau (2012) analyze the
short-term eﬀects of the subsidy using a RDD approach, but there are no studies
analyzing the eﬀects of those subsidies over the life-cycle. Finally, the introduction
of a state guaranteed credit program (CAE) to finance college education. Rau,
Rojas, and Urzúa (2013) use a structural approach the short-term eﬀects on college
participation and drop-out rates, but the long-term eﬀects (particularly labor market
outcomes) of private loans to college education have not yet been studied.
5.2 The Model
This is partial equilibrium life-cycle model with three stages: young life, adult life,
and retirement. In the young life, individuals decide whether to invest in human
capital or not by first attending High School or not, and after so choosing diﬀerent
types of College. Educational choices depend upon the cost of eﬀort of education,
monetary costs of schooling like tuition fees, and expectations about the future
regarding private returns in the labor market, and marriage and fertility prospects.
The cost of eﬀort is driven by ability endowments which are modelled as a flexible
distribution of unobserved discrete and finite types. The role of these unobserved
types will be fundamental for our modeling framework: they will provide a direct
link between abilities and skills driving sector-specific wage returns when people
enter into the adult life.
If individuals drop schooling at any stage, they enter the adult life. At this stage,
people optimally choose consumption and labor supply optimally, but they also may
decide to form a new family by getting married. The labor supply decision involves
allocating time to the home production of a public good, or to market production in
one of three sectors: the formal sector, the informal sector, and self-employment ac-
tivities. Individuals can choose to work in market production part-time or full-time,
so they also spend time in home production. The choice of sector determines im-
portant sources of individual and household insurance. Formal jobs, unlike informal
jobs and self-employment, requires contributing to the social security system and
therefore individuals have access to the private health care system which is of better
quality. Formal jobs also provide insurance against income shocks after retirement,
as earners compulsory accumulate 10% of their gross salary into a pension savings
account which they can use only upon retirement (65 for males, 60 for females). The
self-employed can choose to contribute voluntarily either to their pension account
or to the health system. Individuals can also smooth out income or unemployment
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shocks through borrowing and saving. This channel may be particularly important
for informal workers or the self-employed who face a larger volatility of income and
employment. Private savings may also have the role of insuring households that have
worked little in formal jobs and therefore will face low incomes after retirement. In
the case of married couples, individuals will also have more flexibility to adapt their
labor supply to the requirements of home production. For example, women can take
part-time jobs or they can work informally or self-employed, jobs which are often
associated to more flexibility and autonomy.
The dynamics of marriage and divorce is characterized by an intertemporal col-
lective model with no commitment. Single individuals draw potential partners every
period and can get married, but they cannot commit to the initial allocation of re-
sources in the future. Instead, every period they can renegotiate the initial plan
or get divorced if it is optimal for one or the two spouses In this modelling frame-
work, individual preferences are determined by individual consumption and leisure,
by the public good collectively produced at home, and by the matching quality if
they are married (Mazzocco, Ruiz, and Yamaguchi (2014)). After marriage, each
subsequent period partners evaluate marriage continuation by comparing the indi-
vidual value of marriage against the outside option of divorce. Matching quality is
unobserved but it will be set at the beginning of the marriage depending on spouses
unobserved types, and then it will evolve according to matching shocks. Married
households will jointly decide consumption and labor supply eﬃciently in a cooper-
ative framework, where each of the spouses has certain bargaining power. I follow
the approach of Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002), Voena and Bayok (2014) and
Pistaferri, Meghir, Voena, and Low (2013) to determine the pareto weights. At the
moment of the match, they are found so that gains from marriage relative to the
outside option for each spouse are equated. After marriage, weights will evolve so
that gains from mariage are equally splitted, and if at some point there is no weight
that make both spouses to prefer marriage than divorce, the marriage terminates.
At the retirement stage, which starts at age 60 for women and 65 for men and
lasts until age 75 for both, single or married individuals are not allowed to work
and they will consume the household incomes, which will be provided by the indi-
vidual accumulated pension savings, by household assets, and by any sort of public
transfers. Married couples are not allowed to get divorce at this stage.
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5.2.1 Timing and Decisions
Individuals of both gender (j = m, f) start making educational choices at age 14
based on expected returns, directly observed costs to schooling, and unobserved het-
erogeneity. Unobserved skills are modeled as initial skill endowments by including
discrete and finite k unobserved types (Heckman and Singer, 1984). Years of sec-
ondary schooling will be pooled into the first period of the model, while from age
18 onwards each period of the model will represent one year in the life-cycle. While
in secondary schooling, individuals do not need to fund their own education and
consumption, but they have to fund post-secondary education with own income or
student loans. People may achieve five schooling paths, denoted by s. They may be
high school dropouts (s = 1), obtain a high school diploma (s = 2), and at age 18
to start three exclusive post-secondary careers: a technical degree in a Professional
Institute (s = 3), often lasting 3 years, a college degree in a high quality university
(usually public) lasting 5 years (s = 4), or a college degree in a low-quality (usually
private) university (s = 4). djs,t equals 1 if individual achieves maximum schooling
type s, which I denote byEdj.
Denoting the age of individuals by tj, individuals meet a potential partner of the
same unobserved type with certain probability and can get married, which happens
if the single-earner value function is lower than the value of marriage. Individuals
hold their own assets before marriage, while household assets after marriage are
pooled individual assets. Two-earners household utility will be the weighted sum of
individual utilities, where the Pareto weights are endogenously determined according
to the diﬀerence between the value of staying in marriage and the outside option for
each of the household members. In the same way, two-earners households can split
up into single-earner households by comparing the benefits of staying married, which
depend on the matching quality, with the value of becoming a single-earner. When
this happens, assets are divided according to their bargaining power. Children arrive
with exogenous probabilities which depends on spouses education, marital status,
female age, and the presence of other children.
After dropping out school, single-earners and two-earner households start making
consumption and labor supply decisions. Two-earners household decisions are taken
according to spouses’ bargaining power determined at the moment of matching.
Labor supply choices are the following: individuals can work as a salaried employee
in the formal sector (a = 1), work as a salaried employee in the informal sector (a =
2), be self-employed (a = 3), or home production (a = 4). Individual consumption is
cjt and career choices d
j
a,t equals 1 if individual chooses alternative a. Moreover, part-
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time jobs only in the formal salaried or in the informal salaried sectors is allowed for
females, alternative denoted by the variable pjt . Every period an earner decide to
work in sectors a = {1, 2, 3}, they accumulate one additional year of experience kjt , or
half a year if they work part-tine. If one earner decides to work in the formal salaried
sector, a fixed amount of her wage (  = 10%) is saved in her pension account, money
that can only be used for retirement. Ultimately, this is a human capital investment
model, so the wage oﬀer in a particular sector of the economy is the realization of a
sector-specific technology of skill production function, in which each skill component
is valued according to a sector-specific equilibrium rental price. In our model, the
skill vector comprises education, sector-specific experience and innate ability.
5.2.2 The Young Life
At this stage individuals make educational choices based upon expected returns to
schooling, marriage prospects and realized costs. Decisions are strictly individual,
as I don’t allow people to get married until they finish schooling or dropput. Mon-
etary costs of education at secondary level are very low and we assume that the
level of assets at age 14 is zero, so schooling participation at this stage depends on
ability and family characteristics. Instead, post-secondary education starting at age
t = 18 is costly, so own consumption and fees should be funded with own assets
(parental wealth) or student loans, and I restrict preference for leisure to behave as
if college students worked full-time in the formal sector. Denote by µk is initial skill
endowment of individual type k at age 14, and zi a set of observed socioeconomic
background variables of the student’s family (parents education and SES index).
The flow utility of attending schooling level s which lasts ⌧s periods is
U js,k =
8>>><>>>:
 js,0,kµk +  
j
s,1,z
j   ⌘js if s = 2
(cj⌧s )
1  
1   exp
 
( js,1(d
j
1,t = 1)
 
+  js,2z
j +  js,0,kµk + ⌘
j
s if s = {3, 4, 5}
Where  js,0,k is the cost of eﬀort of education at level s for individual type k, and
⌘js is a random eﬀort cost.
Let ⌦1 the state space at the beginning of secondary schooling years. Indi-
viduals choose either to finish high school or to drop out and start working in a
particular sector of employment, or leisure/home production picking the choice tha
maximizes life-time utility, where the choice-specific value function for attending
secondaryschooling is
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V js=2(⌦
j
t=1) = U
,j
s=2,k + Emax
h
V js={3,4,5}(⌦
j
t=2 | Edj = 2), V j,workt=2 (⌦jt=2 | Edj = 1)
i
where V js={3,4,5}(⌦
j
t=2 | Edj = 2) represents the value of attending any of the col-
lege choices given that the individual decided to finish secondary schooling, and
V j,workt=2 (⌦
j
t=2 | Edj = 1) is the value of any working alernative given that the indi-
vidual decided to remain as a high school drop-out.
At age 18 the problem is slightly diﬀerent, because individuals must fund educa-
tion with own assets. Let ⌦jt=2 the state space at the beginning of the period which
includes initial assets and previous education level. I allow for College students to
drop out education before they finish their degrees, and I also allow them to switch
education to a diﬀerent College type. The choice-specific value function of attending
College types s = {3, 4, 5} is
V jt=2,s(⌦
j
t=2) = Max
c⌧s
 
U ,js,k +  EVt+1(⌦
j
t+1 | ⌦jt)
 
s.to.
Ajt+1 = R
⌧sAjt   cjt   Fs
whereFs are observed tuition fees for each type of post-secondary education, and
Ajt is the individual level of assets at a particular age.
5.2.3 The Adult Life
Preferences
Single individuals have preferences over own consumption and leisure, and they value
the ouput of home production. Married individuals additonally value the quality of
the matching. Utility is assumed to be separable in consumption, leisure or sector-
specific dis-utility of work, the output of home production Qt, and the matching
quality (✓t,k), which is assumed to be type-specific. Home production is assumed
to be a cobb-douglas production function of the number of children, time at home,
and work participation in informal jobs or self-employed. In our data I cannot
distinguish between leisure and actual home production. Under this specification, I
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can capture the importance of informality and self-employment either in providing
more flexibility and autonomy to maximize home production, and the dis-utility
they create by restricting access to fringe benefits and the access to a better quality
of health both attached to formal contracts. Moreover, individuals switch jobs across
sectors face transition costs, reflecting search costs, the availability of networks, or
psychological costs associated to start a job in new environments.
I model individual preferences as
Ujt,k(c
j
t , d
j
t , p
j
t , Qt,k, ✓t,k) =
(cjt )
1  
1    exp
n
 j1d
j
1,t +  
j
2d
j
2,t +  
j
3d
j
3,t
o
+ ↵j logQjt (nt, d
j
t , p
f
t ) + ✓t,k1[mt = 1]
+  j1d
j
1,t +  
j
2d
j
2,t +  
j
3d
j
3,t + '
j
1
⇣
dj1,t, d
j
4,t 1 + d
j
2,t, d
j
4,t 1 + d
j
3,t, d
j
4,t 1
⌘
+ 'j2
⇣
dj1,td
j
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j
1,td
j
3,t 1
⌘
+ 'j3
⇣
dj2,td
j
1,t 1 + d
j
3,td
j
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⌘
The labor supply vector djt summarizes the vector of dummies for the choice of
sector djt = {dj1,t, dj2,t, dj3,t, dj4,t} while the vector of part-tme choices for females is
summarized by pft = {pf1,t, pf2,t}. Dis-utility of work in the informal sector and in
self-employment is captured by  j2 and  
j
3. ✓t,k is the unobserved quality of the
matching if they are married. I restrict spouses of the same unobserved types to
form a family, so this parameter is type-specific and evolves dynamically as
✓t,k = ✓t 1,k + ⇠t,k s N(0,⌃k)
Home production will follow a Cobb-Douglas production function depending on
the number of children nt, and I assume that households benefit if spouses spend
more time at home. Additionally, I assume that self-employment can have an ad-
ditional eﬀect in home production as this type of labor gives more time flexibility
to invest in home activities that can be combined with market production. The log
linear household good production function is
Qjt = (1 + nt)
 1(1 + dj4,t)
 2+ 3n(1 + dj3,t)
 4+ 5n(1 + pft )
 5+ 6n
For married couples the production function, I assume that male and female
times invested in home production are perfectly substitutable.
Qt = (1 + nt)
 1(1 + dm4,t + d
f
4,t)
 2+ 3n(1 + dm3,t + d
f
3,t)
 4+ 5n(1 + pft )
 5+ 6n
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where I do not assume that males and females labor supply are perfectly sustitutable
in the production function of home output.
Finally, assume that two-earners households cooperate so their preferences are
defined by
Ut,k(c
m
t , c
f
t , d
m
t , d
f
t , p
f
t , Qt,k, ✓t,k) =  t⇤Umt (cmt , dmt , Qt, ✓t,k)+(1  t)⇤U ft (cft , dft , pft , Qt, ✓t,k)
where I assume that partners of the same type can marry and where  t is the pareto
weight, determined endogenously as explained below.
Incomes and Human Capital Accumulation
Family incomes are the sum of labor and non-labor incomes, discounting taxes and
contributions. Labor incomes are driven by labor supply choices and the accumu-
lated vector of skills of each household earner. I depart from a purely competi-
tive market approach, so individuals receive job oﬀers with stochastic arrival rates.
This means that in every period with probability 1 individuals can work in self-
employment activities if they want to, but job oﬀers from the formal salaried and
the informal salaried sectors arrive with certain probability which is determined
exogenously to the model. I make these probabilities depend on age, education,
gender, and the accumulated sector-specific experience. Thus
⇤ja,t(t
j, Edj) for a = {1, 2}
Wages associated to a job oﬀer are a function of the skill production function
Hja,t,k and skill rental prices ra,t. Skill functions vary by sector reflecting the existence
of diﬀerent production functions across sectors, where marginal productivities of
each skill component, experience kjt , education Edj and abilities µk, can diﬀer in
each sector a. Unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated into the skill function to
capture self-selection into jobs based on sector-specific comparative advantage.
W ja,t,k = r
j
a,tH
j
a,t,k = r
j
a,tf(Ed
j, kjt , µk)
Given a functional form for the skill function, the sector-specific log wage oﬀer
is defined by
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lnW ja,t,k = ↵
j
a,0,kµk + ↵
j
a,1Ed
j + ↵ja,2ln(1 + k
j
t ) + ✏
j
a,t
✏a,t ⇠ N(0,⌃)
where the idiosyncratic productivity shock ✏ja,t is assumed to be iid and serially
uncorrelated.
Each household pays taxes according to the level of assets and labor incomes.
Single-earner households face a tax function T j(At,W j1,t,k, d
j
1,t, p
f
1,t), where A
j
t is as-
sets, while double-earners households pay taxes according to T (At,Wm1,t,k,W
f
1,t,k, d
m
1,t, d
f
1,t, p
f
1,t).
Moreover, single and married households are eligible to observed transfer benefits
like unemployment benefit or employment subsidies which can be conditional to
marital status, the number of children at home and to the labor supply status.
They are denoted by Bj(nt,mt, djt).
Therefore, single-earners household incomes are then defined by
yjt =
A 1X
a=1
(1   dj1,t)W ja,t,kdja,tpja,t +Bj(nt, djt)  T jt
while double-earners household incomes are
yt =
X
j={m,f}
(
A 1X
a=1
(1   dj1,t)W ja,t,kdja,tpja,t
)
+B(nt,mt, d
m
t , d
f
t )  Tt
where pensions contributions paid over formal salaried wages are captured by   =
10%.
Wealth and Pensions
Family assets evolve according to standard budget constraints. However, as individ-
uals can get married along the way and each of them carry her/his own accumulated
assets, I assume that after marriage household assets are just the sum of the assets of
each of the partners. As an example, the budget constraint for married households
is
At+1 = (1 + rt)(At   cmt   cft + yt)
With regard to pensions, these are always gender-specific and evolve according
to the monthly contributions paid every time individuals work as formal salaried
and the earned return each period rp , plus additional transfers ⌧ j(nt,mt) reflecting
the generosity of the pension system which may depend on the number of children
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nt and the marital status mt.
P jt =  W
j
1,t,k(d
j
1,t = 1)p
j
t(1 + r
p)t + ⌧ j(nt,mt)
Children
The dynamics of fertility is determined by stochastic processes estimated outside of
the model and incorporated exogenously. In particular, the probability of having
children will be a function of the number of kids the year before, the marital status,
the education and the age and labor status of the female in the previous period.
⇡Nt = ⇡
N(Edmt , Ed
f , tf ,mt, nt 1, d
f
a,t 1)
5.2.4 Recursive Formulation
The State Space
The state space for single households includes assets, the accumulated pension ac-
count, education, experience, the unobserved type, marital status, and the number
of children.
⌦jt = {Ajt , P jt , Edj, kjt , µk,mjt , njt}
The state space for married households includes in addition the education, pension
account and experience for both spouses, the matching quality and the bargaining
power with which spouses enter in period t.
⌦t = {At, Pmt , P ft , Edmt , Edft , kmt , kft , µk, nt,mt, ✓t,k, t}
Value Functions
Single and married individuals observe the shocks to wages and to utility costs
before taking decisions. Individuals can enter period t single or married and they
decide whether or not to continue in the same marital status. To do so, it’s useful
to defining the value function of staying single V j,St (⌦
j
t) by
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AjT+1 > 0
In a similar way, the value of getting divorced after marriage V j,Dt (⌦
j
t) is defined
by
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j
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AjT+1 > 0
where EV j,St+1,k(⌦t+1|⌦t) is the expected value of entering period t + 1 single. Two
modifications follow from the previous case. First, divorced households must pay a
utiliy cost of divorce Djt . And second, household assets are splitted between spouses
according to the endogenous pareto weights.
To determine the individual value of staying married, I first define the problem of
married households optimally deciding savings and labor supply denoted by
z⇤t = {st, dma,t, dfa,t, pma,t, pfa,t} according to the following problem
Max
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f
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where the first four constraints are the standard constraints for a collective model,
while the last two constraints define participation constraints to stay in marriage
and will be explained below.
Pareto Weights
Under this formulation,  t is defined as the pareto weight established optimally at
the beginning of the marriage contract such that each of the spouses share equally
the gains from marriage.
However, in further periods spouses can renegotiate this initial weight so that
marriage continues and the participation constrain above holds for both spouses.
Denoting  t the acumulated deviation from the initial bargaining power, spouses
enter period t with pareto weights  t +  t.
To complete the description of the evolution of pareto weights, Ligon, Thomas,
and Worrall (2002) show that in an optimal solution, Pareto weights can be increased
by a social planner so that if the participation constraints binds for one of the
spouses, the weight can be increased for the individual for that spouse so that it’s
still convenient for him/her to stay in marriage. In practice, definining  jt as the
Lagrange Multiplier of the participation constraint above, the deviations from the
initial weights evolve so that spouses remain in marriage as
 jt+1 =  
j
t +  
j
t
and each spouse value function of marriage can be described by
V j,Mt (⌦
j
t) = U
,j
t,k(c
j⇤
t , d
j⇤
a,t, p
j⇤
a,t| jt +  jt) +  
h
EV j,Mt+1, (⌦t+1| jt +  jt)
i
Instead, if pareto weights cannot be adjusted, then spouses leave marriage and
their value function is V j,Dt,k (⌦
j
t).
Decisions
Individuals entering period t single can meet a potential partner with probability
⇡Mt , which is drawn from a distribution of assets, education and incomes for the two
partners
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⇡Mt = ⇡
M(Amt , A
f
t , Ed
m
t , Ed
f , ymt , y
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t )
Each of these single-earner households decide whether to marry or not by comparing
V j,Mt (⌦
j
t) and V
j,S
t (⌦
j
t), where the former is evaluated without including participa-
tion constraints.
Individuals entering period tmarried compare the value of staying married taking
into consideration the participation constraints and the updated pareto weights,
against the value of getting divorced, which accounts for utility costs of divorce and
asset distribution upon separation.
Expected Value functions
The individual Expected Value Functions after deciding marital status incorporate
the probability of receving job oﬀers and can be expressed as
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The two-earner Expected Value Function is defined similarly but accounting for
sixteen combinations of family arrival jobs from the formal and the informal sector
for the two spouses. and so on for all the possible combinations.
5.3 Final Comments
The state of the art in the understanding of the structure of labor markets in devel-
oping countries has for long been focused for on the study of partial incentives to
labor participation like comparative advantage or the welfare system. Up to now,
there is not such a study that attempts to put all the incentives together and that is
able to provide answers from a life-cycle perspective and for diﬀerent types of house-
holds. The model presented in this chapter undertakes that challenge and intends to
apply the framework from the most advanced available models in labor economics
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to serve the design of optimal labor and educational policies in the long-term. This
is of course still work in progress, but I show it in here to present what will certainly
be the central line of my research agenda over the next few years.
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Data descriptives
Figure A.1 Informality rates controling by cohort eﬀects.
Figure A.2 Informality rates by schooling females
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Figure A.3 Informality rates by schooling
Figure A.4: Wages by education, three sectors: Salaried Formal, Salaried Informal
and Self-employed.
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Montecarlo Simulations Identification Exercise
Group Parameters ✓o ✓1 ✓ˆ ✓1 ✓o✓o
✓ˆ ✓o
✓o
Psychic costs to schooling  HS1,k=1 1 1.200 1.021 20.0% 2.1%
 Col1,k=1 1 0.800 1.022 -20.0% 2.2%
 HS1,k=2 1.1 1.320 1.086 20.0% -1.3%
 Col1,k=2 0.9 0.720 0.922 -20.0% 2.4%
Returns to Ability ↵F0,k=1 8.189 9.827 7.951 20.0% -2.9%
↵I0,k=1 8.007 6.406 8.089 -20.0% 1.0%
↵F0,k=2 8.089 9.707 8.109 20.0% 0.2%
↵I0,k=2 8.107 6.486 7.973 -20.0% -1.7%
Returns to High School ↵F1 0.326 0.391 0.330 20.0% 1.1%
↵I1 0.362 0.290 0.354 -20.0% -2.3%
Returns to College ↵F2 1.307 1.568 1.294 20.0% -1.0%
↵I2 1.208 0.966 1.190 -20.0% -1.5%
Returns to Experience
same sector
↵F3 0.2 0.240 0.203 20.0% 1.5%
↵I3 0.1 0.080 0.102 -20.0% 1.6%
Cross-sector returns to exp. ↵F4 -0.1 -0.120 -0.1016 20.0% 1.6%
↵I4 0.1 0.080 0.101 -20.0% 0.8%
VCV wages  FI 0.3 0.360 0.350 20.0% 16.8%
 2F 0.7 0.560 0.689 -20.0% -1.6%
 2I 0.7 0.840 0.716 20.0% 2.3%
Tuition Costs Valuation  HS2 1 0.800 0.978 -20.0% -2.2%
 Col2 1 1.200 1.019 20.0% 1.9%
Wage Valuation Informal  I2 0.7 0.560 0.687 -20.0% -1.8%
Table A1: Montecarlo simulations estimation exercise
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The eﬀects of extending the tax reduction to formal workers
to the age of 40
Age HS Col
Total Sample 1.3% 0.5%
Type 1 (low) 1.5% 0.6%
Type 2 (high) 2.5% -0.2%
Table A2: Extension of tax reduction to age 40 and schooling
Total Sample Type 1 Type 2
Extension LHS HS Col LHS HS Col LHS HS Col
14-17 -2.3% -2.2% -6.8%
18-22 -3.1% -3.1% -3.1% -2.9% -9.0% -2.1%
23-26 -3.1% -3.2% -2.0% -3.1% -3.0% -2.3% -5.6% -1.0% -1.4%
27-30 -2.8% -2.4% -1.7% -3.0% -2.2% -1.8% -2.9% -0.8% -0.4%
31-35 -2.0% -1.7% -2.1% -2.2% -1.5% -2.4% -2.3% -0.7% -0.5%
36-40 -1.9% -1.6% -1.9% -2.2% -1.4% -2.2% -2.1% -0.7% -0.4%
41-45 -1.4% -1.2% -1.7% -1.6% -1.1% -2.1% -1.5% -0.4% -0.1%
46-50 -0.8% -0.7% -1.5% -1.0% -0.7% -1.8% -0.1% -0.2% 0.0%
51-55 -0.5% -0.3% -1.2% -0.7% -0.2% -1.5% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
>55 -0.4% -0.3% -0.7% -0.6% -0.2% -0.8% -0.2% -0.1% 0.1%
Table A3: Extension of tax reduction to age 40 and informality
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